Iraq

Mine Ban Policy

The Republic of Iraq acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty on 15 August 2007, becoming a State Party on 1 February 2008.^[1] Iraq’s treaty deadline for destruction of all stockpiled antipersonnel mines is 1 February 2012, and its deadline for destruction of all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control is 1 February 2018.

Iraq submitted its initial Article 7 report on 25 August 2008, covering the period until 31 July 2008.^[2] In June, Iraq told States Parties, “A draft transparency report was recently submitted by the Iraqi Ministry of Defense through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and permanent mission of Iraq in Geneva. This report was an unverified draft and should be disregarded. The Iraqi delegation wishes to clarify that the Government of Iraq has entrusted the responsibilities related to the follow-up on the Ottawa Convention and Mine Action in general to the Ministry of Environment. The Article 7 report is currently being processed and compiled at [the Ministry of Environment]…and efforts are being made to submit this report in time by end of July 2008.”^[3]

In its initial report, Iraq did not cite any national legal measures yet undertaken to implement the treaty, as required by Article 9, other than the legal framework for mine action. It is not known if new national implementation legislation, including penal sanctions, is being pursued or if existing laws are considered adequate.

Representatives of the Ministry of Environment and Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Director General of the National Demining Committee, and the Director of the Kurdistan Regional Government Foundation for Landmine Affairs attended as observers the Mine Ban Treaty’s Eighth Meeting of States Parties in November 2007 in Jordan. Iraq made interventions on mine clearance and sustainability of resources.

Representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Director General of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) attended the treaty’s intersessional Standing Committee meetings in Geneva in June 2008.

Iraq has not yet made its views known on matters of interpretation and implementation related to Articles 1, 2 and 3 that have been widely discussed by other States Parties. These issues include joint military operations with states not party to the treaty, foreign stockpiling and transit of antipersonnel mines, antivehicle mines with sensitive fuzes or antihandling devices, and the permissible number of mines retained for training.

Iraq is not party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons. It attended as an observer the Dublin Diplomatic Conference on Cluster Munitions in May 2008.

Production, Transfer and Stockpiling

Iraq produced antipersonnel mines in the past, including in the period leading up to the 2003 invasion. All mine production facilities were apparently destroyed in the Coalition bombing campaign.^[4] In its initial transparency report, Iraq reported that the Al Qaqa Factory, that “produced anti-personnel mines and anti-tank mines before the 2003 war…has been completely destroyed during the 2003 war and there is no intention from the side of the Iraqi Government to reconstruct this facility.”^[5] Landmine Monitor is not aware of any mine transfers from Iraq since the 1990s.

Iraq’s Article 7 report states, “As reported by the different ministries and other role players, Iraq holds no stockpiles of Anti-Personnel Mines. However, this matter will be further investigated and if required, corrected in the next report.”^[6] It also states, “If such stockpiled APMs are identified during further investigation of the matter, appropriate plans will be developed for the destruction of such and it will be reported in the next Article 7 Report.”^[7] Thus, it remains uncertain if Iraq has stockpiled antipersonnel mines that must be destroyed within the four year treaty deadline.

Landmine Monitor has previously noted that Iraq was believed to stockpile, at some point, mines manufactured by Belgium, Canada, Chile, China, Egypt, France, Italy, Romania, Singapore, the former Soviet Union, and the United States, in addition to Iraqi-manufactured mines.^[8]

Iraqi government and Coalition forces continue to find antipersonnel mines in arms caches across the country. From February to April 2008, Coalition soldiers discovered weapons caches that included at least 13 mines.^[9] It was reported in July 2008 that during “Operation Peace” (which began in May 2008) in the Sadr City district of Baghdad, the Iraqi Army had recovered 230 weapons caches, including 120 antivehicle mines and one antipersonnel mine.^[10] In July 2008, 315 mines of different sizes and types were seized along with many other weapons during Operation Bashaer al-Salam in Maysan governorate on the border with Iran.^[11] Also, a total of 32 Claymore mines were reportedly seized from 1 July 2007 to 31 July 2008.^[12]

Many insurgent groups in Iraq are expert in the manufacture and use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs). In March 2007, a US Navy officer was quoted in the media as stating that 15% of the IEDs in Iraq are made from explosives harvested from minefields on the Iran-Iraq border. In the same report, US military officers were quoted as saying that, due to economic hardship, shepherds dig up mines and sell them to the insurgents. Reportedly, the mines were laid by Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War of 1980–1988.^[13]

On 1 September 2008, Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) destroyed 392 antipersonnel mines belonging to the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan (PDKI), in Koya, northern Iraq.^[14] The PDKI turned over 395 mines; NPA kept three for training purposes.^[15] The mines destroyed included Chinese, Italian, Russian, and US designs. NPA staff indicated to the NGO Geneva Call that the mines were new and had not been lifted from existing minefields.^[16]

Mines retained for research and training

In its initial Article 7 report, Iraq indicated it was retaining 1,234 antipersonnel mines for training and development purposes. This includes nine held by the Ministry of the Interior, 487 by the Iraqi Kurdistan Mine Action Agency (IKMAA) which are described as “only explosives, no detonator,” and 738 by Mines Advisory Group (MAG). The MAG mines are “for training and as targets during clearance operations and possible use as donor charges.”^[17]

Iraq also reported mines transferred for training purposes in the Kurdistan region, including 118 by IKMAA, which are described as “Free From Explosives (FFE), Used for training,” and 208 by MAG, with this notation, “All the mines are buried without fuzes in the Mine Detection Dog (MDD) training and accreditation area at Chamchamal in the Sulaymaniyah Governorate.”^[18]

Use

In the ongoing armed conflict, there have been no reports of new mine-laying by Iraqi government military forces. There have also been no confirmed reports of use of antipersonnel mines by any Coalition forces. Most members of the Coalition, although not the US, are party to the Mine Ban Treaty which prohibits them from using antipersonnel mines in any circumstances, as well as from assisting in any way with the use, production, stockpiling, or transfer of antipersonnel mines.

Non-state armed groups

Despite documented cases of discoveries and seizures of antipersonnel mines in this reporting period (since May 2007), few instances appear to have involved new use of antipersonnel mines. A UN official told Landmine Monitor in March 2008 that there are very few incidents of mine use by insurgents, and that most cases have been antivehicle mines. He said in 2007 mine use was focused on the capital, Baghdad, and in al-Anbar governorate, but in 2008 it was moving northward to Diyala, Mosul, and Salah ad Din governorates.^[19]

On 13 July 2007, a US soldier died of wounds sustained “from a land mine detonation during a dismounted patrol in Jisr Diyala.”^[20] On 14 July 2007, a “landmine” killed a soldier from Task Force Marne during a dismounted patrol in Baghdad.^[21] On 2 April 2008, an Iraqi reporter was injured “in a landmine explosion” in the Talbiyah district of east Baghdad.^[22]

In May 2008, it was reported that after the truce between the Shiite Unified Iraqi Coalition and the al-Mahdi army of Muqtada al-Sadr, residents said militia began removing landmines from Sadr City, which had been laid to prevent US and Iraqi forces from entering the area.^[23]

The use of various types of booby-traps has been reported. Explosive booby-traps that are victim-activated are also prohibited by the Mine Ban Treaty. In July 2008, the Iraqi army defused a booby-trapped car in al-Amil and a booby-trapped motorcycle in al-Sabi Ashar Min Tamuz, both in Mosul City.^[24]

Insurgent forces have used IEDs in great numbers. In 2007, the UN registered 12,896 IED incidents.^[25] An IED that is victim-activated—one that explodes from the contact of a person—is considered an antipersonnel mine and prohibited under the Mine Ban Treaty. An IED that is command-detonated—where the user decides when to explode it—is not prohibited by the treaty. Command-detonated bombs and IEDs have been commonly reported in the media, frequently referred to as “landmines.”

In August 2007, the US military reported that the number of incidents involving “house bombs” (officially called “house-borne improvised explosive devices”) had risen dramatically across Iraq in recent months, and noted that the bombs were set off by a variety of means, including remote control, but also tripwires and pressure plates. “Bombs” set off by tripwires and pressure plates are antipersonnel mines as defined by the Mine Ban Treaty. In one incident, on 11 August 2007, a soldier stepped on a pressure plate and detonated an estimated 30 pounds (13.6kg) of explosives hidden under a stairwell, killing five troops and injuring three others. The US military attributes the house bombs to al-Qaeda in Iraqi forces.^[26]

Between 1 January and 1 July 2008, 104 US military personnel died as the result of IED attacks in Iraq. In 2007, 475 US military personnel were killed by IEDs, an increase from 2006 when 373 were killed.^[27] IEDs have also caused numerous civilian casualties.

Landmine/ERW Problem

Iraq is one of the countries most severely affected by landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW), the result of internal conflicts, the 1980–1988 war with Iran, the 1991 Gulf War (first Gulf War), and the conflict that has continued since the 2003 invasion by the US-led Coalition. Since then, almost daily attacks with car bombs or other IEDs on civilians, the military, and the police indicate the huge amounts of abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO) left unsecured after the overthrow of the Saddam Hussein regime and subsequently plundered, assisting ongoing insurgencies.^[28]

The Iraq Landmine Impact Survey (ILIS), implemented by the Information Management and Mine Action Programs (iMMAP), formerly part of the Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation (now renamed Veterans for America, VFA) in 13 of Iraq’s 18 governorates in 2004–2006 found 1,622 communities affected by 3,673 suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) covering 1,730km² of land.^[29]

Border minefields alone have been estimated by one source to total 6,370km².^[30] Iraq’s initial Article 7 report states that Iraqi forces emplaced more than 18 million mines on the border with Iran during the Iran-Iraq war and another 1 million mines ahead of both the first Gulf War and the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq.^[31]

Types of contamination and impact vary significantly between regions. The northern Kurdish governorates of Dahuk, Erbil, and Sulaymaniyah comprise one of the world’s most heavily mine-contaminated areas, particularly along borders with Iran and Turkey and along the Green Line—the former frontline between Kurdish forces and Saddam Hussein’s army. All three governorates also suffer from unexploded ordnance (UXO) contamination.^[32] For Dahuk and Erbil, as of April 2008 IKMAA, formerly the Iraqi Kurdistan Mine Action Center (IKMAC), was not able to establish exactly how many of the mined areas have been cleared by other organizations and how many remain. A clean-up of its database, started in 2007, was still underway.^[33]

South central Iraq is particularly affected by (cluster) submunitions and unexploded air and ground ordnance. More than 54 million submunitions were recorded used during the first Gulf War; although the exact failure is not known, there could be many million unexploded submunitions from that war alone.^[34] The 2003 invasion resulted in extensive further contamination along the routes followed in the advance on Baghdad.

Other governorates bordering Iran also have minefields dating from the 1980–1988 war and some newer mines were laid by Saddam Hussein’s army on the border with Saudi Arabia before the 2003 invasion in al-Muthanna governorate. However, many villages in these areas are abandoned.

Affected communities are mostly rural, agricultural, and small. According to the ILIS, “The type of resource to which landmines and UXO block access are chiefly pasture and crop land, as well as in the north, scrubland used for firewood collection. In the south, irrigated farmland is an important asset type impacted by the contamination.”^[35] High-impacted communities make up 4% of those affected.^[36]

Mine Action Program

Coordination and management

Iraq’s National Mine Action Authority (NMAA), created by the US-led Coalition Provisional Authority in the Ministry of Planning in 2003, had become largely inactive by 2007 as a result of political turmoil and insecurity.^[37] The NMAA remained as an organization under the Ministry of Planning and Development Cooperation until 1 April 2008 when the Ministry of Environment assumed responsibility for mine action within the government.^[38]

The new structure proposed for mine action, which was under consideration by the government as of June 2008, included an interministerial Higher Committee for Mine Action to oversee mine action policy. The NMAA would become the Iraq General Directorate for Mine Action, responsible for regulating and coordinating mine action, setting policy, strategic planning, and maintaining a national database. Under the directorate, the proposal envisaged an unspecified number of regional mine action centers (RMACs).^[39]

The Ministry of Environment was due to select a director general for mine action in 2008. It was also reviewing the credentials of 36 staff from the former NMAA and in April 2008, received authorization to employ up to 1,000 staff for field operations.^[40] The NMAA installed an Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database in 2003, but since the departure in 2005 of a technical advisor provided by VFA, almost no data entry has occurred, except for data from the ILIS. Operators manage their own data.^[41]

The NMAA was originally set up with two RMACs—in Baghdad and Basra—with responsibility for coordinating mine action activities, and collecting and analyzing data; as well, there were two mine action centers in the Kurdistan region (IKMAA and General Directorate for Mine Action, GDMA). In 2007, only one RMAC still existed, in the south based in Basra, covering the governorates of al-Muthanna, Basra, Maysan, and Thi Qar, but due to lack of capacity and security issues it was not operational.^[42]

In 2004, the KRG assumed responsibility for mine action in the three northern governorates of Dahuk, Erbil, and Sulaymaniyah. KRG mine action is managed through IKMAA, which is responsible for Dahuk and Erbil and operates with its own demining teams, and through the GDMA, which is responsible for Sulaymaniyah, and part of Kirkuk and Diyala governorates, and contracts clearance work to commercial companies.^[43]

The KRG passed a law merging IKMAA and the GDMA in April 2007 but the merger had not taken place as of June 2008, although there is coordination and cooperation.^[44] IKMAA and the GDMA operate under the authority of the KRG from which they receive their budgets.^[45] IKMAA’s expenditure for 2007 was around ID4 billion (US$3.3 million).^[46]

The NMAA’s relationship with the Kurdish mine action centers was weak in 2007, but relations improved after the NMAA moved to the Ministry of Environment. The minister, a Kurd, has supported greater involvement of IKMAA and the GDMA in mine action nationwide.^[47] In 2008, for example, IKMAA and the GDMA provided training and technical support for mine action in the center and south of Iraq.^[48]

The UN Office for Project Services (UNOPS) supports IKMAA with a project providing mechanical and manual mine clearance equipment, training on explosive ordnance disposal (EOD), and IMSMA.^[49]

The UN Development Programme (UNDP) has provided institutional and local capacity development support to the NMAA and RMACs since 2003 through international advisors based in Amman, Jordan, who made frequent visits to Iraq. Since March 2006, UNDP has deployed a national advisor to northern Iraq to support IKMAA and the GDMA. UNDP also contracted national advisors to support the NMAA in Baghdad and RMAC South in Basra. The US commercial clearance company RONCO provided technical support to RMAC South until July 2007, when its advisor moved to Baghdad and it has since ended its support.^[50]

Data from operations in the Kurdish governorates is entered into the IKMAA and GDMA databases. UNDP supports database development through an advisor for information management provided by the Swedish government, based in Amman from April 2007, and the support was due to last until the end of 2008.^[51] Another advisor from iMMAP was based in Erbil working on cleaning up the database. In the south, no database development has occurred since 2005.^[52] The Ministry of Environment planned to locate the database temporarily in the offices of Danish Demining Group (DDG) until the RMAC had the capacity to operate it.^[53]

No coordination or sharing of data has occurred with Coalition forces, the Iraqi army, or police.^[54]

National mine action legislation and standards

The NMAA drafted concept legislation intended to provide a legal framework for mine action and submitted it to the Minister of Planning in 2005. In early 2007, the government’s legal committee rejected the draft law saying that the functions described in it belonged to the Ministry of Defense. Completely new legislation will now be drafted under the Ministry of Environment.^[55] UNDP assisted the Ministry of Environment to draft a decree regulating mine action in Iraq. As of August 2008, it had not been approved by the government. ^[56]

The NMAA also drafted 29 national standards based on the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) in 2006, which were also awaiting ministerial approval. None has been approved to date. This matter will also be taken up as part of the development of the NMAA.^[57]

As of early 2008, the NMAA was conducting desk accreditation of mine action operators. However, the process had not been formalized and approved at a higher level and will receive new attention under the Ministry of Environment.^[58]

IKMAA accredits demining organizations intending to work in Erbil and Dahuk. During 2007, two international demining organizations were accredited: RUMITAL Company (a Croatian demining company) and RONCO.^[59] The GDMA also accredits organizations in its operating area. NPA and MAG are accredited by the GDMA and MAG was also in the process of being accredited by IKMAA.^[60]

Strategic mine action planning

In 2007, Iraq’s previous plans, including the 2006 national mine action plan known as Vision 2020,^[61] were abandoned and mine action proceeded without any strategic plan. UNDP believed but could not confirm that the NMAA had a budget of $15 million (approximately €11 million) in 2007.^[62] UNDP’s priority in 2008 was supporting the establishment of a new mine action structure and the institutional capacity of the NMAA. Planning would only be possible once this was in place. UNDP estimated that it would take around two years before the structure was fully functional, but also believed that work on a new strategic plan would begin before the end of 2008.^[63]

Minister of Environment Narmin Othman was reported by the press in February 2008 as saying “Iraq is planning a huge mine clearance operation in a bid to rid itself of some 2.5 million unexploded mines in some 4,000 minefields.” She also reportedly said that a detailed report on mine clearance plans would be presented to the government by September 2008.^[64]

Integration of mine action with reconstruction and development

Iraq’s initial Article 7 report observes that “due to the fact that the mines and ERW situation in Iraq was not included under the priorities of government for reconstruction and development, mine action does not enjoy the full attention required in the Iraqi National Development Strategy.”^[65]

In the north, the GDMA reported that 70% of its projects were linked to reconstruction and development and it received funding from the KRG for clearance related to its development plans.^[66] Most mine clearance in IKMAA’s area was based on KRG priorities supporting development and reconstruction, including oil exploration, water projects, powerlines, and farming. In 2007, MAG activities supported reconstruction in the area, including for a bridge linking Mosul and Dohuk governorates, and houses for internally displaced persons (IDP) resettlement.^[67]

As of April 2008, IKMAA demining teams were supporting DNO Company, which was searching for oil in Dahuk governorate. In 2007, a team cleared one minefield of more than 5,000m² in the vicinity of an asphalt company in Dahuk/Zawita. Another minefield encompassing 14,500m² was cleared to support a proposed highway from Derabun to Dargali south of Zakho in Dahuk governorate.^[68]

However, in the rest of Iraq mine action in 2007 was not integrated into reconstruction and development. Several large development projects ground to a halt as government departments failed to provide for mine/ERW clearance in their planning. Iraq has reported that the Rumailah oil fields, among the country’s biggest reserves, cannot be exploited because of mines and that similar problems obstruct rehabilitation of Iraq’s electricity network, roads, and railways.^[69]

Some government ministries and enterprises, including the Ministry of Transport and Iraq Republic Railways Company, sought advice on clearance from the NMAA in 2007 and this was provided with the support of UNDP. Commercial companies are reported to have conducted some clearance in support of reconstruction and development projects, but the activity was not coordinated or recorded by the NMAA.^[70]

Demining

Demining in Iraq is conducted by international forces and the national military, three international NGOs, commercial demining operators, and the IKMAA.^[71]

The Iraqi army had 10 divisions, each with one company that conducted mine clearance and EOD. The Iraqi army and police are mainly engaged in spot EOD and IED clearance tasks.^[72] Coalition forces also conduct EOD and IED clearance for force protection purposes.^[73]

In northern Iraq, IKMAA has undergone significant restructuring, cutting its staff from 800 in 2006 to around 340 in July 2007, before adding another 45 deminers in November 2007.^[74] The GDMA operated one manual demining team for small tasks, a general survey team, five technical survey teams, and four mechanical teams.^[75] The GDMA also coordinated and issued contracts for clearance to Kurdish commercial companies, including Ararat, Araz Mahmood Maroof, Asa, Chamy Rezan, and Khabat.^[76]

MAG and NPA coordinate mine clearance and EOD activities with both the GDMA and IKMAA. MAG has been working in Iraq since 1992 and in 2007 operated in Dahuk, Erbil, Kirkuk, Ninawa (Mosul), Salah ad Din, and Sulaymaniyah governorates. MAG deployed 18 mine action teams and four mechanical teams in 2007. It also started operating six small arms and light weapons teams.^[77] NPA has operated in northern Iraq since 1995 and in 2007 worked in the GDMA’s area of responsibility.^[78]

The Iraqi Mine UXO Clearance Organization (IMCO) was set up in 2003 and supported by RONCO. It became financially independent of RONCO in August 2008, receiving funding directly from the US Department of State. However, RONCO was to continue providing IMCO with technical and organizational support through 2009.^[79] In mid-2007, IMCO closed its compound in Basra due to insecurity.^[80]

In southern Iraq, DDG, supported by UNDP and the Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA), conducted mainly battle area clearance (BAC). DDG also trained staff of the national NGO Rafidain Demining Organisation (RDO) to conduct BAC and EOD. DDG and RDO worked in Basra governorate. The RMAC allocated DDG and RDO an area of operation and they then determined the clearance priorities themselves. DDG had community liaison teams working in the area to facilitate task selection and prioritization. DDG have also four teams through DANIDA and Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency funding.^[81]

A new company, Arabian Gulf Mine Clearance Organisation, conducting manual demining and BAC, reportedly carried out small commercial tasks.^[82] These included a project with the Iraqi border police to open a passage between Iraq and Iran involving clearance of 4,150m².^[83]

Identifying hazardous areas

Although there have been several mine/ERW contamination surveys, ILIS was the first comprehensive national survey of mine/ERW contamination. Data collection started in 2004 and ended in April 2006, and the report was published in August 2007. ILIS teams had completed the survey of 13 of Iraq’s 18 governorates, omitting two districts and 346 other communities where access was not possible due to lack of security. Similarly, areas that were abandoned by communities due to mine/ERW contamination were not included in the survey because there was no one to interview.^[84]

ILIS found contamination covering an estimated 1,730km² of land (776km² in the northern region, 12km² around Kirkuk, 87.6km² in the partially surveyed south center, and 854.5km² in the southern region). Although the survey found mine contamination was densest in the north, which had 3,024 (82%) of SHAs, casualties were heaviest in the southern four governorates where most of the contamination was more recent and communities were less aware of the dangers of mines and ERW.^[85]

In the north, IKMAA and the GDMA have conducted technical surveys. The GDMA deployed one general survey team and five technical survey teams in 2007, using them to conduct area reduction before it contracted clearance tasks. In 2007, they prepared 52 minefields for tender (covering a total of 19.4km²), and reduced and cancelled 3.6km².^[86]

IKMAA did not operate any technical survey teams in 2007 but in 2008 was preparing a new procedure to conduct preliminary technical survey of all high- and medium- impacted villages in the Kurdistan region. As of April 2008, details were still under discussion with the GDMA.^[87]

The ministers of defense of Iraq and Iran signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) in June 2008 providing for the removal of mines and the remains of soldiers killed in fighting on their borders during the 1980–1988 war. An Iraqi defense ministry spokesperson said it was only an MoU, “not an agreement.”^[88] Landmine Monitor had received no reports of action to implement a December 2005 MoU between Iraq and Iran to set up a bilateral committee to oversee demining of the border and to provide maps of contaminated areas.^[89]

Mine and ERW clearance in 2007 and 2008

In 2007, a total of 32.7km² were reported demined, including 3.7km² through mine clearance and 25.3km² by BAC, a significant decrease from 2006, when 5.72km² of mined areas and 99.51km² of battle area were cleared. In 2006, DDG reported 94.41km² of BAC, but in 2007, only 12.9km². Operations in 2006 had mostly involved surface clearance and verification, and results included some area reduction through data analysis. Operations in 2007, however, have involved much more time-consuming tasks of sub-surface clearance.^[90]

Clearance in the north of Iraq did not face the same challenges as in the rest of the country. However, in the three governorates of Dahuk, Sulaymaniyah, and Erbil, operators, including the GDMA, IKMAA, MAG, and NPA, cleared 3.7km² in 2007, down from 5km² in 2006.^[91]

As in previous years, little clearance occurred in central and southern Iraq during 2007. In addition to the challenge posed by lack of security, there was a lack of clearance capacity, lack of awareness of what clearance capacity was available, and how to access it.^[92]

Demining in 2007^[93]

* Included BAC.
** Data did not distinguish between antipersonnel and antivehicle mines.

IMCO worked in south Rumailah oil field from January to March 2008 but had to stop due to security problems.^[94]

In 2007, the Ministry of Electricity contracted an unidentified Iranian company to clear a route for powerlines to import electricity from Iran. Work started in June 2007 and as of August the Iranian company had reported clearing 16km and the Iraqi army 12km but the NMAA said it had been unable to conduct quality assurance and had not identified an agency to certify the land as cleared.^[95]

IKMAA is responsible for land release and handover in its area of responsibility. Landowners sign for receipt of cleared land handed over usually at a ceremony also involving local authorities. At the ceremony, IKMAA explains the demining techniques used, the size of the area cleared, the duration of clearance, and the number of mines/UXO found in that specific minefield. IKMAA suspended operations in June and July 2007 while it reviewed its team structure but in the remaining 10 months of 2007 it cleared 20 minefields.^[96] In the GDMA’s area of responsibility, quality control teams check land before it is released to the public.

In the south, DDG quality assured its own operations as well as those of RDO.^[97] IMCO and RONCO similarly conducted their own quality assurance.^[98]

Summary of Efforts to Comply with Article 5

Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, Iraq is required to clear all antipersonnel mines from mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 February 2018. Iraq has financial resources to support a mine action program, but as of mid-2008 Iraq had yet to put in place a structure to mobilize and manage demining resources or prepare a strategy. UNDP believed a clearer outlook for mine action would emerge in 2009 as the new mine action structure took hold and turned attention towards drawing up a mine action strategy.^[99]

Landmine/ERW/IED Casualties^[100]

Iraq’s Article 7 report noted that “there is no reliable information available on mine/ERW victims in most of the country.”^[101] In 2007, Landmine Monitor identified at least 216 mine/ERW/IED casualties in 99 incidents in Iraq, including 101 people killed, 114 injured, and one unknown. Of these casualties, 54 were recorded by the GDMA and IKMAA in Kurdistan region in northern Iraq, mine action operators recorded eight, one victim assistance (VA) operator recorded 13, and the rest were identified through media monitoring. For 2007, IKMAA and the GDMA did not record casualties among security forces or clearance personnel.

The vast majority of casualties were male (135, 63 civilians), 24 female (all civilian) and the gender of 57 was unknown (39 civilians).

Casualties by Device Type ^[102]

Casualties by Status

Civilian Casualties by Age and Gender

* Includes 26 children
* Mainly in northern Iraq.
** Mainly in Basra and Karbala.
***These were demining casualties.

At least 154 of the casualties were Iraqis (109 civilians). Irish, Polish, Turkish, and US nationals were among the foreign casualties.

Among civilian casualties, handling an explosive device was the most common activity (52). Activities included storing it at home, playing and touching; 45 of these casualties were recorded in northern Iraq. Other common activities were tending animals (nine) and farming (five).

DDG had one clearance accident in January 2007, in which one person was killed and one injured, most likely by submunitions.^[103] IMCO recorded two injured clearance personnel in three accidents.^[104]

Most casualties occurred in the governorates of Baghdad (42, mostly security forces), Sulaymaniyah (39, all civilians), Basra (36, mostly civilians), and Dahuk (18, 17 civilians).

The 2007 casualty rate is an increase compared to 2006 when 99 casualties were recorded (54 killed, 29 injured, and 16 unknown). This increase is partly due to the improved casualty data collection in northern Iraq and the increased level of detail in records compiled by the NGO Iraq Body Count. In April 2008, the media reported that there had been 565 UXO casualties in Iraq in 2006, one-quarter of them were under 18.^[105]

Under-reporting is certain, as there is no systematic casualty data collection, particularly in southern and central Iraq. There is inconsistent reporting by information providers; for example, in 2007 the Iraqi Health and Social Care Organization (IHSCO) and MAG were not able to provide casualty data. Also, media do not report on all conflict casualties, usually mentioning only fatal and/or foreign casualties and articles often contained insufficient device type and incident information to be included in casualty totals.

Casualties continued to be reported in 2008 with at least 111 casualties to 19 August (61 killed and 50 injured). Of these the GDMA and IKMAA recorded 51, and the others were identified through media monitoring. At least 45 of the casualties were civilian, three were deminers and 40 were security forces (the status of 23 is unknown). Four casualties were women and 18 were children (seven boys, others unknown). The majority of casualties were Iraqi (96); foreign nationals included 10 US military and one Israeli volunteering in the US Army. The nationality of the deminers was unknown.

One casualty was caused by an antipersonnel mine, 31 by unspecified mines (28 civilians, mostly in northern Iraq), 32 by ERW (no submunitions), and 24 by victim-activated IEDs. All but two of the IED incidents were caused in booby-trapped houses in Diyala governorate, where the US Army launched a military campaign in January 2008. The incidents caused two child casualties and 20 military casualties. At least 15 Iraqi military casualties were caused while defusing ERW. Mine action authorities in northern Iraq stated that there would be an increase in casualties due to drought in the region.^[106]

In February 2008, mine action authorities in northern Iraq stated that there were still five to 10 mine/ERW casualties per month in the region,^[107] indicating 60 to 120 casualties per year (although only 54 were recorded by the authorities in 2007). According to ILIS estimates there would be at least 300 casualties per year in Iraq.^[108] However, the ILIS estimated the casualty rate in areas not covered by IKMAA and GDMA to be many times higher.^[109] In June 2007, Basra health authorities reported that there were one or two ERW casualties per day, or 350–700 casualties per year.^[110] In August 2008, DDG confirmed that they heard through hospitals that “there are quite lot of accidents involving ERW.”^[111]

Data collection

According to UNDP, ILIS is still the most reliable source of casualty data,^[112] but this was incomplete as five governorates were not surveyed. Further, the ILIS does not contain casualty data on casualties from non-contaminated communities,^[113] nomads, or displaced people.^[114] Iraq’s Article 7 report noted that “no reliable system of Injury/Victim Surveillance exists” and that the development of such a system was “curtailed by the possibility of the UN Mine Action Team to provide support to this important aspect.”^[115]

As of August 2008, there was no unified data collection mechanism in Iraq and various government bodies and NGOs continued to collect casualty data in a non-standardized way. In principle, the NMAA is responsible for casualty data management and information-sharing, but this was not the case in 2007–2008, as NMAA’s role continued to be limited to “participating passively in meetings.”^[116] In Iraqi Kurdistan, IKMAA and the GDMA increasingly shared information and they both shared their data with relevant stakeholders.^[117]

It was believed that this situation could improve through the launch of the pilot project to establish a national injury surveillance mechanism using EpiInfo computer software and including information on mine/ERW survivors. The project is a joint cooperation between the World Health Organization (WHO), UNICEF and UNDP with the Ministry of Health as the implementing partner. As of August 2008, the project was close to completion in Baghdad, Basra, and Erbil governorates; results were not available.^[118] However, the project was said to have improved data collection at IKMAA in Erbil.^[119]

In 2007, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) started a casualty data pilot project in Erbil, which included data entry and analysis of information on 3,600 communities visited from 2003–2007.^[120]

UNDP verification and unification of five defunct databases handed over to the NMAA^[121] was ongoing as of August 2008. Verification of casualty data was said to be not a priority, but would become “a more central issue” once there was sufficient capacity at NMAA. Verification of the other parts of the databases was scheduled for completion by the end of 2008.^[122]

There are no complete figures on the number of mine/ERW casualties in Iraq. Landmine Monitor analysis of the five NMAA databases in August 2007 showed there were approximately 21,492 records entered since 2001 (containing casualties occurring before this time).^[123] However, these figures are incomplete, particularly since 2003, as only one database was kept updated in 2004–2005. Most casualties were recorded in Sulaymaniyah governorate (12,573).^[124] Through the media, mine action authorities claimed there were 14,000 mine/ERW casualties in northern Iraq.^[125]

In its Article 7 report, Iraq noted that 5,348 casualties were recorded in Sulaymaniyah (2,427 killed and 2,921 injured); 2,403 in Erbil (855 killed, 1,528 injured, remainder unknown); and 443 in Dahuk (209 killed and 234 injured) between 1991 and March 2008. Nearly 60% of casualties (4,801) were caused by mines.^[126]

The ILIS recorded 577 “recent” casualties (38% killed) and 7,672 “less recent” casualties; detailed information was reported in previous editions of Landmine Monitor.^[127] In 2008, the ILIS started surveying the five remaining governorates and results were expected in April 2009.^[128]

IHSCO recorded 571 mine/ERW casualties in Karbala, Qadisiyah, and Wasit governorates between March 2003 and end 2007 (7% killed and 93% injured); further information was not available.^[129]

There are no reliable statistics on the number of persons with disabilities, but it is estimated that there are between 80,000 and 100,000 amputees, mostly war-disabled.^[130]

Landmine/ERW Risk Education

The ILIS noted that “the significant number of communities whose key informants had a clear recollection of past Mine Risk Education and clearance events…suggests that this response has been active in many of those communities.”^[131] Iraq’s Article 7 report also noted that the decrease of reported mine incidents “indicates (implicitly) that children and other affected community members are progressively practicing the safe behaviours.”^[132]

However, there are significant regional differences, as more mine/ERW risk education (RE) has been carried out in northern Iraq than in other parts of the country, partly due to security reasons and the long-time presence of mines/ERW.^[133] RE coverage in the north is assessed as adequate.^[134] A 2007 assessment by IHSCO in three south central governorates showed that communities had basic awareness of the dangers of mines/ERW, but that in 98% of cases, they had not received direct RE.^[135]

In 2007–2008, communities in all parts of the country remained at risk from mines, ERW, and IEDs. The type and duration of contamination varies regionally, with generally more ERW contamination in southern and central Iraq and more mine contamination along the borders and in northern Iraq. There is no reliable and nationwide casualty data collection to assist priority setting and risk profiling by mine/ERW RE implementers (see above). It was said that generalized messages were used.^[136]

Handicap International (HI) noted that a main outcome of a UNICEF-organized RE stakeholder workshop in November 2007 was that there was: “A clear need for a broader Knowledge, Attitude and Practices (KAP) study in areas of coverage to help the organisations direct their MRE message dissemination.”^[137]

In 2007, RE was primarily conducted throughout Iraq by UNICEF either directly or through partners: IHSCO in the center; IKMAA and the NGO DARASTAN Group for Child and Media in the north; and INTERSOS and DDG in the south. The Ministry of Health^[138] and the Iraqi Red Crescent Society have also conducted RE.^[139]

In 2007, some 310,000 people received RE, according to UNICEF; 2,800 teachers were trained; 200 community volunteers were trained for community liaison and monitoring; and 60,000 different types of materials were distributed.^[140] These figures are a small decrease compared to 2006 when 335,380 people were reached through RE.^[141]

Iraq’s Article 7 report stated that some 1.5 million people in 11 governorates had received RE and nearly 5,000 people had received training to disseminate RE messages between 2003 and 15 June 2008.^[142]

Strategic framework and capacity

In principle, the NMAA is in charge of coordinating and monitoring RE activities but has not been able to do so in 2007–2008 due to continued internal challenges. In Kurdistan region, IKMAA and the GDMA continued to function autonomously.^[143]

In 2007–2008, UNICEF carried out de facto coordination of RE activities with RMACs, government ministries, and NGOs. UNICEF provided financial and technical support including capacity building for stakeholders, coordination of RE activities in schools and communities, RE material development, and direct RE for high-risk populations.^[144]

Mine action plans, notably Vision 2020, are no longer in use and new strategic plans will only be developed once the NMAA’s structure and institutional capacity is established.^[145] The priorities for UNICEF are to build national capacity and continue RE activities, despite security challenges. UNICEF develops annual workplans for RE, which were said to be implemented in 2007.^[146] In 2008, as in previous years, UNICEF planned to focus on NMAA capacity-building, dissemination of standardized RE materials, and support to the injury surveillance project.^[147] UNICEF also supported a planned study tour of other severely mine-affected countries where the government has led mine action efforts and “has successfully implemented community based MRE and victim assistance projects.”^[148]

UNICEF organizes regular coordination meetings and one national strategy meeting per year. In November 2007, the NMAA and IKMAA participated in UNICEF’s annual review of RE activities and contributed to developing the 2008 plan.^[149] In the north, there are regular coordination meetings between the different RE implementers, organized by IKMAA. In Basra, the RMAC organized regular coordination meetings until mid-2007, but ended these pending restructuring of the NMAA. In Baghdad, there were no RE coordination meetings during 2007.^[150] INTERSOS noted that coordination in the south was weak and that there was no monitoring of RE activities. INTERSOS records its RE activities in the IMSMA database stored at DDG, and sends monthly reports to UNICEF.^[151]

National standards developed in 2005 by UNICEF and the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) are used, but UNICEF believes they need to be reviewed once the NMAA’s capacity is sufficient.^[152] Iraq’s initial Article 7 report contained detailed historical information and statistics on RE activities implemented by various organizations.^[153]

No nationwide evaluations were conducted in 2007, but UNICEF tasked IHSCO to conduct an RE survey in three governorates in central Iraq (Karbala, Qadisiyah, and Wasit) because these governorates had received very little RE according to ILIS, little clearance had taken place, and they were home to large displaced populations. Based on the ILIS results (for high- and medium-impacted communities) and its own casualty data, IHSCO surveyed 89 affected communities between September and November 2007, and found most communities were affected by ERW (68); none of the communities were solely mine-affected.^[154]

The survey showed that most people entered dangerous areas for grazing their animals (74%), farming (44%), out of lack of awareness (35%), collecting water (30%) and collecting wood (18%); other reasons were recreation, collecting herbs, hunting, and rescuing an ERW casualty.^[155] Most people did not know they were taking risks (62%), but of those who were aware of the risks, 42% did it for clearance purposes, 25% to sell scrap metal, 22% for recreation, and 19% to extract explosives for fishing. Girls and boys were at equal risk from ERW and, among adults, men were more at risk than women. Interviewees showed basic awareness of the dangers of ERW, but only two communities in Qadisiyah governorate received RE (from Civil Defense). People often left their communities because of conflict but are unaware of the dangers when returning.^[156]

In mid-2008, HI started a KAP survey in northern Iraq (tasked by UNICEF); the results were due to be presented in November 2008.^[157]

In 2006, an evaluation of RE materials developed by all organizations was conducted to analyze gaps in “consistency and accuracy of messages, appropriateness of the messages as per the target group, adequacy to address the problems and safe behaviour.”^[158] Some gaps were identified and changes recommended. In response, in 2007 UNICEF developed a standard messages package for RE implementers.^[159]

Coverage and response

The ILIS reported that the typical casualty was male of productive age killed or injured while tending animals or farming. It noted that the low incidence of tampering and scrap metal collection maybe due to under-reporting (or may have occurred during the primary activities of farming and tending animals).^[160] Non-agricultural land used for foraging for wood and plants was important in the north and in Kirkuk.^[161] People in urban areas in parts of southern Iraq were at risk due to AXO.^[162] The largest casualty group was between 15 and 29-years-old (70% of recent casualties in northern Iraq, 45.9% in the south, and 50% in south-central Iraq).^[163]

In the north, DARASTAN noted that RE activities are unequally distributed as some areas receive RE every three months while others have not been reached at all. It also said that insufficient RE is provided to adolescents and young men.^[164] In the south, INTERSOS noted that RE teams received many requests for clearance but that the needs could not be met.^[165]

In the north, the risk appeared to grow the greater the the size of the population in any given community (and subsequent land/economic pressure) and in the south the risk appears to depend upon how recent the contamination is.^[166] It appears from 2007–2008 casualty data that, at least in the north, casualties due to handling are increasing and that “touching ERW” is the most common high-risk activity.^[167] Implementers noted that people become casualties because they ignore RE messages, because mined areas are not properly marked, and when the displaced or nomads, unaware of the location of mined areas, enter them to tend animals.^[168]

Activities

In northern Iraq, two IKMAA teams provided RE training and community liaison in conjunction with clearance and public information dissemination. Target groups were shepherds, nomads, and children. In March 2007, a child-to-adult approach was introduced and field-tested in two villages between May and December; 68 children participated and results were found to be positive. In 2007, RE teams provided training to 1,229 teachers and 9,046 children in schools and distributed a teacher’s manual on RE in cooperation with the Ministry of Education. In addition, 8,343 people in 103 communities received RE (3,363 men, 2,860 women and 2,120 children) and 302 government staff were trained. Radio and television messages were also broadcast. The RE teams received five community clearance requests; four were responded to and approximately 100 mines and 400 ERW were destroyed.^[169]

In 2007, DARASTAN provided RE in northern Iraq (Sulaymaniyah and Khanaqin governorates) and some limited RE in Baghdad. It focused on school and home-based activities for children. Some 870 children were reached in 2007 and 4,300 received school-based RE in Baghdad in the first six months of 2008. The project ended in May 2008 due to a lack of funding.^[170]

In 2007, MAG conducted direct RE sessions for vulnerable communities as needed, including IDPs from central and southern Iraq. MAG’s work included efforts to develop a sustainable national RE capacity through teacher training, conducted in coordination with the Ministry of Education in the KRG. Community liaison teams conducted evaluations to monitor the impact of RE in schools. Beneficiary statistics were not provided.^[171]

In the south, UNICEF cooperates with the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Youth and Sports for RE in schools and teacher training. Focal points from these ministries received training through INTERSOS and DDG.^[172]

In 2007, INTERSOS provided community-based RE in Basra, Maysan, al-Muthanna, and Thi Qar, including school-based RE and child-to-child approaches. It provided emergency RE to 523 beneficiaries and trained 40 community volunteers. INTERSOS and the volunteers reached 43,664 children and 650 adults. Community clearance requests were passed on to DDG.^[173]

IHSCO provided RE training through its community centers with HI support and started an RE capacity-building project for the Ministry of Education with MAG support.^[174] With financial and technical support from the ICRC, the Iraqi Red Crescent Society provided RE in 15 governorates.^[175]

Victim Assistance

The government of Iraq is unable to cope with the needs of persons with disabilities because of the huge demand for and the scarcity of services.^[176] Many persons with disabilities are only cared for within the family network and 90% of them live below the local poverty line.^[177] The IHSCO RE assessment found that only 4% of survivors interviewed had received assistance.^[178]

Due to the multitude of actors and competing political agendas, coordination between stakeholders is challenging.^[179] Service provision was hampered by targeted attacks on NGOs and international organizations.^[180] Service provision for the approximately 2 million IDPs is even more limited.^[181]

As in previous years, VA was not a high priority in Iraq.^[182] In 2007, it was reported that the main challenges for VA were the lack of a comprehensive approach, insufficient services, and low levels of awareness and capacity.^[183] This appears to be largely unchanged. However, in September 2008, as Landmine Monitor was going to print, Iraq appeared poised to join the “VA25” group of States Parties with significant numbers of mine survivors and “the greatest responsibility to act, but also the greatest needs and expectations for assistance,” making it the VA26.

In northern Iraq, the VA situation is relatively good,^[184] but needs continued support to be sustainable as the regional health ministry is not able to allocate funds sufficient for comprehensive assistance.^[185] The GDMA further noted that services can be considered efficient despite gaps, but that the long-term funding challenge is mainly due to a lack of efficiency and interest from the federal Ministry of Health. Nationally, VA is weak, especially in central and southern Iraq.^[186]

In 2008, the ICRC reported that “The Iraqi health-care system is now in worse shape than ever.”^[187] Despite reconstruction efforts, access to healthcare has steadily decreased since 2003 due to continued damage and looting of health facilities, extreme staff shortages (75% of medical staff have left Iraq), increased demand, the lack of an institutional framework and funding,^[188] reinstatement of service fees, and violations of medical neutrality. This was further hampered by the lack of supplies, materials and even electricity or clean water, as well as unspent health budgets (for 2006 and 2007). Most hospitals are not able to deal with mass casualty situations,^[189] particularly in rural areas where most mine/ERW casualties occur and health professionals “are almost completely absent.”^[190] Providing emergency medical care has become “extremely difficult” in some areas due to checkpoints and curfews.^[191]

IDPs are often not able to receive treatment outside their home area, where they were first registered with the local authorities. ^[192]

For 2007, the ICRC reported that, “both in number and in capacity the [physical rehabilitation] centres are no longer adequate.”^[193] Government or NGO-operated centers are available in major cities, but access is hampered by high transportation costs, the lack of well-trained staff, the quality of services, and security conditions. Nevertheless, the ICRC reported that, except for Baghdad, more people had access to services.^[194] However, many centers need international support and do not operate at full capacity. Services remained more accessible in northern Iraq, where many services are operated by local NGOs with government and international funding.^[195]

War and insecurity have had a major impact on mental health, but psychosocial care is largely non-existent, lacks trained staff, and mental health problems are stigmatized. Some services are provided in general hospitals in the main cities, but no community-based services exist and few people receive support. Some NGOs provide limited services, particularly in northern Iraq.^[196]

Both the British NGO Medact and the ICRC reported that there were limited training opportunities for medical and rehabilitation professionals.^[197] Medical schools struggled to stay open and students “faced many threats to their safety;” those who graduate may not be fully qualified. There also is a great need to train social workers and informal counselors.^[198]

In May 2007, the Ministry of Planning estimated that 43% of Iraqis suffer from “absolute poverty” and that more than 50% of Iraqis are unemployed; many of the unemployed are young men.^[199] Poverty levels in mine/ERW affected areas in southern and south central Iraq are higher than elsewhere.^[200] The Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs operates several educational programs for persons with disabilities, but these lack means.^[201] NGOs also conduct limited programs.^[202] However, it was reported that mine/ERW survivors and other persons with disabilities are not employed in Iraqi government institutions and are not accepted in most schools.^[203]

With support from the World Bank, the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs operates the Social Safety Net program for vulnerable groups, including persons with disabilities. The program assists one million Iraqis.^[204] The government provides benefits to disabled war veterans, but many supplement it with employment.^[205] The KRG also provides disability pensions.^[206]

Iraq has legislation to protect the rights of persons with disabilities, which was said to be enforced in the public sector, but not in the private sector.^[207] However, societal inequality remained.^[208] As of July 2008, a draft disability law, which included pensions, accessibility, employment, and land provision stipulations, was pending in the parliament of the KRG.^[209]

Victim assistance strategic framework

In principle, the NMAA is in charge of coordinating all components of mine action at the national level, including VA, but it has not taken the lead on the issue and very few VA activities have originated from the mine action program.^[210] The primary focus in 2007–2008 was on reorganization of the NMAA and capacity-building.^[211] Iraq’s mine action plans included VA, but the plans are not in use and there is no dedicated VA staff. Coordination between the NMAA and relevant government bodies or NGOs was not in place.^[212]

In northern Iraq, both the GDMA and IKMAA were actively involved in coordinating and monitoring VA activities with support from the national UNDP mine action program specialist and UNICEF. Although the two regional centers have not yet merged, they coordinate regularly. There are no VA strategies pending the complete merger of IKMAA and the GDMA and an operational NMAA. There are VA officers in Sulaymaniyah (GDMA) and, since November 2007, in Erbil and Dahuk (IKMAA). VA activities are carried out in coordination with the regional Ministry of Health, which also allocates funding. Coordination and information-sharing between the KRG, RMACs, and NGOs was good, having improved in 2007. Both the GDMA and IKMAA channel VA funding to relevant stakeholders.^[213] According to IKMAA, the main challenges for VA in northern Iraq in 2007 were a lack of data, insufficient funding for long-term sustainability of rehabilitation centers,^[214] political divisions delaying service provision, and poor staff retention at centers due to low salaries.^[215]

In southern Iraq, RMAC coordination of VA activities halted in 2007 awaiting the reorganization of NMAA.^[216] There does not appear to be coordination between regional and national levels.

At the national level, the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs are mainly responsible for disability issues,^[217] but they lack capacity and have many competing priorities. There is no national disability strategy or coordinating body.^[218]

Activities

Various organizations work on VA-related issues and only those providing updated information for the reporting period have been included. Information about other organizations can be found in previous editions of Landmine Monitor.

Under the Emergency Disability Project (EDP) supported by the World Bank, major reform to the disability sector started in 2008. It included policy development, partnership strengthening, and capacity-building through the establishment of a multi-sectoral disability working group headed by the Ministry of Health, which developed a draft law to establish a national assembly on disability.^[219] The project also financed the renovation/reconstruction and equipment of physical rehabilitation centers; by June 2008 work was underway at seven sites.^[220]

In October 2007, the Center for International Rehabilitation and the Ministry of Health facilitated training in Bosnia and Herzegovina for 110 physiotherapists and rehabilitation center managers who treat conflict-injured as part of the World Bank EDP project. The aim was to improve services at 14 physical rehabilitation centers and create a framework for social inclusion of persons with disabilities.^[221]

VA activities in northern Iraq were boosted by the joint UNDP/WHO project started in August 2007. The $2.6 million project allowed IKMAA and the GDMA to channel funding to the main local service providers, which had been struggling to maintain their activities since they were placed under KRG funding (between 2004 and 2006).^[222]

Within the framework of the project, UNDP focuses on social reintegration and income-generating activities ($1.2 million); WHO supports health and physical/psychological rehabilitation ($1.4 million). The project’s main aim is to build VA capacity and it is anticipated that the KRG will continue to fund the program when UN support finishes.^[223] However, concerns were raised about sustainability after the project ends in 2009.^[224] The Prosthetic Limbs and Rehabilitation Center in Dahuk (PLCD), the Diana Prosthetic Limbs Center (DPLC) in Erbil, and the Kurdish Organization for Rehabilitation of the Disabled (KORD) in Sulaymaniyah provided physical rehabilitation and socio-economic reintegration services under the project. As of June 2008, 6,933 physiotherapy sessions, 2,844 mobility devices, and 1,102 prosthetic and orthotic devices were provided and 49 people started vocational training.^[225] PLCD provided prosthetic devices to 120 survivors in 2007.^[226]

KORD runs two physical rehabilitation centers and three outreach posts in northern Iraq. In 2007, it produced 329 prostheses and 545 orthoses, carried out 1,861 repairs and provided 1,861 physiotherapy sessions for 984 beneficiaries (246 survivors); it supported 54 income-generating projects for 56 direct and 300 indirect beneficiaries. It also translated the UN Convention for the Rights of Persons with Disabilities into Kurdish and distributed 3,000 copies. Despite WHO/UNDP support in late 2007, KORD continued to face financial challenges in 2007.^[227]

The GDMA had records of 3,674 survivors receiving assistance in 2007, and approximately 5,000 persons with disabilities received educational support (these figures include KORD beneficiaries listed above).^[228] In areas of IKMAA responsibility, 4,873 services were provided to survivors from all over Iraq, including 39 survivors injured in 2007. In total, 198 mine/ERW survivors received services for the first time.^[229] IKMAA also started cooperation and coordination with the ICRC.^[230]

In Basra, Rotary International volunteers managing the Iraq Prosthetics Project supported the Basra Prosthetics Center with equipment, training, and materials. In August 2008, the US Department of State Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement provided $1.5 million to the project to assist approximately 5,000 amputees in the area around Basra. Staff from the center also received training from the al-Hussein Society for the Habilitation/Rehabilitation of the Physically Challenged in Amman, Jordan.^[231]

In 2007, the ICRC supported nine rehabilitation centers, the Prosthetics and Orthotics Training School and the al-Salam crutches production unit. It also supported the construction of a rehabilitation center in Fallujah, which started in 2007. The centers received raw materials, technical advice, and transport costs (for the Erbil center only). The ICRC-supported centers assisted 23,202 people, and produced 2,522 prostheses (802 for survivors) and 6,477 orthoses (143 for survivors).^[232] The ICRC also provided medical emergency kits to hospitals in Baghdad to deal with mass casualty situations.^[233] As well, the ICRC undertook emergency distribution of RE materials during fighting in Basra and Sadr City in April 2008.^[234]

There are various disabled people’s organizations (DPOs), particularly in northern Iraq, but they are usually underfunded and receive little government support. Their activities focus on ad hoc awareness-raising but coordination between various DPOs is weak.^[235]

Several non-Iraqi Islamic organizations, as well as Islamic political parties and religious organizations, including mosques, also provide assistance.^[236]

Support for Mine Action

Landmine Monitor is not aware of any long-term comprehensive cost estimates for meeting mine action needs (including RE and VA) in Iraq. The NMAA, within the Ministry of Environment, has official responsibility for mine action throughout Iraq, including strategic planning, budgeting and donor relations.^[237] The KRG exercises responsibility for mine action in the three northern governorates of Dahuk, Erbil, and Sulaymaniyah, including allocation of budgets to IKMAA and the GDMA, which plan mine action programming independently from the NMAA.^[238]

National support for mine action

UNDP estimated Iraq’s national mine action budget in 2007 to be $15 million (€10,940,121).^[239] Landmine Monitor did not report national funding in 2006. Based on available resources in Iraq and the rising value of oil, UNDP has stated that Iraq has the necessary funds, given adequate organization, to meet its Article 5 obligations.^[240]

The KRG Ministry of Finance allocated funds totaling IQD4 billion ($3.2 million) to IKMAA in 2007. The GDMA did not report total funding for 2007.^[241]

In April 2008, the Iraqi government announced the creation of 2,000 new mine clearance jobs to support mine and UXO clearance throughout Iraq. Each mine clearance contractor was reported to receive a salary of IQD200,000 ($160) per month, consisting of IQD150,000 in basic pay and IQD50,000 in risk allowances.^[242] The total annual cost of salaries for the newly created positions, based on the above, will be IQD4.8 billion (approximately $3.84 million). The government did not report whether salaries or related expenses would be covered by national or international funds.

International cooperation and assistance

In 2007, 13 countries reported providing $37,279,571 (€27,189,535) to mine action in Iraq. Reported mine action funding in 2007 was approximately 6% more than reported in 2006. Reported annual international funding has decreased from a high of $58.7 million in 2004. As Iraq’s stockpile of antipersonnel mines and number of mine survivors remain unknown, and because there is no long-term mine action strategy in place, it is not possible to measure funding at 2007 levels against mine action needs.

As of mid-2007, the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) reported that in 2007 the UN had taken “extra caution” in planning annual programs due to the limited availability of funds, but did not report significant shortfalls or negative impacts on programming. UNMAS noted a trend in Iraq to link mine action with other development projects, such as agricultural development in southern Iraq.^[243]

2007 International Mine Action Funding to Iraq: Monetary^[244]

2007 International Mine Action Support to Iraq: In-Kind^[245]