Nicaragua

Mine Ban Policy

The Republic of Nicaragua signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997 and ratified it on 30 November 1998, becoming a State Party on 1 May 1999. Legislation to enforce the antipersonnel mine prohibitions domestically, Law 321, was enacted on 7 December 1999 and includes penal sanctions.^[1]

Nicaragua participated in the Eighth Meeting of States Parties in Jordan in November 2007, where it made statements during the general exchange of views, victim assistance, and mine clearance sessions. Nicaragua also attended the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in Geneva in June 2008, where it reported on mine clearance efforts.

On 28 February 2008, Nicaragua submitted its ninth Article 7 report, covering the period from 28 February 2007 to 28 February 2008.^[2]

Nicaragua has not expressed clear views with respect to key issues of interpretation of Articles 1, 2 and 3 of the treaty, including what acts are prohibited by the ban on “assistance,” whether antivehicle mines with sensitive fuzes are banned, and the acceptable number of mines retained for training.^[3]

Nicaragua is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and its Amended Protocol II on landmines. Nicaragua attended the Ninth Annual Conference of States Parties to the protocol in November 2007, but did not submit its annual report required under Article 13. Nicaragua is party to CCW Protocol V on explosive remnants of war.

Nicaragua participated in the Dublin Diplomatic Conference on Cluster Munitions in May 2008 and adopted the final treaty text.

Production, Transfer, Stockpile Destruction, and Retention

Nicaragua has stated that it has never produced antipersonnel mines.^[4] It is not known to have ever exported mines. Nicaragua destroyed its stockpile of 133,435 antipersonnel mines between 12 April 1999 and 28 August 2002.^[5]

According to its most recent Article 7 report, the Nicaraguan Army retained a total of 1,004 antipersonnel mines for training as of February 2008.^[6] This is the same number as reported in 2007.^[7] Unlike previous years, Nicaragua did not consume any retained mines.^[8] The report stated that the army transferred 26 PMN mines to the Engineer Corps for detector calibration and 46 mines to the mine detection dog (MDD) training unit.^[9]

In March 2006, Nicaragua informed Landmine Monitor that following the completion of its demining program it would present a plan for reducing the number of mines retained for training.^[10]

Nicaragua has previously reported that it possesses 121 Claymore-type directional fragmentation mines (MON series).^[11]

Landmine/ERW Problem

Nicaragua is contaminated by mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) as a result of armed conflict between 1979 and 1990. Most of the mines used were antipersonnel, but antivehicle mines were also laid along the northern border with Honduras.^[12] Mined areas have been reported in 105 communities^[13] in 74 municipalities in 14 of the 15 departments and the two autonomous regions.

Based on records from the Nicaraguan Army, which Nicaragua considered to be 80% complete,^[14] the total number of antivehicle and antipersonnel mines emplaced was initially said to be 135,643 in 991 minefields.^[15] This had risen to more than 175,849 mines (29% more than the original estimate) as a result of clearance operations and reports from communities of new suspected hazardous areas (SHAs).^[16] Of this revised total, Nicaragua reported in February 2008 that 158,661 mines had been found and destroyed, leaving at least 17,188 in the ground.^[17] At the June 2008 Standing Committee meetings, Nicaragua reported that 964 mined areas had been cleared out of a total of 1,006, and that the estimated total number of mines emplaced had risen to 176,076, an increase of 227.^[18]

In June 2008, it was reported that at least 14,584 mines remained in 40 mined areas^[19] across eight municipalities: five in the department of Nueva Segovia (Jalapa, Mozonte, Murra, San Fernando, and Wiwilí); one in the department of Jinotega (Wiwilí de Jinotega); one in the department of Matagalpa (La Dalia); and one in the Southern Atlantic Autonomous Region (Bocana de Paiwas).^[20] The area along the border with Costa Rica is considered to have been cleared of mines.^[21]

More than 24,000 people were believed to be living within about 5km of the remaining mined areas. This represents a 95% reduction in the number of people impacted since the start of the mine action program in 1991.^[22] All the remaining mine-impacted communities—the number has not been made explicit, but is no more than 51^[23]—are said to be impoverished.^[24]

Mine Action Program

Coordination and management

The National Demining Commission (Comisión Nacional de Desminado, CND) is responsible for formulating national mine action policy, assisting and coordinating implementation of the National Humanitarian Demining Program (Programa Nacional de Desminado Humanitario, PNDH), managing international funds, and conducting risk education. CND employees are paid by the Ministry of Defense, but the CND has no operational budget and works with resources from donor countries channeled through the Organization of American States (OAS) or bilaterally.^[25]

Status of strategic mine action planning

Due to the “high number” of unrecorded mines discovered during clearance, every year since 2004 operations have been delayed and the projected completion of the mine action program put back. In March 2008, Nicaragua declared that it would not be able to meet its Article 5 deadline of 1 May 2009 and requested a one-year extension of its deadline.^[26] Clearance priorities for 2008 and 2009 included all known mined areas.^[27]

Integration of mine action with relief, reconstruction and development efforts

A study conducted on behalf of the OAS by the National Institute of Statistics and Census (Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas y Censos, INEC) from August 2006 through April 2007 found a direct relationship between mine clearance in previously affected areas and subsequent improvements in various development indicators, such as health, access to education, and access to water and electricity.^[28] Some of the improvements are, however, explained by improved access to formerly affected communities as a result of the repair or construction of roads to allow access for mine clearance operations.^[29] By the end of 2007, 138.5km of roadwork had been completed to facilitate mine action and an additional 96km of road repair or construction was planned to enable mine clearance to be completed.^[30]

Demining

Mine clearance in Nicaragua is the responsibility of so-called Small Demining Units (Pequeñas Unidades de Desminado) of the Nicaraguan Army Engineer Corps. Previously, more than 600 Nicaraguans worked in mine action (both civilians and army personnel), but in 2007 the total number was reduced to around 500 as a result of a decline in funding.^[31]

Clearance operations are organized on five “fronts” consisting of between 70 and 100 personnel each. Additionally, a group of 29 deminers referred to as the Marking Platoon (Pelotón de Señalización) works as an independent, mobile explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) unit to respond to new reports of mines and UXO, and to mark mined areas. The unit may be called on to clear larger areas than usual in EOD operations if a newly discovered mined area constitutes an immediate threat to the population and mine clearance teams are fully committed elsewhere.^[32]

In 2007 and 2008, the vast majority of the mine clearance in Nicaragua was done manually. There was a limited amount of mechanical clearance carried out in the interior of the country, but the conditions and remoteness of minefields along the Honduran border did not make mechanical clearance feasible, according to the Assistance Mission for Mine Clearance in Central America (Misión de Asistencia para la Remoción de Minas en Centro América, MARMINCA). MDDs are no longer used in Nicaragua.^[33]

Nicaragua reports that it respects the International Mine Action Standards and national standing operating procedures when conducting quality assurance.^[34] Clearance operations are supervised by the Inter-American Defense Board and the OAS, with technical assistance from MARMINCA.^[35]

Marking and fencing of affected areas

Not all mined areas are marked or fenced, in part due to the number of mined areas in remote regions and because previously marked areas have had the markings/fences removed by civilians. When new areas are found that cannot be cleared immediately, they are “informally marked” with tape and red danger signs.^[36]

Mine and ERW clearance in 2007 and 2008

There is no disaggregated information available on mine clearance specifically for 2007. Data is maintained on a cumulative basis. Based on information from Article 7 reports and presentations to the Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies in 2004–2007, an average of more than 350,000m² was cleared each year, the equivalent of 30,000m² per month. Over the proposed 28-month period from the time of making its Article 5 extension request through the end of the period requested, Nicaragua planned to clear 293,000m² in total—slightly less than 10,000m² per month. Nicaragua attributes this significantly lower productivity rate to more difficult terrain.

Nicaragua has also, however, claimed that clearance in 2007 was less than in 2006 for the following reasons:

• a 30% decline in funding that obliged a further reduction in the number of deminers;
• weather conditions, including the rains from Hurricane Felix, a Category 5 hurricane that reduced the number of useful days by 30–40% from previous years;
• the remote location of remaining minefields, requiring the construction of access roads;
• a halt in operations following two accidents in order to review standing operating procedures;
• the number of responses to public reports of mines or other explosives which took time away from planned mine clearance activities; and,
• problems with the machines used for demining.^[37]

For 2008, Nicaragua planned to clear 9,889 mines in 29 mined areas while continuing to respond to community requests for clearance. In 2009, Nicaragua would then clear the remaining 7,726 mines in 22 mined areas. However, the targets for both years depended on funding levels remaining at the level available at the start of 2008.^[38]

Summary of Efforts to Comply with Article 5

Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, Nicaragua is required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 May 2009. Between 1990 and 31 January 2008, Nicaragua’s mine clearance program released 52.8km² of SHAs and destroyed 158,661 mines in 961 minefields.^[39] Since 2004, however, Nicaragua has repeatedly declared that it would need one more year to meet its treaty obligations. Each year, however, completion was pushed back and in March 2008, Nicaragua declared that it would not meet its 1 May 2009 deadline and applied for a one-year extension. The extension request cited the discovery of new minefields and the decline in international funding as justifications for the need for an extension.

The extension request included an operational plan and budget covering the period 2008–2010. Nicaragua planned to employ 17 teams of 10 deminers each (a total of 170 deminers). Based on the number of demining teams deployed, each team would clear three mined areas, equivalent to an average of one every nine months. The average size of a mined area is 5,700m², and 22 of the mined areas remaining as of March 2008 were 4,000m² or less.^[40]

Nicaragua faces three potential obstacles to meeting an extended deadline of 2010, should it be granted. First, the extension requires significant levels of international funding. In 2007, there was a 30% decrease in international funding and 100 deminers were laid off. More cuts were expected in 2008.

Second, if significantly more mines are found than expected, Nicaragua claims this could slow clearance operations, as it has in the past.

Third, environmental factors have also impacted clearance operations. Over the last 15 years, Nicaragua has experienced three severe tropical storms and, each year, the possibility of another storm hitting the country persists. If a hurricane does hit, it will likely adversely affect clearance operations.

In March 2008, a senior Nicaraguan mine action official expected funding to decline in 2008, thereby further reducing clearance capacity and possibly even further delaying compliance with its Article 5 obligations.^[41] Nicaragua was seeking US$6.6 million from international donors (an additional $1.2 million for mine clearance in 2008, $5 million for 2009 and $400,000 to conclude activities from January through April 2010). If these amounts are not received, Nicaragua warned that mine clearance would have to extend beyond 1 May 2010.^[42]

An unspecified part of the $5 million for 2009 is needed to replace and repair metal detectors and communications equipment. As of March 2008, Nicaragua’s mine action program had a “deficit” of $1.2 million.^[43] In its critique of Nicaragua’s initial extension request, the ICBL called on Nicaragua to provide more information on the expected funding levels, confirm that efforts are being made to secure funding, and factor into its work (and the extension request) the implications of any funding decreases.

Landmine/ERW Casualties

In 2007, the OAS Assistance Program for Demining in Central America (PADCA) registered 15 new mine/ERW casualties in four incidents and two clearance accidents (one person killed and 14 injured).^[44] Three casualties were deminers and all the others were civilian (three men, three women, five children, and one person of unknown age/gender). Five casualties were caused by antipersonnel mines and ten by ERW.

Casualties occurred in the departments of Nueva Segovia, Estelí, and Matagalpa. On 8 June, one farmer was killed and another injured when an antipersonnel landmine exploded while they were working outside the boundaries of a previously cleared minefield in San Fernando, Nueva Segovia.^[45] On 25 July, two deminers were injured while clearing a minefield in Peñas Blancas, Matagalpa.^[46] No details were available about the third deminer injured in a separate incident. Scrap metal collection caused nine casualties in two ERW incidents, including five children.^[47] One incident, involving five people in San Ramon, Estelí, occurred after the family returned home and was sorting through the metal they had collected.^[48]

This is a significant increase from 2006 (two killed and five injured in five incidents) but similar to 2005 (15 casualties in eight incidents).^[49] OAS PADCA believes the increase can partly be attributed to increased scrap metal collection^[50] by families who collect garbage for a living.^[51]

No casualties were reported in 2008 through 30 June;^[52] during the same period in 2007, six casualties were recorded in two incidents.^[53]

Data collection

Mine/ERW casualty data collection and casualty surveillance is coordinated through OAS PADCA and is publicly available on its website. OAS PADCA collects information on new and previously unidentified casualties from emergency and rehabilitation services, military, police, and NGOs. OAS PADCA also monitors media reports and provides guidelines on how to report mine/ERW incidents to healthcare providers and local police.^[54] In the past, OAS PADCA and other sources have acknowledged that it was difficult to determine the exact number of mine/ERW casualties in Nicaragua, since it was believed that some incidents in isolated rural areas were unreported.^[55] However, in 2008 OAS PADCA believed that, as a result of ongoing data collection efforts through mine/ERW risk education (RE) campaigns, the actual number of survivors in the country may not be significantly higher than the number identified in the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database, which it described as “very complete.”^[56]

As of January 2008, the OAS PADCA database had registered 1,147 mine/ERW casualties since 1980, including 86 people killed and 1,061 injured. The casualties were reported in 1,010 incidents and 26 demining accidents. Of the casualties not caused by a demining accident, 754 (75%) were the result of mines, and the remaining 256 (25%) were from ERW.^[57] Demining accidents caused 41 casualties (five killed, 36 injured); 26 casualties were military personnel (six killed and 20 injured); 1,075 were civilian (205 killed and 870 injured); and the status of five casualties is unknown.

Female casualties were 10% of casualties (118); children under 12 years accounted for at least 78 casualties (63 boys, 15 girls); adolescents aged 12–19 years accounted for 169 casualties (144 male, 25 female); and the age of 170 people was unknown. The majority of casualties were reported in the northern departments of Nueva Segovia (33%, 382 casualties) and Jinotega (28%, 323 casualties).^[58] The database is continuously updated as past incidents are reported.

In Form I of its latest Article 7 report, Nicaragua noted that OAS PADCA and the Nicaraguan Army developed a landmine casualty census including the total number of casualties, their situation, incident and residence location, and assistance received. The information was included in IMSMA.^[59]

The Ministry of Health’s (MoH) 2007 National Health Policy stated that approximately one in ten Nicaraguans over the age of six were disabled, with a higher prevalence among women than men.^[60] However, INEC found in 2004 that 12.5% of the population had some kind of disability. The National Technological Institute disputed these figures, estimating that the disabled population amounted to 15%.^[61] Some 2.2% of persons with disabilities were war-disabled.^[62]

Landmine/ERW Risk Education

In 2007, the trend of decreased overall coverage by mine/ERW RE, which started in 2006, continued, the result of reduced areas left to clear. In 2007, RE coverage decreased by 40% (42,327 beneficiaries compared to 70,187 in 2006). ^[63] An OAS PADCA casualty assessment had led to a stronger focus on ERW in 2006, including a permanent radio campaign and emergency RE in communities that had experienced ERW incidents.^[64] However, in 2007, ERW casualties continued to increase, particularly due to scrap metal collection.^[65] OAS PADCA responded to scrap metal collection incidents with increased emergency RE and elevated clearance priority for localities where casualties occurred.^[66] In 2007, OAS PADCA and the CND, working with the Ministry of Education (MoE), were the only RE providers.^[67]

Nicaragua has a “National Plan for Education to Prevent Landmine Accidents” that forms part of the national mine action strategy.^[68] In principle, all RE activities are coordinated and monitored by the CND through the Sub-Commission on Education and Prevention which included representatives from ministries, NGOs, the Nicaraguan Red Cross (NRC), the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), UNICEF, and OAS PADCA. However, the sub-commission did not meet in 2007.^[69] Every year, OAS PADCA conducts an internal evaluation of RE programs to reorient activities for the following year, if needed.^[70] The results of the annual evaluation are presented to the CND which approves the RE plans for the following year.^[71] The 2007–2008 annual reviews of the program found the current RE approach to be successful and the program continued without significant changes.^[72] Casualty data from IMSMA is used to prioritize which communities receive RE. The difficult terrain and the isolation of mine-affected communities remained a challenge for RE in Nicaragua.^[73]

Nicaragua reported on RE activities for 2007 in Form I of its Article 7 report, describing the CND’s role in coordinating RE activities and implementing the national plan. The report listed programs implemented by OAS PADCA, the NRC/ICRC, and the CND, in cooperation with the MoE.^[74] However, its description of NRC activities in the North Atlantic Autonomous Region (Región Autónoma Atlántico Norte, RAAN) contradicted information provided by other sources, including the CND, which claimed NRC was not implementing RE in the region. Evaluations in December 2005 led to the cessation of RE activities (including those by NRC/ICRC) in the RAAN by 2007, where most clearance had been completed by 2005.^[75]

OAS PADCA continued to carry out campaigns in all departments where it was involved in demining operations. OAS PADCA provided RE in 140 high-risk communities in 12 municipalities in five departments, with the greatest focus in the departments of Nueva Segovia and Jinotega.^[76] In 2007, OAS PADCA RE teams responded to 218 public reports of mine/ERW discoveries, which were verified and resulted in the destruction of 4,845 items (164 mines and 4,681 ERW). Reports increased by nearly 60% compared to 2006 (129).^[77]

CND/MoE RE activities complemented OAS PADCA efforts by training teachers and distributing educational materials, produced with support from UNICEF in 2006, to schools in other departments close to mine-affected areas.^[78] In 2007, materials were distributed to 6,473 primary and 4,008 secondary schoolchildren in five different municipalities in the department of Madriz, which has been cleared of known minefields but borders other mine-affected departments. In 2008, the CND planned to distribute RE materials to 220 teachers in 12 municipalities in four departments, which had not received RE previously but were close to mine-affected departments.^[79]

Honduran communities along the border with Nicaragua that had previously been affected by conflict and landmines continued to receive RE.^[80]

Victim Assistance

Few projects to improve the quality of life of persons with disabilities have been implemented, as both the government and NGOs have funding constraints; there was no visible improvement in 2007.^[81]

Nicaragua’s urban hospitals have sufficient surgical capacity for emergency care and specialized services, but services in mine/ERW-affected areas are scarce and emergency evacuation usually takes several hours.^[82] It was further reported by INEC that few persons with disabilities received adequate medical treatment and that the quality of services was poor.^[83]

Access to rehabilitation and mobility devices is limited to three facilities, two of which are in the capital, while most mine/ERW survivors live in rural areas. All three facilities continued to depend on external financial support, and funding remained a challenge.^[84] Access was further hampered by lack of a national policy and the prohibitive cost of mobility devices and transportation to the centers. Retaining physical rehabilitation professionals was a challenge as salaries were low compared to neighboring countries. Between 1996 and 2008, the price of prostheses rose by 120% and only 0.5% of amputees could afford to pay for prostheses themselves.^[85] In 2007, the government started providing free emergency and primary healthcare, but there were still fees for physical rehabilitation.^[86]

Psychosocial support was only available in the capital, Managua. Economic reintegration and education opportunities were inadequate to meet the demand and were further hindered by lack of disability awareness, discrimination, and lack of a long-term plan to address the continuing needs of survivors.^[87]

Nicaragua has legislation to protect the rights of persons with disabilities, but the government did not effectively enforce the law and discrimination was widespread.^[88] On 7 December 2007, Nicaragua ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, but it had not signed its Optional Protocol as of 31 July 2008. The MoH maintains a website providing information on policies and services for persons with disabilities.^[89]

Progress in meeting VA25 victim assistance objectives

Nicaragua is one of 25 States Parties with significant numbers of mine survivors, and “the greatest responsibility to act, but also the greatest needs and expectations for assistance” in providing adequate services for the care, rehabilitation, and reintegration of survivors.^[90] As part of its commitment to the Nairobi Action Plan, Nicaragua presented its 2005–2009 objectives at the Sixth Meeting of States Parties in 2005, but neither revisions to the objectives nor plans to achieve them had been presented formally as of July 2008. Nicaragua’s objectives thus remained incomplete and largely non-SMART (specific, measurable, achievable, relevant, and time-bound).

A mid-term review of the status of victim assistance (VA) from November 2007 stated that “Nicaragua has revised its objectives. The document is in the process of being translated.”^[91] However, the revised document has not been made publicly available and Landmine Monitor was unable to obtain a copy, despite repeated requests. The CND cited the lack of a focal point within the MoH to explain why the information was not available.^[92]

Some advances in achieving the VA objectives were, however, presented at the Eighth Meeting of States Parties in November 2007, but some of the progress had already been presented in April 2007.^[93] In addition, Landmine Monitor was unable to corroborate all of this reported progress. For example, it was reported in November 2007 that a physiotherapy facility was being constructed in Ocotal, Nueva Segovia department.^[94] However, the director of a disabled people’s organization based near Ocotal reported that, as of 27 March 2008, no such facility was being constructed.^[95]

Within Nicaragua, NGOs expressed concern about the sustainability of national funding to maintain VA programs, as well as the lack of involvement of NGOs in government planning. In 2007, the government did not hold any meetings to seek NGO input on its efforts to meet its 2005–2009 objectives.^[96]

In 2007, the VA expert on Nicaragua’s delegation to the Eighth Meeting of States Parties cited the continued presence of mines close to the border with Honduras and the lack of sufficient resources to expand economic and social reintegration programs as the main challenges limiting progress.^[97] Nicaragua did not provide progress updates at the Standing Committee meetings in June 2008, and did not include a VA expert in its delegation.

Victim assistance strategic framework

Victim assistance was a component of Nicaragua’s Integrated Mine Action Program 2002–2007, coordinated by the CND and its Sub-Commission for Medical Assistance and Rehabilitation of Mine Survivors, which previously met three times a year but met just once in 2007.^[98] As of 28 March, the sub-commission had not yet met in 2008.^[99]

The Rehabilitation Office at the MoH, the focal point for work on VA issues directly with the CND, was closed at the end of 2007. Tasks undertaken by this office were redistributed between the National Rehabilitation Council (Consejo Nacional de Rehabilitación, CNR) and the Aldo Chavarria Rehabilitation Hospital. As of July 2008, no new focal point had been appointed at the MoH to work on VA planning with the CND.^[100]

One operator reported concerns that the efficiency with which OAS PADCA provided assistance to survivors decreased the government’s motivation to develop national capacity in this area.^[101] OAS PADCA funding had been scheduled to end in 2006, yet OAS PADCA reported that it planned to continue providing services to survivors even after closure of the clearance program in 2010, if funding was available.^[102]

In June 2008, the ICRC’s Special Fund for the Disabled (SFD) assisted the MoH in convening a roundtable with representatives from various government ministries and NGOs to develop a five-year national plan for the provision of physical rehabilitation services to persons with disabilities.^[103]

Responsibility for promoting the rights of persons with disabilities was spread across several government agencies and commissions including the ministries of health, education and family, the National Advocacy Commission, the CNR and the Office of the Attorney General.^[104] The VA focal point at the MoH will also be responsible for the implementation of the UN Convention of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.^[105]

The CND made a commitment to provide free psychosocial care, access to physical rehabilitation and socio-economic assistance.^[106] These services are supported by OAS PADCA, subject to funding availability. In 2007, not every survivor waiting for services in social reintegration was assisted.^[107]

At least 1,373 persons with disabilities, including 580 mine/ERW survivors or their families, received services during 2007. Within this total, OAS PADCA provided funding to assist 425 survivors. In addition, the NGO Walking Unidos assisted 504 people with physical rehabilitation (including 30 survivors), and the Polus Center for Social and Economic Development, Different Capacities (CAPADIFE) assisted 431 people with physical rehabilitation (112 survivors).^[108] Thirteen children of mine survivors received educational sponsorship.^[109]

In 2007, the SFD continued to provide financial, material and technical assistance to three physical rehabilitation centers (Walking Unidos; CAPADIFE; and the National Center for Technical Assistance and Orthoprosthetics, CENAPRORTO), which enabled them to assist more than 1,000 persons with disabilities (28% of whom were mine/ERW survivors). The NGOs CAPADIFE and Walking Unidos increased their capacity in 2007. CENAPRORTO, managed by the MoH, saw a decrease in the number of people assisted, mainly because of funding problems. The SFD supported the NRC with identification and follow-up with patients from rural areas, which resulted in an increase of patients from rural areas at CAPADIFE (from 128 in 2006 to 180 in 2007). The Special Fund also sponsored the prosthetic/orthotic training of two technicians at the University Don Bosco Prosthetic School in San Salvador, El Salvador.^[110]

OAS PADCA continued to support vocational training for mine/ERW survivors in cooperation with the National Technical Training Institute; it provided economic reintegration services to 17 survivors in 2007.^[111] By January 2008, the socio-economic reintegration program had assisted 325 people and 98 remained on the waiting list.^[112] Handicap International (HI) assisted the government in registering persons with disabilities, including mine survivors, and supported efforts to promote the rights of persons with disabilities.^[113] In December 2007, the charity Grapes for Humanity raised $50,000 for the Polus Center’s Coffeelands Landmine Victim’s Trust which assists coffee farmers in Colombia and Nicaragua who have been injured by mines/ERW. The US Department of State matched this amount. The distribution of funds between Colombia and Nicaragua is unknown.^[114]

Support for Mine Action

Nicaragua has reported a cost estimate totaling $8.3 million (€6,053,534) for fulfillment of its Article 5 obligations during the period 2008–2010, with annual costs estimated at $1.8 million in 2008, $6 million in 2009 and $500,000 in 2010.^[115] National funds were projected to account for $1.7 million or roughly 20% of total required funds, with the remaining $5.9 million or 80% provided by international donors.^[116] In February 2008, Nicaragua held a meeting in Managua with representatives of donor states to develop financial support for its mine action plan.^[117] Nicaragua did not report funds committed as a result of the meeting. Landmine Monitor is not aware of comprehensive long-term cost estimates covering VA needs in Nicaragua.

National support for mine action

Nicaragua reported contributing $1 million from the national budget to mine action in 2007. It has reported contributing the same amount annually since 2000.^[118] Nicaragua reported covering CND staffing costs, while operational costs were covered by international donors.^[119] Nicaragua has projected contributing $600,000 to its mine clearance objectives in 2008, followed by $1 million in 2009, and $100,000 in 2010.^[120]

International cooperation and assistance

In 2007, five countries reported providing $4,493,022 (€3,276,947) to mine action in Nicaragua. Reported mine action funding in 2007 was approximately 21% less than reported in 2006. Sweden contributed approximately $1.4 million in 2006 through the OAS, but did not contribute funds in 2007. Funding in 2007 was insufficient to meet mine action needs in Nicaragua, which as of March 2008 reported a deficit of $1.2 million in funding towards meeting its 2008 mine clearance obligations proposed under its Article 5 extension request.^[121]

2007 International Mine Action Funding to Nicaragua: Monetary^[122]

Nicaragua reported $5.5 million in international funding in 2007, roughly equivalent to 2006 funding levels reported to Landmine Monitor.^[123] However, Nicaragua did not provide a breakdown of funds by donor state or agency, or by the year funds were originally allocated, making comparison impossible with funds reported to Landmine Monitor.