Lebanon

Mine Ban Policy

The Republic of Lebanon has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty. Positive movement toward the accession to treaty in 2005 was set back by the 2006 conflict between Israel and Hezbollah.^[1]

Lebanon has long held the position that it is unable to join the treaty due to the continuing conflict with Israel, and the 2006 conflict heightened concerns about the security of its southern border.^[2] Accession is still under consideration, although regional politics and the unstable internal political situation may hinder steps toward accession.

On 5 December 2007, Lebanon abstained from voting on UN General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution 62/41 calling for universalization and full implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty, as it has with similar resolutions in previous years.^[3]

Lebanon did not attend as an observer the Eighth Meeting of States Parties in Jordan in November 2007. The director of the Lebanon Mine Action Center (LMAC) attended the meetings of the intersessional Standing Committees in Geneva in June 2008, but made no statements.

Lebanon is not party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons.^[4] It attended the Ninth Annual Conference of States Parties to Amended Protocol II as an observer.

Lebanon participated in the Dublin Diplomatic Conference on Cluster Munitions in May 2008 and adopted the final treaty text.

Production, Transfer, Stockpiling, and Use

In November 2004, Lebanon confirmed that it “has never produced or exported antipersonnel mines.”^[5] The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) stockpile an unknown number of antipersonnel mines. In March 2008, LMAC’s director told Landmine Monitor that the stockpile consists of a small quantity of mines that he described as lower than the maximum number permitted by the Mine Ban Treaty.^[6]

Based on photographic evidence provided to Landmine Monitor in 2007, it appears that Hezbollah has access to, and has in the past made use of, captured or recovered Israeli No. 4 type antipersonnel mines, M18A1 Claymore mines, and tripwire assemblies of unknown origin.^[7]

In May and June 2007, the non-state armed group Fatah al-Islam used antivehicle mines and explosive booby-traps during the conflict against the Lebanese army in the Palestinian refugee camp at Nahr al-Bared.^[8] The booby-traps caused Lebanese military casualties, but the details are classified.^[9] The use of explosive booby-traps that are victim-activated is prohibited under the Mine Ban Treaty because they function like antipersonnel mines. There were no reports of the group using factory-produced antipersonnel mines.^[10]

Landmine/ERW Problem

Lebanon is contaminated with mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW), particularly (cluster) submunitions and other unexploded ordnance (UXO). Mines and explosive ordnance were used extensively from the beginning of the civil war in 1975 until the end of the Israeli occupation in 2000. When Israel withdrew from southern Lebanon in 2000, some 400,000 mines remained to be cleared.^[11] The 2003 Landmine Impact Survey (LIS) found 306 impacted communities affected by 933 suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) covering an estimated 137km².^[12]

By the end of 2007, there were still mines in the south along the UN-delineated Blue Line between Lebanon and Israel, and in areas north of the Litani river, in the Bekaa valley, and across Mount Lebanon. The Mine Action Coordination Centre Southern Lebanon (MACC SL) estimates there are about 375,000 landmines along the Blue Line and up to about 3km inside Lebanese territory, covering an area of more than 7km², but it has not been given a mandate by the Lebanese government to clear them (apart from a specific area along the Blue Line in al-Adaysseh village).^[13]

The 2006 conflict with Israel resulted in heavy new contamination of southern Lebanon with an estimated 500,000 submunitions and other types of UXO.^[14] As of 21 July 2008, MACC SL had identified 1,056 cluster bomb strike locations covering a total of 40.7km².^[15] By the end of 2007, MACC SL reported that 32.6km² of this area had been released,^[16] and by June 2008 the figure had risen to 37.5km².^[17]

The UN estimated that in addition to submunitions, the 2006 conflict with Israel left Lebanon contaminated by around 15,300 other items of UXO, including air-dropped 500-2,000lb (227–907kg) bombs found in residential areas. Most of the contamination was in the south, but areas in the center and north of Lebanon were also contaminated by UXO.^[18] Most of this contamination had been cleared by mid-2008.^[19]

In May 2007, fighting between the Lebanese army and Islamic militants in Nahr al-Bared Palestinian refugee camp resulted in additional UXO contamination and laying of booby-traps by Fatah al-Islam, including antivehicle mines. As of March 2008, little clearance had occurred or was planned and it was still not possible for the estimated 35,000 people displaced by fighting to return.^[20] UN officials estimated clearance work could take up to two years.^[21]

A study of the economic impact of submunition contamination in Lebanon found that two-thirds of the land originally affected was agricultural, representing close to 5% of all agricultural land in southern Lebanon. It estimated current and projected losses of agricultural production would total between US$22.6 million and $26.8 million.^[22]

Mine Action Program

Coordination and management

The Lebanese Mine Action Authority (LMAA), an interministerial body established in 1998 with the Minister of Defense as chairperson, is responsible for the Lebanese National Mine Action Program (LNMAP).^[23] LMAC, a military body, known prior to May 2007 as the National Demining Office, is responsible for implementing and coordinating the LNMAP.^[24] It holds regular meetings with ministries, municipalities and village leaders (mukhtars). A quarterly meeting is also held for donors and other stakeholders.^[25]

MACC SL, a joint operation between the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS), LMAC, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), is responsible for coordinating clearance in the south, below the Litani river, and Area 6, an area north of the Litani comprising Hasbaya and Nabatiye in Nabatiye governorate, and Jezzine in South governorate, including the UN Interim Force in Lebanon’s (UNIFIL) clearance operations.^[26]

LMAC intended to take full national ownership of mine action management by the end of 2007, including an independent quality management system and a national operations center for mine clearance. However, in May 2007, LMAC asked MACC SL to maintain its current structure and responsibilities, including its liaison function between UNIFIL and the LAF, and to provide technical, operational, and strategic advice to the LAF Engineering Regiment and LMAC until the end of 2008. A memorandum of understanding to this effect was signed on 7 February 2008.^[27] The handover from UNMAS to LMAC was planned to take place on 31 December 2008.^[28]

The UN Development Programme (UNDP) continued to support LMAC’s institutional development in 2007 and 2008 by providing an international technical advisor and national information technology and administration staff.^[29] Mine action agencies use an older version of the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA), modified to meet in-country needs, with the support of a technical advisor provided by Switzerland. LMAC planned to trial a more recent version of IMSMA in June 2008.^[30]

National mine action legislation and standards

Lebanon does not have national mine action standards. Mine and ERW clearance is conducted according to LMAC technical standard guidelines, which are based on the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS).^[31]

Status of strategic mine action planning

In 2007, Lebanon adopted a new Long Term Plan for 2008–2012 to reflect the results of the 2006 conflict and clearance scheduled for 2007. A primary goal was to address contamination in all high- and medium-impacted communities indicated in the 2003 LIS.^[32] LMAC planned to revise its Long Term Plan in the second half of 2008 to take into account progress in submunition clearance.^[33]

The MACC SL operational plan for 2007 had aimed to free southern Lebanon from the impact of mines and submunitions by December 2007, except for the UN-delineated Blue Line along the border with Israel, and subject to availability of funds. This target was not met because of several factors, including poor weather conditions, underestimation of the level of contamination, and the unstable political situation, which diverted Lebanese army resources away from clearance.^[34] The revised MACC SL operational plan for 2008 aimed to finish clearing the remaining submunition problem by the end of 2008, with the available level of resources.^[35] In August 2008, however, it was reported that a lack of funds was threatening the clearance program.^[36]

Integration of mine action with reconstruction and development

ERW clearance has supported reconstruction and development, but due to the urgency of the post-conflict situation clearance often takes place at the same time as, rather than prior to, reconstruction and development.^[37]

MACC SL sets clearance priorities after its five community liaison officers collect contamination data. MACC SL’s priorities for clearing submunition contamination are houses, main access roads, land around houses, agricultural areas (according to the farming calendar to minimize the impact of the contamination), and grazing areas. MACC SL provides task lists to operators who in many cases have their own community liaison staff and further prioritize the given tasks.^[38]

MACC SL has also made efforts to link mine action with reconstruction and development through post-clearance land use assessments to identify why cleared land has not been used and to identify potential projects requiring funding. MACC SL has also worked with the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and World Vision to identify alternative livelihood projects for families whose land is contaminated.^[39]

Evaluation of mine action

An UNMAS review of emergency clearance coordinated by MACC SL in 2007 concluded that the overall response was rapid and effective, despite a lack of early contingency planning, and that the UN rapid response framework was well suited to large-scale, high-profile emergencies. The review identified a need to improve coordination between UN agencies with mine action responsibilities and for increased emphasis on risk education (RE), which was found to have been overwhelmed by the rush of returnees in the days immediately after the 2006 conflict.^[40]

Demining

Demining in 2007 was conducted by Lebanese and foreign military contingents and international organizations. The first demining NGO in Lebanon was planned to start in 2008.^[41]

The LAF Engineering Regiment conducts military and humanitarian demining. For humanitarian demining, they have two companies of 260 personnel working in 12 teams, supported by mechanical assets and mine detection dogs (MDD).^[42]

In 2007, the MACC SL coordinated operations by UNIFIL and nine bodies/organizations: Mines Advisory Group (MAG), Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), Handicap International (HI), the Swiss Foundation for Demining (FSD), DanChurchAid (DCA), ArmorGroup, BACTEC, the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF), and the Swedish Rescue Services Agency (SRSA). ArmorGroup finished its operations at the end of 2007 and the NZDF in February 2008. As of mid-December 2007, these organizations provided a total of 61 battle area clearance (BAC) teams, eight explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) teams, 14 manual demining teams, six mechanical teams, and two MDD teams.^[43] By June 2008, the number of BAC teams had fallen to 53.^[44]

UNIFIL, operating on the Blue Line between Lebanon and Israel, deployed battalions from Belgium, China, France, Italy, Spain, and Turkey. As of December 2007, UNIFIL had accredited seven BAC teams and four EOD teams. UNIFIL had not yet accredited another three BAC teams, nine EOD teams, two MDD teams and one explosive ordnance detection dog team, and one mechanical asset.^[45] No explanation has been provided.

SRSA, a Swedish government body, operated with three BAC teams, one mechanical and one EOD team: it is the only international organization to have an EOD team.^[46]

DCA, FSD, HI, MAG, and NPA all worked in southern Lebanon in 2007 conducting BAC and had funding to continue operations in 2008. HI, MAG and FSD planned to conduct mine clearance in the north later in 2008. MAG had a contract with UNDP to conduct a survey and risk assessment, which formed the basis for a tender for a contract with the UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) to clear Nahr al-Bared refugee camp; MAG submitted a proposal in July 2008 and was awaiting the outcome of the tender process as of end August.^[47]

RONCO assisted in building LMAC’s mine action capacity with funding from the United States Department of State, but left in September 2007^[48] and was replaced by DynCorp International, which was contracted by the US Department of State to assist LMAC in program management and provide equipment to the LAF Engineering Regiment, including marking devices, mechanical demining attachments, metal detectors, personal protective equipment, staking, and vehicles. In 2008, DynCorp was also to assist with technical survey and marking of all suspected minefields.^[49]

Local clearance (so-called village demining) of submunitions was a problem immediately after the conflict in 2006 and early 2007, increasing the risk of accidents and removing evidence that helps to identify the footprint of cluster munition strikes.^[50] However, by the end of 2007, LMAC did not consider local clearance a significant problem as much of the surface contamination had been cleared.^[51]

In southern Lebanon in 2007, eight deminers were reported killed and 13 injured in clearance operations, one of the highest demining casualty rates in the world.^[52]

Identifying hazardous areas

As of March 2008, Israel’s refusal to provide data on cluster munition strikes remained the biggest obstacle to identifying strike areas.^[53] These have been located through information gathered by MACC SL community liaison officers and clearance organizations, and through technical work in identifying strike patterns.^[54]

The LIS, conducted by MAG, was certified by UNMAS in September 2004 and released in August 2005. Data from the survey has been entered into the LMAC and MACC SL database. Many areas north of the Litani river are still contaminated and the LIS data is now being used to help prioritize clearance.^[55]

No technical survey of mined areas took place in 2007, as the government and UN gave priority to clearing submunitions in the south. A nationwide technical survey started by the LAF in early 2005 was suspended in August 2006 with the outbreak of conflict with Israel. By that time it had resulted in the release of 53.3km² of land, another 1.8km² was marked for area reduction, and 5.99km² was scheduled for clearance. The LAF resumed the technical survey in February 2008,^[56] and DynCorp was scheduled to resume work on the survey in September 2008.^[57] By 22 May 2008, the survey had resulted in release of 2km² to the population. A further 13,057m² had been marked for area reduction and 691,947m² of land was due for clearance.^[58] MAG resumed technical survey in Chouf district in Mount Lebanon governorate in early 2008.^[59]

Marking and fencing of affected areas

Minefields remaining along the Blue Line are well marked, except for where the Israelis plowed through their own minefields in the 2006 conflict. Many of the minefields in the rest of the country are not marked. This was to be done in the course of technical survey and area reduction.^[60]

Mine and ERW clearance in 2007 and 2008

Clearance efforts in 2007 continued to concentrate on tackling submunition contamination from the conflict with Israel. At the end of 2006, MACC SL reported having cleared approximately 3.4km² of land contaminated by submunitions.^[61] By the end of 2007, clearance operations had raised that figure to 32.6km². This included 6km² which had been area reduced, 9.5km² on which sub-surface clearance had taken place, and 17.1km² of land that had been surface cleared and would require further evaluation to determine whether sub-surface clearance was needed. Clearance operations during the year resulted in the destruction of 44,206 submunitions and 5,216 other items of UXO.^[62]

Operations in 2007 left about 10km² of land in the south contaminated by the 2006 conflict which had not undergone any form of clearance.^[63] MACC SL expected that by the end of 2008 there would only be a residual problem, posing a minimal threat of injury or to economic livelihood, which did not require a donor-funded clearance program and could be dealt with by the LAF on a “report and respond” basis.^[64]

The operational focus on clearing submunitions meant Lebanon made little progress clearing landmines in 2007. UNIFIL contracted SRSA to conduct clearance to support UNIFIL’s pilot project for marking the Blue Line. In 2007, SRSA demined 7.25km² of suspected mined areas, destroying 50 antipersonnel mines, and also conducted surface and sub-surface BAC of 400,000m² of battle area, destroying 2,340 items of UXO.^[65]

MACC SL reported at the end of 2007 that the UAE-supported Operation Emirates Solidarity (OES) would tackle the remaining mines in southern Lebanon, except for those along the Blue Line. In the first three months of 2008 (up to 27 March), OES cleared 648,422m² and released another 324,000m² through actions other than clearance.^[66] MACC SL stated that unless a decision was taken to clear the Blue Line as well, clearance organizations would cease operating in the south by the end of 2008, and that LMAC would coordinate any residual clearance. MACC SL commented that additional clearance capacity might be needed in north Lebanon, but that operators should discuss this in detail with LMAC before making any plans.^[67]

Among the NGOs, MAG had 22 BAC teams, three mechanical teams, and two MDD teams in 2007, clearing 4.5km² of battle area and in the process destroying 4,129 submunitions and 618 other items of UXO. By end-June 2008, however, MAG had reduced capacity to 16 BAC, one mechanical and two MDD teams. It also had a manual demining team working in Chouf district in Mount Lebanon governorate.^[68]

HI had three teams, clearing 0.72km² and 196 submunitions in 2007.^[69] NPA had three BAC teams, which cleared 0.8km² and 754 submunitions in 2007 and planned to add one female team in 2008.^[70] FSD had four BAC teams and one large-loop detector team in 2007 but scaled down to a total of two teams in February 2008. In 2007, it cleared 0.45km² of battle area, destroying 236 submunitions and 38 other items of UXO.^[71] It expected funding from the European Commission (EC) for a “mine for wine” project in Chouf district, Mount Lebanon governorate, in 2008.^[72] DCA had five teams in operation from the end of March 2007, clearing (including visual and sub-surface) 1.2km² and destroying 891 items of explosive ordnance.^[73]

BACTEC conducted demining under the OES in Area 6, in Jezzine (South governorate) and Hasbaya (Nabatiye governorate), with two manual demining teams, clearing 0.7km² of land and destroying 514 antipersonnel mines and 52 antivehicle mines. BACTEC also operated 11 BAC teams and three mechanical teams funded by UNMAS, which destroyed 15,900 submunitions and 1,650 other items of UXO.^[74] ArmorGroup conducted BAC, EOD and survey in southern Lebanon with 10 manual teams and one completion team to conduct quality assurance, clearing 0.9km² of mined area and 0.6km² of battle area. ArmorGroup worked until December when its contract ended.^[75]

MACC SL is responsible for returning submunition-affected land back to communities after clearance. Handover forms are signed by community representatives—the village leader, municipality leader, and landowners.^[76]

Each organization has its own internal quality management system. Once they have completed the work, they hand the land over to MACC SL which conducts quality checks, according to the Technical Standard Guidelines.^[77]

Landmine/ERW Casualties^[78]

In 2007, Landmine Monitor identified at least 130 new mine/ERW casualties in Lebanon, of whom 37 were killed and 93 injured. LMAC recorded 69 of these casualties, MACC SL 70 and the Landmine Resource Center (LMRC) 69; 64 of the casualties recorded by MACC SL and LMAC were identical. Only 36 of the casualties were recorded in all three databases; in particular, information on military casualties was lacking. Landmine Monitor analysis of media articles identified an additional 27 casualties not recorded in any of the databases (13 LAF, seven foreign troops, two deminers, and five civilians).

Civilian Casualties by Age and Gender

Casualties by Status

Casualties by Device Type

The most common activity recorded was clearance (30), including at least eight LAF soldiers, seven MAG staff, six UNIFIL troops, four BACTEC staff, and one each for FSD, ArmorGroup, and SRSA (no details available for the two others). Ten of the clearance casualties were foreign (from Belgium, China, France, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and Zimbabwe). Other foreign casualties were 10 Palestinian civilians (seven in Nahr al-Bared refugee camp) and seven Spanish UN forces.

Civilians were usually carrying out livelihood activities such as farming, herding, burning weeds, and collecting wood (28% of civilian casualties), or tampering (19% of civilian casualties), mostly by males (17). While shepherds were considered to be most at risk by LMAC, both UNDP and MACC SL stated that most people were involved in tampering, although this is not necessarily recorded as such.^[79]

In the south, more than 65% of casualties continued to be due to submunitions. Janoub (South governorate) recorded 48 casualties (29 from submunitions), including 39 in Tyre district. There were 43 casualties in Nabatiye governorate (19 in Nabatiye district and 16 in Bint Jbeil district), including 31 submunition casualties. However, 32 casualties also occurred in the Shamal (North governorate), mostly in Nahr al-Bared refugee camp (27, including seven LAF deminers and 13 LAF).^[80]

The casualty rate in 2007 is a significant decrease compared to at least 207 casualties recorded by LMAC in 2006 (31 killed and 176 injured).^[81] The increase in 2006 was due to the July–August conflict, including submunitions in southern Lebanon or newly emplaced landmines, as only four casualties were reported prior to the conflict. In the aftermath of the conflict, submunitions caused on average two casualties per day between 14 August and 31 December 2006. This rate dropped to an average of one or two per week in early 2007 and to two per month as of August 2007.^[82]

Nevertheless, the casualty rate (38) in areas north of the Litani river in 2007 was higher than annual casualty rates recorded prior to the 2006 conflict (22 in 2005, 14 in 2004). This increase is mainly due to new contamination in Nahr al-Bared refugee camp which caused at least 27 casualties. This figure is probably incomplete as it was reported that “numerous Lebanese military casualties” occurred as a result of the use of booby-traps and antivehicle mines in Nahr al-Bared, but this information is classified.^[83]

Casualties continued to be reported in 2008, with at least 27 recorded by LMAC to 24 June,^[84] 24 by MACC SL to 11 July,^[85] and 18 by LMRC to 12 June.^[86] Insufficient detail was provided to determine the total number of casualties. By early 2008, the average casualty rate in southern Lebanon increased slightly to three per month, and, as in the previous year, peaked in April because of increased farming activity.^[87]

Casualty data for 2006–2008 is probably under-reported as some international NGOs noted that while conducting assessments for victim assistance (VA) projects they regularly came across mine/ERW casualties who had not been identified previously.^[88] It also remains unclear whether Hezbollah militants are recorded in the casualty databases, although LMAC and UNDP state that these would have been included, probably as “civilians.”^[89] It was added that casualties are not recorded if people want to stay “hidden.”^[90] Foreign casualties, mainly Palestinian and Syrian day laborers, are also likely to be under-reported because many lack adequate insurance for treatment or fear eviction from the country.^[91]

Data collection

The LMAC IMSMA database, supported by UNDP, is the national repository of casualty data and collects data through reports from the army intelligence units in each governorate. This information is checked with the local police, but not with local hospitals. LMAC also receives information from the LMRC, MACC SL and, infrequently, NGOs.^[92] The LMRC and MACC SL each have a casualty data collection system, but do not exchange information. Therefore, all databases are incomplete, contain duplications, and data entry and verification is inconsistent.^[93] MACC SL only collects casualty data to support clearance priorities.^[94]

Data collection in Lebanon is incomplete and the 2006 conflict further complicated data collection issues. In 2008, LMAC and MACC SL acknowledged that some casualties in 2006 were “not reported, hidden or wrong,”^[95] but no steps appear to have been undertaken to consolidate the separate databases, particularly the LMRC and MACC SL databases.^[96]

The LMAC database does not contain all the information needed to effectively implement VA, so LMAC tasks LMRC (and occasionally NGOs) to verify the needs of the casualties for further planning.^[97] LMAC regularly distributes casualty information to all mine/ERW RE and VA providers. In 2008, it started work on a system in which each survivor has a file, including information on the assistance received.^[98]

The total number of casualties in Lebanon is unknown. Data prior to 2005 is particularly incomplete and mostly not entered into IMSMA, due to codification, quality, and verification issues.^[99] It is estimated that there have been fewer than 5,000 casualties since 1948; in total, there are some 4,200 casualty records.^[100] As of end 2007, the LMRC database contained information on 2,704 survivors who were still alive.^[101]

Reportedly there is a disability database at the Ministry of Social Affairs which has records on 50,000 persons with disabilities.^[102] Almost half of persons with disabilities have a physical disability.^[103]

Landmine/ERW Risk Education

A year-long RE assessment by the LMRC in 2007 noted that communities have sufficient knowledge about the risks of mines/ERW, but that the adoption of safe behavior was “limited.”^[104] In 2007, significant RE was still being conducted, although not at the level of the months following the conflict. Activities were carried out mainly by members of national organizations in the National Steering Committee on Mine Risk Education, but as a result of the 2006 conflict, several international organizations were also involved in RE in 2007.^[105] Activities appear to have decreased in 2008, as international projects ended.^[106]

Throughout 2007, the most significant mine/ERW threat in Lebanon remained submunition contamination south of the Litani river. As a result of the 2006 conflict, 150 villages were identified as most at risk and were targeted accordingly by the national RE program.^[107] It was said that in October–November 2006, all affected areas in the south (300,000 people) had received RE.^[108] The 2007 LMRC assessment confirmed that people in most villages knew about the dangers of mines/ERW and were aware of activities taking place. However, they had usually received information through word of mouth from neighbors or key people in the community.^[109] As of March 2008, it is unclear whether all these villages had effectively received RE,^[110] and some clearance organizations reported that RE had not been conducted everywhere.^[111] National organizations report little about which communities were reached.^[112]

The total number of people who received RE in 2007 is unknown. LMAC estimated that the target population for RE messages was approximately 1 million people,^[113] but many of these were only reached through the media. NPA estimated that 300,000 people in some 150 communities were reached.^[114] Three international NGOs reached 56,758 people in 2007.^[115]

RE and demining operators believe there is still a need for RE due to the high level of contamination and continued risk-taking behavior in southern Lebanon,^[116] but there were concerns about the effectiveness of RE and the need to adapt approaches and link them to programs easing economic hardship.^[117] It is also believed that RE is needed in areas north of the Litani river due to the presence of mines/ERW and because the population regularly travels to southern Lebanon.^[118]

Strategic framework and capacity

RE is coordinated and supervised by LMAC, and mainly implemented by the National Steering Committee on Mine Risk Education.^[119] Committee members represent different confessional and political groups in the country and usually work in the communities they represent. Technical and financial support was mainly provided by NPA and UNICEF, as well as some international NGOs. The LMRC provides training support and donor liaison.^[120]

Since 2007, the steering committee, which meets every two weeks, uses annual and shorter-term workplans usually drafted by the LMRC in consultation with the committee.^[121] The absence of a unified action plan during the emergency phase was a major obstacle for the RE campaign according to the LMRC assessment.^[122] Steering committee members use standard materials discussed in committee meetings and approved by LMAC.^[123] In 2008, national RE standards, based on the international standards, were drafted by LMRC in consultation with the steering committee and were pending LMAC approval as of March.^[124] Steering committee members stated that coordination of activities was generally good.^[125]

RE stakeholders state that there is sufficient national RE capacity,^[126] but since the 2006 conflict some international NGOs were involved in RE in 2007. LMAC initially did not allow international NGOs to implement direct RE activities, but instead wanted them to fund national organizations. The international NGOs are not part of the steering committee,^[127] which leads to duplication of efforts.^[128] UNIFIL and clearance teams also distribute RE messages. However, operators stated that UNIFIL did not use standard materials and that their messages occasionally conflicted with those spread by RE implementers.^[129] MACC SL does not have a mandate to conduct RE.^[130]

While most steering committee members work in southern Lebanon, there does not appear to be coordination on RE with MACC SL and clearance operators.^[131] Occasionally, clearance organizations request RE teams to go to particular areas, but this has not been successful in practice.^[132] The LMRC assessment noted that the army did not respond to community requests, and that civilians sometimes report contamination.^[133]

Evaluations

In November 2007, UNMAS conducted a review of emergency clearance coordinated by MACC SL, which concluded that the overall response was rapid and effective, and that the UN rapid response framework was well suited to large, high-profile emergencies. Areas for improvement included coordination and an increased emphasis on RE, which was overwhelmed by the rush of returnees following the end of the conflict.^[134]

A 2007 LMRC assessment found that casualty rates could not be directly linked to RE.^[135] The main conclusions were that not all RE materials were appropriate; no clear lesson plans were followed; no measurable objectives were stated; communication skills needed to be improved; and introducing participatory techniques was a “must.”^[136] Interviewees expressed the need for more information about clearance activities in their communities, interactive RE, and a larger community role in school-based RE.^[137]

Coverage and response

Although there is a high general awareness about mines and submunitions, only half of interviewees in the LMRC assessment were able to correctly describe mines and submunitions, or how to recognize a dangerous area. It was also noted that, “Safe behavior was more said than practiced.”^[138] Some 30% of interviewees noted that they did not have enough RE information “to protect themselves.”^[139] Focus groups created by INTERSOS indicated that many people significantly underestimated the number of casualties from submunitions.^[140]

In 2007 and early 2008, men and boys were thought to be particularly at risk by one operator.^[141] Other operators stated that tampering was an important cause of incidents among boys and (young) men as a result of recklessness and not because of the economic benefits from scrap metal collection.^[142] Deminers are also an at-risk group. It was reported among several clearance operators that some deminers take unnecessary risks and even went into contaminated sites after working hours, resulting in several incidents.^[143]

A wide variety of RE methods have been used. Although, according to the LMRC assessment, most people remember awareness messages received through the media (television),^[144] NPA noted that this type of RE “could be improved.”^[145] It was also noted that people are familiar with the messages and methods and that new, more interactive approaches need to be developed.^[146] Materials were adapted to deal with submunition contamination and with specific at-risk groups,^[147] but the LMRC assessment noted that the generally low education level of the target groups made some of the printed materials inappropriate^[148] and that messages needed to focus more on safe behavior.^[149] In 2008, more interactive approaches and materials were reportedly developed.^[150]

Activities

As in previous years, steering committee members divided communities according to factional allegiance and focused on all the at-risk groups. Most operators indicated that the five large awareness-raising events in southern Lebanon were the major highlight of 2007.^[151] However, they did not provide statistics on the number of people reached in 2007.

Victim Assistance

The 2008 action plan of the National Steering Committee on Victim Assistance, states that, “The health and social welfare sectors in Lebanon as well as other sectors like education, transport, and employment are unable to cater for the needs of [persons with disabilities],” or fulfill their rights.^[152] National VA capacity will only become sufficient with adequate funding.^[153]

The NGO disability sector is strong but divided among factions, and provides services the government is unable to provide. However, it relies heavily on international donor support.^[154] While significant international funding was received in the immediate aftermath of the 2006 conflict, this had decreased as of 2008, especially for disability issues, as most donor countries consider Lebanon a middle-income country.^[155]

Survivors complained that they had received visits from several organizations to collect their information, but that no assistance followed. This was confirmed by several operators.^[156] Both survivors and VA operators noted that most survivors usually receive emergency medical treatment, but, for a number of reasons, fewer access other services, including a lack of awareness,^[157] but also the location and affordability of services.^[158] Some VA organizations had their buildings destroyed in 2006, which also hampered service provision into early 2008.^[159] However, with sufficient financial support, national VA capacity is considered to be sufficient.^[160]

Hospitals in large cities are well-equipped with capable staff able to deal with mine/ERW trauma; smaller hospitals can provide sufficient first-aid treatment. However, there are significant regional disparities in access to services, especially in southern Lebanon.^[161] In principle, the Ministry of Public Health covers medical and some rehabilitation costs for mine/ERW casualties through contracts with service providers and at public hospitals. However, both complained that government reimbursements were delayed, a situation exacerbated by the 2006 conflict.^[162] In the case of the Tyre Public Hospital, which continues to treat conflict-injured, the reimbursement delay was seven years.^[163] The government acknowledged the delays and its limited budget.^[164] The Ministry of Public Health has an annual budget of approximately $500,000 for assistance of survivors and other persons with disabilities at 28 service providers.^[165]

Physical rehabilitation services, supervised by the Ministry of Public Health and the Ministry of Social Affairs and carried out mainly by national NGOs, are adequate. The government reimburses some costs, but several basic services are not free of charge, material donations are insufficient, and reimbursements are delayed.^[166] Additional costs can be covered for those with insurance at the National Social Security Fund, but it also continued to have funding problems.^[167] Disability card holders should receive free treatment, but it continued to be reported that they have to pay for services.^[168] Also, many survivors need psychosocial support but are not aware of existing programs. Psychological support is provided when an individual expresses the need for it, but programs are said to lack a systematic approach.^[169]

The most significant consequence of the 2006 conflict was the exacerbation of structural poverty and the limitation of economic activities due to ERW contamination in southern Lebanon, which continued into 2008.^[170] Many people continued to use contaminated land due to economic necessity, and several survivors in southern Lebanon who had previously received micro-credits or other socio-economic help saw their income-generating activities destroyed.^[171] The 2007 post-conflict surveys by the LMRC reiterated that the main needs of mine/ERW survivors were employment and education opportunities.^[172] Legislation stipulates that 3% of jobs should go to persons with disabilities, but this was not enforced and the body in charge of recruiting civil servants refused to accept applications from persons with disabilities.^[173]

Lebanon has general provisions to protect the rights of persons with disabilities, but specific disability legislation developed in 2000 was still not enforced in 2008^[174] as it was not a government priority.^[175] On 14 June 2007, Lebanon signed the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and its Optional Protocol; as of 31 July 2008, Lebanon had not ratified either instrument. In July 2008, the UN Special Rapporteur on Disability met with the President and the Speaker of the House in Lebanon to push Lebanon to become one of very few Arab countries to ratify the convention.^[176]

Non-Lebanese nationals are not eligible for any benefits.

Victim assistance strategic framework

LMAC is responsible for supervision and coordination of VA activities implemented by members of the National Steering Committee on Victim Assistance. Overall it was said that coordination of VA was weaker than RE, even though the steering committee members were the same.^[177] It was also reported that there was “serious overlap” between NGOs because of security, political, and religious reasons;^[178] in other areas, there were likely to be gaps.^[179] Financial, capacity-building and technical support was provided by NPA while LMRC provided support for policy development and capacity-building.^[180]

The May 2007 National Mine Action Policy stated that the “Government of Lebanon, conscious of the damage and suffering caused by landmine[s] and explosive remnants of war, shall take full responsibility for the humanitarian, socio-economic and environmental impact caused by these devices….” The policy aims to support “landmine/ERW victims in all medical, psychological, and economical aspects and support activities to help ensure that victims regain their full legal rights, and can smoothly reintegrate within the society.”^[181]

In late 2007, LMRC developed a 2008 action plan for the steering committee which was endorsed by LMAC in February 2008. The plan links VA to assistance to persons with disabilities in general and implementation of the 2000 disability legislation. The plan was developed on the basis of LMRC casualty surveys^[182] and uses a “victim-centered” non-discriminatory, rights-based approach.^[183] Specific objectives include:

• establishing an information-sharing coordination mechanism;
• promoting first-aid capacities;
• producing information on VA services;
• ensuring continued training for rehabilitation providers;
• ensuring medical and rehabilitation services promoting reintegration; and
• advocacy on the rights of persons with disabilities and on the mine/ERW issue.

The plan also contains timeframes, clear responsibilities, target beneficiaries and progress indicators.^[184] The plan is specific, measurable, achievable, relevant and time-bound (SMART), and based on experience gathered in the Mine Ban Treaty VA25 process. However, activities by international NGOs or disability organizations are not considered or linked to the plan.

The target beneficiaries of the action plan are 100 survivors identified as never receiving services before, aged 55 or younger as they are “better predisposed to benefit from assistance…and more in need [of] an income generating activity.”^[185] Family members of those killed by mines/ERW, direct caregivers, community advocates, and members of highly-affected communities (farmers and shepherds whose only source of income is contaminated land) can also benefit from the strategy.^[186] While these criteria appear to contradict the non-discriminatory approach advocated by the plan, LMRC stated that “this is a realistic target considering the security situation and the lack of coordination between implementers.”^[187] NPA added that there is only funding to assist 100 people annually.^[188]

The ongoing focus on clearance continued to draw resources away from VA activities, which have been the lowest funded mine action component for years. The main reasons were a lack of donor interest in long-term and less-visible activities^[189] and VA (due to the relatively small number of survivors) not being a national priority.^[190] Some organizations also noted that the lack of transparency of implementers is a contributing factor.^[191] LMAC does not have funds for VA and all funding is provided by international organizations, almost exclusively through NPA.^[192] MACC SL does not have a mandate for VA,^[193] but occasionally facilitates ad hoc support.^[194] Several international NGOs conducted VA in 2007, and coordinated with LMAC, but not systematically with steering committee members.^[195]

Assistance activities

The majority of VA activities are carried out by steering committee members, providing a wide range of medical, rehabilitation, vocational training, sports, and income-generating projects, usually small-scale. World Vision, INTERSOS and FSD included a small VA component in their mine action projects; HI provided capacity-building support to the disability sector, mainly the Lebanese Physical Handicapped Union.^[196]

Several UN agencies, such as the FAO, provided socio-economic development support, benefiting mine/ERW survivors without directly targeting them.^[197] UNIFIL also provides medical and other social services to affected communities.^[198] The Indian Battalion of UNIFIL organized regular “Jaipur Foot” rehabilitation camps in Marjeyoun in Nabatiye governorate, where specialists from India provided rehabilitation assistance to approximately 365 survivors between 2006 and July 2008.^[199]

Due to the large number of operators, this report must be considered incomplete and only those organizations providing information to Landmine Monitor for this reporting period have been included. Statistics from organizations listed below contain duplications, as several organizations include referral to other organizations in their statistics, without specifying the other organization; survivors also received multiple services.^[200]

In 2007, al-Jarha provided 490 services to some 200 survivors (including 30 due to 2006 conflict) mainly in Tyre (South governorate), Nabatiyeh (Nabatiye governorate) and Dahye, a suburb of Beirut, although the target was 420 people. Reaching this target was hampered by the continued effect of the destruction of facilities in the 2006 conflict. The organization increasingly focused on widows of mine/ERW survivors expanded/reconstructed services in northern Lebanon, and provided direct material/house reconstruction support.^[201]

FSD provided physical rehabilitation and economic reintegration to 35 survivors or their families between July 2007 and February 2008 through a private donation of $50,000 (in memory of an ICRC delegate killed by a landmine in Senegal in 2006). FSD found that most of the beneficiaries they identified were not recorded in casualty databases or, if they were, had received little assistance, in most cases not even adequate medical care. FSD coordinated closely with LMAC and was looking for further funding for this work.^[202]

INTERSOS facilitated economic assistance to survivors or their families as part of its mine action program in cooperation with Islamic Risala Scouts Association (IRSA), the Islamic Health Council and the al-Mahdi Scouts; 14 survivors were assisted including two injured in 2007. The project ended in March but further funding was sought.^[203]

The LMRC, in partnership with IRSA, conducted a small-scale capacity-building project between September 2007 and 29 February 2008 in cooperation with Austcare. Psychosocial support activities were organized for 1,800 children (supported by the World Rehabilitation Fund, [WRF], World Vision, and Balamand University).^[204]

The Lebanese Association for Health and Social Care, created in 2003, started a VA project and joined the steering committee in 2007. It provides health, rehabilitation, and vocational services; in 2007, it assisted 355 mine/ERW survivors and persons with disabilities, including one submunition casualty.^[205] The National Center for Development and Rehabilitation assisted 76 mine/ERW survivors (and 50 other persons with disabilities) who received multiple services including physical rehabilitation and socio-economic support.^[206]

In 2007, NPA provided micro-credit consultancy services to six national partners, evaluated all micro-credit projects by survivors, conducted advocacy, supported a local NGO’s football team of survivors, and facilitated the participation of a survivor in the Oslo Process meetings leading to the negotiation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions. It also conducted psychosocial activities for 100 survivors and provided direct assistance to 54 survivors who received prosthetic devices, 10 micro-credits, and 45 emergency assistance services.^[207]

In 2007, the WRF continued to provide financial and capacity-building support to the Jezzine Landmine Survivor Cooperative, which is located in an area relatively untouched by the 2006 conflict. The complete handover of the cooperative to its members was due to be completed by August 2008. Throughout 2007, attention was focused on strengthening the cooperative’s management and administrative structure, infrastructure expansion, business skills training, and improving profitability. The main challenges for sustainability are the low education level of the members, sustaining staff salary levels, and obtaining business loans for members (rather than grants).^[208]

World Vision expanded its existing operations in Lebanon to include an economic reintegration project for mine/ERW survivors or family members in the cities of Marjeyoun, Bint Jbeil, and Nabatiyeh. Between September 2007 and March 2008, in-kind grants or income-generating support were provided to 83 people either directly or through partner organizations. It also conducted a psychological assessment of survivors in the three areas to provide counseling if needed.^[209]

Vision Association provides services in the Bekaa valley. In cooperation with HI, it distributed disability aids, including mobility devices, to 46 survivors, and 37 survivors received other types of assistance as did 105 other persons with disabilities.^[210]

Support for Mine Action

Landmine Monitor is not aware of comprehensive long-term cost estimates for meeting mine action needs (including RE and VA) in Lebanon. The Long Term Plan 2008–2012 for mine action, however, provides a detailed resource mobilization strategy for the five-year period, and highlights the resource mobilization strategy as one of two principle elements for achieving its overall mine action goals, along with yearly Integrated Work Plans (IWPs).^[211] The priorities of the Long Term Plan—national technical survey, capacity-building and maintenance, mine action coordination, VA, and RE—are to be fulfilled through the annual workplans based on available resources for each year.^[212] The plan sets out “overarching end-state goals” including the adoption of a transparent and effective resource mobilization policy, based on the following objectives:

• to conduct information exchanges and visits between donors and LMAC;
• to develop transparency and build donor confidence in LMAC;
• to establish Lebanon and LMAC as a “source of mine action expertise suitable for international deployment” ;
• to create two Lebanese demining NGOs to increase national mine action resources and improve visibility of Lebanon among international donors; and
• to advocate for national funds for mine action from the government of Lebanon independent of LAF funds, to “reflect Lebanon’s commitment to mine action in the context of developmental framework.”^[213]

The plan includes a funding timeline, based on Lebanese projects contained in the UN Mine Action Portfolio 2005, outlining the projected roles of donors and partners in financing projects for the entire five-year period. The LAF are projected to donate $4 million in-kind annually from 2008–2012. Commitments from several donors, implementing agencies and NGOs are shown until 2008 (UNMAS), 2009 (UNICEF, UNDP, MAG, and NPA), and 2010 (US). However, funding amounts and the relationships between these donors and implementing agencies and NGOs are not shown. Future funding is shown as required, but not yet confirmed for MAG, NPA, and UNDP, as well as from the Lebanese diaspora and the private sector (neither of which had reportedly contributed funds in the past). No donors have been identified for clearance of high- and medium-impact areas, required from 2008 to 2011.^[214]

In July 2007, an estimate of costs was finalized to cover operational costs and “achieve key clearance objectives” of cluster munition strike areas in southern Lebanon, ending the need for large-scale international financial assistance to related programs. Total costs were projected at $10.77 million (approximately €7.86 million) for 2008.^[215]

The LMAA is responsible for mine action policy, while the Ministry of National Defense, through LMAC, is responsible for implementing mine action strategy in Lebanon.^[216] The ministry also chairs an International Support Group for Mine Action, which is responsible for the following:

• identifying resources to cover financial and technical mine action gaps;
• securing financial sources for demining;
• overall funding cooperation with international institutions; and
• reviewing proposals submitted by LMAC or third parties for funding.^[217]

The LAF has delegated responsibility for developing and implementing the long-term mine action plan to LMAC.^[218] Mine action programs in 2007 in Lebanon, in particular southern Lebanon, continued to be supported by several funding mechanisms, including UN peacekeeping assessed budgets, the Lebanon Crisis Flash Appeal, and the UN Portfolio of Mine Action Projects.^[219] The 2007 UN Inter-Agency Mine Action Strategy for southern Lebanon included objectives for clearance, RE, VA, rehabilitation of mine and UXO-affected communities, and integration of mine action needs into national development and reconstruction plans.^[220] The last objective calls for capacity development of national institutions, transition to national coordination of mine action programming, and resource mobilization for mine/ERW survivors.^[221] The strategy has been developed and implemented by UN agencies in cooperation with national authorities, the private sector, international and regional organizations, and other partners.^[222] A Protection Cluster Working Group chaired by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees is responsible for setting and implementing policies on a range of human security issues in Lebanon, including the interagency mine action strategy. All mine action members of the working group are responsible for raising their own required funds.^[223]

UNDP assists LMAC in “all aspects of management” through the provision of a chief technical advisor and a national mine action program officer.^[224]

National support for mine action

There is no allocated budget for mine action in Lebanon. Mine action costs are covered at the national level by in-kind contributions from the LAF. The long-term plan states that the government of Lebanon “is not capable of meeting the resource requirements for the LTP 2008–2012, nor is the Government of Lebanon capable of internally allocating the resources necessary to reach the end-state for mine action in Lebanon within a reasonable time period.” The plan further states that, in the absence of dedicated national funds for mine action, resource mobilization at the international level is “imperative.”^[225]

LMAC reported mine action funding by the government of Lebanon totaling $5.5 million in 2007, allocated to the LAF to support deminers’ salaries, maintenance of equipment, facilities and vehicles.^[226] National funding in 2006 was reported to be approximately $4 million of in-kind contributions, and national funding from the LAF for the period 2008–2012 is projected to be $4 million per year.^[227] The types of in-kind funding anticipated, and how LAF funds will be allocated, are not provided in the plan.

International cooperation and assistance

In 2007, 15 countries and the EC reported providing $28,338,812 (€20,668,669) to mine action in Lebanon. Reported mine action funding in 2007 was almost 60% less than reported in 2006, when emergency response to cluster munition strikes in southern Lebanon resulted in a significant rise in annual funding levels to approximately $68.8 million. International funding in 2005 was $6,300,000. According to MACC SL in June 2008, large-scale submunition clearance operations should, with “appropriate and dedicated funding” be complete by the end of 2008.^[228] With the end of emergency funding, the Long Term Plan 2008–2012 will presumably become the benchmark against which to judge international funding levels. The goals of the plan are reportedly based on “moderate levels” of international funding, but the plan does not provide annual targets or minimum international funding requirements.^[229]

As of June 2008, MACC SL reported receiving $7 million of its $10.77 million required funds for 2008, leaving a shortfall of $3.77 million. Also in June 2008, MAG reported reduction in activity of its BAC program over a period of seven months due to lack of funding. As of July 2008, UNMAS reported that funding was still required for UNDP’s socio-economic development projects in mine-affected areas. VA was highlighted as an area suffering from “a chronic lack of funds.”^[230] In August, the UN reported that many of the teams clearing submunitions in the south would have to stop work imminently for lack of funds.^[231]

2007 International Mine Action Funding to Lebanon: Monetary^[233]

2007 International Mine Action Support to Lebanon: In-Kind^[232]