+   *    +     +     
About Us 
The Issues 
Our Research Products 
Order Publications 
Multimedia 
Press Room 
Resources for Monitor Researchers 
ARCHIVES HOME PAGE 
    >
Sub-Sections:
Untitled document

Democratic Republic of the Congo

2008 Key Data

State Party since

1 November 2002

Contamination

Antipersonnel and antivehicle mines, submunitions, other ERW

Estimated area of contamination

Unquantified

Casualties in 2008

14 (2007: 28)

Estimated mine/ERW survivors

Unknown but at least 1,247

Article 5 (clearance of mined areas)

Deadline: 1 November 2012

Demining in 2008

Mined and battle area clearance: 0.55km2

Risk education recipients in 2008

575,723

Progress towards victim assistance aims

Slow

Support for mine action in 2008

Ten-Year Summary

The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) became a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty on 1 November 2002. National implementation legislation is under consideration in the Parliament. In May 2006, the DRC reported that it had completed its stockpile destruction. It continues to find and destroy additional stockpiled mines each year. There were credible allegations of use of antipersonnel mines in the DRC by non-state armed groups at least until 2004, and by Ugandan and Rwandan government forces in 2000.

The DRC has made limited progress in identifying and clearing mined areas from its territory since becoming a State Party. The extent of contamination remains unclear, and the UN has noted the lack of significant progress in treaty implementation.

The UN Mine Action Coordination Centre recorded 1,696 mine/explosive remnants of war (ERW) casualties (705 killed and 991 injured) in the DRC between 1999 and 2008, although data collection remained limited and many more casualties are thought to exist. Risk education has been conducted by international and national NGOs working in partnership since 2002, and has increased each year.

Despite having developed objectives to increase victim assistance by 2009, as part of its commitment to achieve the aims of the Nairobi Action Plan, mine/ERW survivors have received little assistance since 2004. Due to ongoing conflict, poor healthcare services, an under-resourced rehabilitation sector, and few opportunities for psychological assistance or economic reintegration, survivors received limited or no support services.

Mine Ban Policy

The DRC acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty on 2 May 2002, becoming a State Party on 1 November 2002. The National Commission to Fight Antipersonnel Mines was created in 2002.[1]

The DRC submitted its latest Article 7 transparency report on 22 May 2009, covering calendar year 2008. It has submitted six previous reports.[2]

The DRC has not enacted domestic legislation to implement the Mine Ban Treaty. In its May 2009 Article 7 report, it stated that the process of developing legislation had been “paralyzed” by internal political problems, which have had “grave repercussions” on the functioning of national institutions.[3] However, it also said the legislation was still under consideration by the Lower House of Parliament, before being sent to the Senate and then the President for promulgation, noting that it hoped to complete the process in 2009.[4]

The DRC attended the Ninth Meeting of States Parties in Geneva in November 2008, where it made statements on stockpile destruction, mine clearance, and victim assistance. It did not attend the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in May 2009.

The DRC has not engaged in the discussions that States Parties have had on matters of interpretation and implementation related to Articles 1, 2, and 3 (joint military operations with states not party, foreign stockpiling and transit of antipersonnel mines, antivehicle mines with sensitive fuzes or antihandling devices, and mines retained for training).

The DRC is not party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons. It signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions on 18 March 2009 during a special event at the UN in New York. It had not ratified the convention as of 1 July 2009.[5]

Production, use, stockpiling, destruction, and retention

The DRC is not known to have produced or exported antipersonnel mines. While government forces used antipersonnel mines in the past, Landmine Monitor has not received any allegations of use of antipersonnel mines by government forces since the DRC acceded to the treaty. There were credible allegations of use of antipersonnel mines in the DRC by non-state armed groups at least until 2004, and by Ugandan and Rwandan government forces in 2000.[6]

In May 2006, at the Standing Committee meetings, the DRC informed States Parties that it had completed the destruction of all 2,864 stockpiled antipersonnel mines it had been able to identify, thus fulfilling its treaty obligation to destroy stocks by 1 November 2006. It stated that if more stockpiled mines were discovered later they would be destroyed in a timely fashion.[7]

Since May 2006, the DRC has destroyed newly discovered or seized antipersonnel mines on many occasions. In its May 2009 Article 7 report, the DRC listed 631 additional mines destroyed during 2008, all of them reportedly turned over by national armed forces (Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo, FARDC) personnel at Kabinda, Lubao, and Lufalanga, as well as the Kamina military base. The report does not explain whether the mines were discovered among FARDC arsenals or were discovered or seized from other sources. The stockpiles consisted of the following mines: 267 M35, 110 NR413, 100 TM-500, 78 Z1, 72 No. 4, one M18, one AUPS, one No. 2, and one TS-50.[8] The DRC also reported destruction of more than 1,000 additional mines in 2007 and 2006.[9]

In its May 2009 Article 7 report, as in its previous report, the DRC stated that information on retained mines was “not yet available.”[10] It is still not clear if this indicates the DRC is considering retaining or has already retained an unspecified number of mines for training and research purposes.

Non-State Armed Groups

Non-state armed groups (NSAGs), both Congolese and foreign, remain active in the country.[11] Landmine Monitor found no allegations of new use of antipersonnel mines by any group in 2008 or the first half of 2009. Disarmament and demobilization of former NSAG combatants continued.[12] As noted above, the DRC reported additional mines destroyed during 2008, but did not report specifically on mines surrendered by or seized from NSAGs.

Scope of the Problem

Contamination

The DRC is affected by mines—both antivehicle and antipersonnel—and ERW. Contamination is from UXO, possibly still including unexploded submunitions,[13] as well as from significant quantities of abandoned explosive ordnance. The precise extent of contamination is unknown due to the lack of a nationwide general survey[14] although, as of November 2008, a total of 2,004 suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) had been identified.[15]

Contamination is said by the government to exist across the territory, but is predominantly found in the east, north, and part of the south of the country.[16] In November 2008, the UN declared that the provinces of Equateur, Katanga, North Kivu, Province Orientale, and South Kivu were the most affected. The DRC’s latest Article 7 report also includes Maniema in a list of the most affected provinces.[17] The UN also stated that, “more and more dangerous areas are being reported in Kasai Oriental and Occidental.”[18]

Casualties

In 2008, the UN Mine Action Coordination Centre (UNMACC) reported 14 mine/ERW casualties (three killed and 11 injured). The casualties were seven men, one woman, five children (four boys and one girl), and no details were provided for one casualty. At least six were civilian casualties and details for the others were not recorded. At least three incidents were caused by ERW; for the others the device was unknown. Three incidents occurred in South Kivu province and one incident each in the provinces of Kasai Occidental, Katanga, North Kivu, and Oriental. This was a decrease compared to 2007 when 28 new mine/ERW casualties (four killed and 24 injured) were reported in 11 incidents in the DRC.[19]

Due to delays in data collection, however, it is possible that the 2008 casualty figure will increase in future reporting, as in previous years, including 2007, for which UNMACC had reported 22 casualties.[20] Casualty reporting remained inconsistent. In 2008, UNMACC informed Landmine Monitor of three people killed in April while tampering with a hand grenade, but these casualties were not included in the UNMACC total for 2008. No further explanation was provided.[21] UNICEF reported that there were 10 mine incidents during October 2008 to January 2009: this does not correspond with UNMACC records.[22]

Casualties continued to be reported in 2009: at least one boy was injured while playing with ERW in North Kivu, as of 15 June. [23]

As of June 2009, the total number of casualties recorded by UNMACC in the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) from 1964 to the end of 2008, was 2,184 (931 killed and 1,247 injured; six people who were neither killed nor physically injured were also included in the database).[24] Reflecting the inconsistencies in data and reporting for the DRC, it was also reported that the 2,184 UNMACC-recorded casualties occurred between 1996 and 2008.[25] The UN reported that the current records underestimate the extent of the problem. Total casualty figures for the DRC are expected to “rise dramatically” when information can be collected in areas currently inaccessible due to ongoing conflict.[26]

From 1999 to 2008, UNMACC recorded 1,696 casualties (705 killed and 991 injured).[27] The majority of casualties were men (782 including four deminers), followed by women (311), boys (205), and girls (88), while the age and/or gender of 315 casualties was unknown. Most casualties were civilian (1,213), while 67 were military and another 421 unknown. ERW caused most casualties (571) followed by antipersonnel mines (554), antivehicle mines (66), cluster submunitions (142), other victim-activated improvised explosive devices (IEDs)—booby traps—(10), and unknown devices (358).

The main activities at the time of the incident were farming (319), passing by/standing near (245), collecting food/wood/water (221), and hunting and fishing (108). Deliberate tampering caused 68 casualties, traveling (60), household work (31), and tending animals (19). One civilian casualty occurred during a demining accident and 175 casualty activities were recorded as “other” and 322 as unknown. Four deminer casualties and 57 military casualties were reported. The casualty peak occurred between 2000 and 2003 when at least 1,316 casualties were recorded. Most casualties occurred in the provinces of Equateur (381), South Kivu (359), Katanga (170), and North Kivu (168).[28]

Risk profile

People are mainly at risk from UXO, although mines also pose a threat. The highest level of contamination is found from the north of Equateur province to the south of Katanga province, via the two Kasai provinces. Most incidents reported were caused through farming, herding, attempting to transform hazardous items into agricultural, hunting, or fishing tools, collecting water and firewood, and children playing with suspected items.[29] The state of ammunition stockpiles also poses a significant risk to civilians and explosions have occurred in a number of ammunition storage areas.[30]

Conflict in the Eastern provinces (North Kivu, Maniema, Oriental, and South Kivu) has increased the level of UXO contamination, as well as creating large numbers of internally displaced persons (IDPs). In other areas relative stability is an incentive for refugees based in Zambia, Tanzania, and the Republic of the Congo to return to Katanga and Equateur, two of the most contaminated provinces.[31] According to the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 39,543 refugees returned to the DRC in 2008.[32]

Socio-economic impact

According to the UN, the growing number of victims and dangerous areas being reported suggests that the impact of contamination is considerable.[33] The DRC has stated that contamination impedes access to water points, renders agricultural land unusable, endangers the return of refugees and IDPs, and blocks the reconstruction of roads. The existence of antivehicle mines has, for example, prevented Médecins sans Frontières Suisse from accessing the health point at Dungu; the health center at Ikela in Equator province is said to be similarly blocked.[34]

Program Management and Coordination

Mine action

In March 2008, the government created two new structures: an interministerial National Mine Action Commission to serve as the national mine action authority and a “Focal Point” in the Ministry of Interior and Security. Both will lead to the establishment of the Congolese Centre for Mine Action, a “technical, operational, and permanent” structure charged with implementing the policies and decisions of the Commission.[35] In the absence of a formal governmental regulatory body, the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) manages UNMACC, established in 2002, which is part of the UN Mission in the DRC (MONUC) peacekeeping mission. UNMACC maintains de facto responsibility for planning, managing and monitoring all mine action activities on behalf of the government.[36]

Risk education

Risk Education (RE) is managed by UNMACC. UNICEF funded a position for a Congolese national on UNMACC’s staff to coordinate RE issues beginning in August 2007. From August to December 2008, there was a gap in the contract and no one was responsible for managing RE. As of January 2009, the post was filled again.[37] The RE officer receives training from the deputy program manager.[38]

An accreditation process exists for international NGOs and is to be extended to national NGOs, but this had not happened as of May 2009.[39] The RE officer is in charge of quality assurance of the operators.[40] The national standards for mine action that are being developed by UNMACC include RE, but had not been approved as of June 2009.[41]

RE is included in the monthly mine action coordination meeting organized by UNMACC.[42]

UNMACC’s operational plan includes RE and was developed through consultation with key stakeholders. The goal is a reduction by 50% of new mine/UXO incidents by 2012. The specific RE objectives are: to coordinate RE activities, build capacity, monitor and evaluate RE programs, and the financial management of RE projects.[43] An evaluation is planned for September 2009.[44]

Victim assistance

A focal point for victim assistance (VA) at the Ministry of Health (MoH) was appointed in late 2007.[45] UNMACC’s VA role has been limited, other than data collection. There was some limited collaboration between UNMACC and the MoH on logistics and data management issues.[46] In early 2009, UNMACC was preparing to fill a position for a VA coordinator which would include roles of casualty data management, VA planning and coordination, and liaison on VA issues with the ministries of health and social affairs. Funding for the position was secured by April 2009.[47] As of 17 June 2009, the position had not been filled.[48]

Data collection and management

An evaluation of the UNMAS program in 2008 found that “greater efforts” were needed to ensure reliable data is available to assist mid- to long-term planning.[49] UNMACC has been administering the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database for the DRC.[50] RE activities are entered into IMSMA.[51]

There is no complete nationwide data collection mechanism in the DRC and casualties are believed to be under-reported. Some areas remain inaccessible because of the lack of infrastructure or security constraints.[52]

UNMACC began collecting data on mine/ERW casualties in the DRC in 2002. It collects casualty information through partner organizations, mostly local NGOs and international organizations. The capacity of the organizations involved is variable, and quality assurance from UNMACC is inadequate.[53] No changes were reported in data collection organizations. However, the detail in reporting forms was reduced to match the level of information that could be entered into IMSMA.[54] The 2008 UNMAS evaluation recommended that UNMACC improve distribution of casualty data to VA providers.[55] Health system data does not differentiate mine/ERW casualties from other injured people, although the distinction may sometimes take place in the records of local services.[56]

From January to May 2008, Handicap International (HI) carried out a Preliminary Opinion Collection and Community Impact Survey in Equateur, Maniema, North Kivu, and Orientale provinces. The survey identified previously unrecorded casualties; 54 in North Kivu and six in Maniema. Data was shared with UNMACC for IMSMA use.[57] UNMACC reported that it received 62 casualty reports provided by HI but that many of the records contained incorrect or incomplete data and required further verification.[58]

Mine action program operators

National operators and activities

Demining

RE

Casualty data collection

VA

Synergie pour la lutte antimine (Synergy for Mine Action, SYLAM)

 

x

x

 

Tosalisana

 

x

x

 

Action for the Complete Development of Communities (ADIC)

 

x

x

 

Bureau des Actions de Développement et des Urgences (BADU)

 

x

x

 

Humanitas Ubangi

 

x

x

 

Eglise du Christ au Congo (ECC-Meru)

 

x

x

 

International operators and activities

Demining

RE

Casualty data collection

VA

NGOs

       

DanChurchAid

x

x

   

Handicap International

x

x

x

x

Mines Advisory Group

x

x

   

Commercial companies

Demining 

RE

Casualty data collection 

VA 

Mechem

x

     

The Development Initiative Limited (TDI)

x

     

Plans

Strategic mine action plans

No strategic mine action plan exists for the DRC. In May 2008, the evaluation of the UN mine action program recommended that UNMACC develop a four- to five-year mine action operational strategy concentrating on the following areas:

  • identification of contaminated areas;
  • establishment of an action plan for effective prioritization of clearance operations;
  • definition of the needs for RE and development of an action plan; and
  • development of a meaningful VA policy.[59]

The UN reported that in 2009, mine action would “emphasize surveying, due to the continuous lack of information, and pay more attention to the overlooked provinces of Kasai Oriental and Kasai Occidental.”[60] As of April 2009, an operational action plan was reportedly being drafted, due to be ready by June.[61] No further progress was reported as of late July 2009.

The DRC has not presented a national VA strategy. In its 2009 Article 7 report the DRC stated that drafting of a VA strategy was ongoing.[62] Yet, in 2007, it was reported that “a plan of action based on the Nairobi Action Plan has been developed.”[63] In 2008, the VA focal point in the MoH declined to provide a copy of the draft plan, and explained that further developments were pending.[64] The UNMACC position for a VA coordinator includes the task of preparing a VA strategy.[65] A recommendation of the 2008 evaluation was for the program to develop “a meaningful victim assistance policy.”[66]

Integration of mine action with reconstruction and development

The national strategy for growth and poverty reduction was published in July 2006, but it does not refer specifically to the problem of mines or ERW.[67] According to the poverty reduction strategy, the government’s priority activities take account of persons with disabilities. Possible activities include the establishment of a national program for persons with disabilities, improving economic and social circumstances, promotion of education and training, and improving health and mobility of persons with disabilities.[68]

National ownership

Commitment to mine action and victim assistance

In November 2007, the UN stated that although the government “continues to demonstrate commitment to the treaty, there has been no significant progress on implementation. The adoption of national legislation and the establishment of a national mine action authority are still pending.”[69] It repeated this statement in 2008.[70] In November 2008, the DRC declared its firm commitment to implementing the Mine Ban Treaty and claimed that its recent progress had been far more significant, notably through its efforts to set up national mine action structures.[71]

VA, to the extent that it has been included in broader health and disability services in the DRC, has been primarily the responsibility of the MoH, which coordinates the rehabilitation sector through the National Community-Based Rehabilitation Program (Programme National de Réadaptation à Base Communautaire, PNRBC). However, the centers which provide rehabilitation services to persons with disabilities, including mine/ERW survivors, are managed by NGOs, religious organizations, or private companies and receive support from the ICRC.[72]

National mine action legislation

Two ministerial decrees were issued in 2008, establishing a National Mine Action Authority and a focal point for mine action. A national law, including a legal basis for the mine action program, was planned to be adopted before the end of 2008.[73] This had not occurred as of March 2009.[74]

National management

The demining program in the DRC continues to be managed by the UN, although in 2008 the government appeared to be taking a greater interest in asserting its responsibilities for the program. The focal point system is seen as a positive step but is still at an early stage of development.[75]

National budget

In 2008, a budget of US$2.9 million was proposed by the Ministry of Interior and Security to support the Focal Point for Mine Action, but this was not approved by the National Assembly. It was planned to reintroduce the budget for the 2010 fiscal year.[76]

National mine action standards/Standing operating procedures

National mine action standards (NMAS) were drafted in 2008 with the assistance of the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining.[77] In November 2008, the DRC stated that the standards would be adopted by February 2009.[78] As of March 2009, 21 of the 27 planned NMAS had been drafted and a review had started within technical working groups.[79] The NMAS were expected to be adopted by the end of 2009.[80]

Program evaluations

In 2008, UNMAS commissioned an external evaluation of the UN mine action program in the DRC. The purpose of the evaluation, conducted in March–April, was to help define the future course of the program.[81] The evaluation concluded that there was a need to “reactivate and reorient the program,” on the one hand, by continuing to encourage the government to establish the necessary capacity to deal with the mine/ERW problem, and, on the other hand, to improve the efficiency of mine action. This implied gaining a better understanding of the extent of contamination as well as being more responsive to the needs of the NGOs and proactively supporting their operations.[82]

The evaluation report included only a brief review of data collection and VA issues, highlighting the need for increased data collection and sharing of information as well as a severe lack of VA services. The evaluation concluded that establishing specific VA projects for mine/ERW survivors in the DRC was not warranted and that mine action actors should help to ensure that mine/ERW survivors’ needs are met through appropriate programs in the existing health, education, social, and employment sectors.[83]

Demining and Battle Area Clearance

In 2008, demining and battle area clearance continued to be carried out by three international NGOs: DanChurchAid (DCA), Handicap International (HI), and Mines Advisory Group (MAG). A new international demining operator, TDI (The Development Initiative Ltd.), a commercial company, arrived in the DRC in December 2008. As of May 2009, it was deploying to Katanga province to carry out general survey and spot explosive ordnance disposal tasks.[84] Swedish Rescue Services Agency (SRSA) joined DCA in a partnership in February 2009, using a Mini MineWolf machine in Kabalo on DCA tasks.[85]

Demining and battle area clearance in 2008[86]

Operator

Area cleared

(m2)

Antipersonnel mines destroyed

Antivehicle mines destroyed

Unexploded submunitions destroyed

Other ERW destroyed

DCA

323,125

11

2

0

4,563

HI

9,796

12

2

10

388

MAG

204,749

0

0

0

44,184

Mechem

16,492

0

0

0

8

* The DRC reported the destruction of only 19 antipersonnel mines during 2008.[87]

The 2008 UNMAS evaluation identified UNMACC’s quality management as a serious weakness of the demining program. Only the subcontracting agency Mechem seemed to be correctly monitored, [88] although UNMACC conducted six quality management missions in 2008 and a further three in the first quarter of 2009 on DCA projects.[89] Neither HI nor MAG had a quality assurance or quality control visit during 2008,[90] although in 2009, HI received one visit per month in the first four months of the year.[91] HI noted that the lack of quality management capacity impeded the appropriate handover of cleared land.[92] In April 2009, UNMACC stated that a new concept of operations would include a “total quality management process.”[93]

Demining and battle area
clearance: 2004–2008

Year

Area cleared (km2)

2008

0.55

2007

0.41

2006

0.78

2005

0.45

2004

0.01

Progress since becoming a State Party

Under Article 5 of the treaty, the DRC is required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 November 2012. In five years of clearance, DRC has cleared only 2.2km2 of suspected hazardous areas and has no credible estimate for the extent of contamination. On 27 November 2008, at the Ninth Meeting of States Parties, the DRC declared that it was “superfluous” to consider the need for an extension at this stage but noted the “major obstacles” facing the country in its efforts to implement the Mine Ban Treaty.[94]

Risk Education

In 2008, mine/ERW RE was implemented by national NGOs and accredited international NGOs working in partnership.[95] Other national NGOs expanded their spheres of activity to include RE and survey.[96] In 2008, the number of beneficiaries recorded in IMSMA was 549,457,[97] but the total reported to Landmine Monitor by operators was 575,723. This continues a trend of increasing RE activity over the last five years.[98]

RE activities include emergency RE, direct RE, training of trainers, and community liaison (CL). Reaching remote and isolated communities has continued to be a major challenge for RE.[99]

MAG and Humanitas Hubangui, a national NGO, have a network of community volunteers in most of the affected areas, which they provide with notebooks and T-shirts to gather information. When MAG passes through communities, their CL officers collect the information and where necessary, produce dangerous area reports.[100] MAG conducts organizational capacity-building for Humanitas Hubangui on both implementing and managing RE with a view to the organization being able to access funding on its own.[101] They also conduct RE through the community volunteers, including refugees in transit camps, in Katanga, North Equateur, and South Equateur provinces to a total of 170,600 beneficiaries.[102]

HI worked in partnership with the national NGOs SYLAM and Tosalisana in Kisangani and Goma to deliver emergency RE, training of trainers to mine committees, local authorities, child-to-child training, and community liaison to a total of 31,462 beneficiaries.[103]

DCA worked in partnership with ECC-Meru, the national church umbrella organization, Badu and ADIC to conduct RE and community liaison in Katanga, South Kivu and Manjema to a total of 373,661 beneficiaries.[104]

An RE workshop was held in Bukavu with all operators (except HI, as a fatal accident prevented their participation) in September 2008 to develop a common set of RE materials, including school booklets, leaflets for use in communities during RE sessions and at refugee transit camps, and training aids. They were produced in Swahili, Lingala, and French.[105] They were printed and distributed by UNICEF in early 2009.[106]

The international NGOs report monitoring the activities of their national partners.[107]

The 2008 external evaluation of the UN mine action program recommended defining the needs for RE, developing an action plan, revising and harmonizing messages, setting up an accreditation procedure for national organizations, and developing national coordination capacity.[108]

There was little RE in the DRC until July 2002. Since then international and national NGOs have conducted RE through a mix of emergency and community-based activities (including setting up community committees, and child-to-child RE), mass media, and CL. Target groups have included at-risk communities, IDPs, and refugees. RE has been conducted in Kisangani and the surrounding areas, north Katanga, North and South Kivu, Equateur, and Orientale provinces.[109]

HI started to conduct RE in the DRC in 2002, and was joined by UNICEF, DCA, and Mines Awareness Trust in 2003 and MAG in 2005.[110] National NGOs called for capacity-building to create a sustainable RE capacity, and UNICEF and international NGOs responded by providing several training courses and working in partnership with national NGOs.[111] In 2006, the number of RE beneficiaries doubled from the previous year, as a result of the doubling number of national NGOs and training by international operators.[112] It continued to increase in 2007 with international NGOs increasing the scope of the programs and more national NGOs becoming involved. Yet geographic coverage remained inadequate.[113]

In 2004, Mines Awareness Trust seconded an RE advisor to UNICEF who designed a national RE curriculum and materials.[114] From 1999–2008, UNMACC recorded 1,423,862 beneficiaries.[115]

On the occasion of International Day for Mine Action, 4 April 2009, a famous singer in the DRC, Miss Mbongo, was appointed as Ambassador of the struggle against landmines.[116]

Victim Assistance

The total number of survivors is unknown, but is estimated to be at least 1,247.[117] In 2008, VA efforts were stalled by political discord and the consequences of internal conflict on the operation of relevant institutions.[118] No specific VA programs exist in the DRC. All assistance has been provided through broader programs for health and persons with disabilities. Accessing rehabilitation services remained challenging. Few other services have been reported by international organizations or local authorities.[119]

A lack of resources, combined with looting of medical equipment, has eroded the healthcare system.[120] Emergency healthcare in the DRC remained inadequate in mine-affected areas in 2008, and in many places public health services had collapsed. International organizations continued to supplement healthcare, but faced funding shortages. Ongoing conflict hampered relief efforts and simultaneously increased demand for services.[121] The government reportedly provided limited assistance through healthcare facilities and some surgical assistance in coordination with the national community-based rehabilitation program. Government services in areas with mine casualties faced limited finances and lacked technical capacity.[122]

Improvement of physical rehabilitation services remained a serious challenge.[123] PNRBC services remained weak and lacked funding. No expansion of the program, as had been planned, was reported for 2008.[124] PNRBC has struggled to implement activities since its launch in 2002. The PNRBC community-based rehabilitation (CBR) network attempted to integrate data on persons with disabilities in 2008. It faced challenges in equipping and standardizing services at centers.[125]

Limited psychological support services exist in the DRC, despite the needs of people suffering trauma from conflict, particularly sexual violence.[126] Psychological care within the health system is only provided by physiotherapists and social workers with some basic training.[127] Persons with disabilities often found it difficult to obtain economic reintegration assistance including through employment, education, and government services. Limited private and public funds were allocated to schools providing specialized or vocational training for persons with disabilities.[128] No specific economic reintegration services were reported for survivors.[129]

The DRC has no specific legislation for persons with disabilities, including mine/ERW survivors. The 2006 constitution contains a general provision protecting the rights of persons with disabilities.[130] But the government has not effectively enforced existing legal provisions. Accessibility of buildings or government services is not mandated by law.[131] Supported by HI, in 2008, local associations for persons with disabilities in Kinshasa worked to develop draft legislation to protect the rights of persons with disabilities, based on the provision in the constitution.[132]

As of 1 July 2009, the DRC had not signed the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. The DRC stated it had started the accession process in late 2007.[133] In 2008, the treaty text was reportedly translated and distributed nationally to provincial parliaments. Workshops on the convention were held in provinces including Kisangani, and North and South Kivu, with a view to adoption by the national parliament in 2009.[134]

Progress in meeting VA26 victim assistance objectives

The DRC is one of the 26 States Parties with significant numbers of mine survivors, and “the greatest responsibility to act, but also the greatest needs and expectations for assistance” in providing adequate services for the care, rehabilitation, and reintegration of survivors.[135] As part of its commitment to the Nairobi Action Plan, the DRC presented its 2005–2009 objectives at the Sixth Meeting of States Parties in 2005; they were subsequently revised in 2006, but no plans to fulfill the objectives were added. Objectives remained largely non-specific.[136] As noted above, the creation of a strategic plan to implement the objectives was announced twice in 2007, but was being revised and had not been formally presented as of May 2009.

Landmine Monitor was unable to identify significant progress on any of the DRC’s VA objectives since 2004, other than partial improvement in data collection, the deadline for which elapsed in 2007. In 2008 and 2009, no notable developments were reported on objectives, which were scheduled to be realized by 2009. Challenges appeared to be a lack of coordination, capacity, technical support, and funding. No progress in implementing objectives was reported in 2008, and the only concrete activities reported by the DRC were consultations regarding a VA strategy.[137]

In 2008, a process support visit was undertaken by the Mine Ban Treaty’s Implementation Support Unit on the behalf of the co-chairs of the Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration. The DRC participated in the Nairobi workshop on advancing VA in Africa in 2005. The DRC included a VA or disability expert on its delegation to the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in 2006 and 2007, and at each meeting of States Parties from 2006 to 2009. The DRC used the voluntary Form J attachment to its annual Article 7 report to provide some information on the state of VA in all years from 2005 to 2009.[138]

Victim assistance activities

ICRC-supported hospitals reported admitting 502 weapon-wounded patients, among them one mine/ERW casualty (0.02% of the total in 2008).[139] During the year, ICRC-supported physical rehabilitation centers provided 93 prostheses for mine/ERW survivors (16% of the total) and 11 orthoses for mine survivors (9% of the total).[140] The ICRC increased its support from one rehabilitation center in 1999 to five in 2009: Kasai Occidental, North Kivu, South Kivu, and two centers in the capital, Kinshasa.[141]

HI continued to support the reintegration of persons with disabilities in Kinshasa through its CBR project in cooperation with the urban division of social affairs. The HI CBR project did not operate in coordination with the national CBR program run by the MoH. The HI program identifies persons with disabilities and provides referrals to appropriate medical, rehabilitation, and educational services. Based on its recent data collection activities, HI intends to work with local NGOs to build VA capacity as part of an exit strategy from VA in the DRC by 2011. Through the HI program, one mine/ERW survivor received a referral for prosthetics assistance in 2008.[142]

No data from the MoH on beneficiaries of the PNRBC was available due to a lack of adequate data collection.[143]

Support for Mine Action

Landmine Monitor is not aware of any comprehensive long-term cost estimates for meeting mine action needs (including RE and VA) in the DRC. There is no long-term strategic plan for mine action, including resource mobilization strategies. In November 2007, the DRC stated that development of a strategic plan through to 2012 was one of two national priorities for mine action.[144] UNMAS reported that such a strategy was planned for 2008, along with capacity development for a transition away from UNMACC management.[145] No such plan was reported complete as of July 2009.

National support for mine action

The DRC did not report national funding to mine action in 2008, as in 2007.[146]

International cooperation and assistance

In 2008, six countries reported providing $12,407,357 (€8,425,476) to mine action in the DRC. Reported mine action funding in 2008 was roughly 110% more than reported in 2007. In US dollar terms, funding to the DRC has risen every year since 2003. However, as in previous years, given that the full extent of the landmine problem is not known, it is not possible to assess the adequacy of overall funding for mine action.

2008 International Mine Action Funding to the DRC: Monetary[147]

Donor

Implementing agencies/organizations

Project details

Amount

Netherlands

MAG, UNMAS

Unspecified mine action

$4,196,640

Sweden

MAG, SRSA

Unspecified mine action

$3,569,346 (SEK23,497,996)

Denmark

DCA

Integrated mine action

$1,719,375 (DKK8,750,000)

Belgium

MAG

Integrated mine action

$1,193,142 (€810,228)

United Kingdom

DCA

Data collection, RE, mine action coordination

$911,561 (£491,540)

Spain

DCA

Mine clearance

$817,293 (€555,000)

In March 2009, Japan made a contribution of ¥762 million ($7,391,400) to the UN Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Action for mine action in the DRC and Chad.[148] It did not differentiate the amounts dedicated to Chad and the DRC, but in May 2009, Chad reported that at least $5,586,000 of Japan’s contribution would be allocated to technical survey and clearance programs in Chad.[149] This would leave not more than about $1.9 million in funding to the DRC, to be applied to survey, rapid response capacity, and VA programs.[150]


[1] Article 7 Report, Form A, 30 April 2003; and see also Landmine Monitor Report 2006, p. 325.

[2] Previous Article 7 reports were submitted on 20 May 2008, 30 April 2007, 18 April 2006, 2 May 2005, 21 June 2004, and 30 April 2003.

[3] Article 7 Report, Form J, 22 May 2009. In its May 2008 Article 7 report, the DRC had reported “new momentum” in development of national implementation laws, and stated that in 2007 a bill on the prohibition of mines was presented to parliament for “assessment.” Article 7 Report, Forms A and J, 20 May 2008. In its April 2007 Article 7 report, the DRC stated that the government had restarted the process of adopting the basic texts relevant to application of the treaty. Article 7 Report, Form J, 30 April 2007.

[4] Article 7 Report, Forms A and J, 22 May 2009.

[5] For details on cluster munition policy and practice see Human Rights Watch and Landmine Action, Banning Cluster Munitions: Government Policy and Practice, Mines Action Canada, May 2009, pp. 60–61.

[6] See Uganda and Rwanda chapters in this edition of Landmine Monitor. In earlier years, there were also credible allegations of use of antipersonnel mines in the DRC by the armed forces of Burundi and Zimbabwe.

[7] See Landmine Monitor Report 2006, pp. 326–327. The DRC representative in May 2006 did not indicate the date on which the DRC considered the program completed. The 2,864 mines destroyed included mines held in the military regions, mines recovered from non-state armed groups, and mines abandoned across the country. Apparently, it only included seven mines (Claymore type) held by the armed forces. The DRC’s Article 7 reports seem to indicate that 2,662 stockpiled antipersonnel mines were destroyed from 2002 until the end of 2005. The mines were destroyed by HI, Mechem, and MAG.

[8] Article 7 Report, Form G, 22 May 2009.

[9] For details see Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 280.

[10] Article 7 Report, Form D, 22 May 2009.

[11] Foreign armed groups reported to be active or present in DRC as of June 2009 included the Forces Démocratiques de Liberation du Rwanda (FDLR), the Interahamwe (Rwanda), and the Lord’s Resistance Army (Uganda). For details of the disarmament process, see Landmine Monitor Report 2006, pp. 328–330.

[12] See, for example, “MONUC hands over weapons to the FARDC,” MONUC, 15 May 2009, monuc.unmissions.org.

[13] DCA deminers have documented the presence of cluster munition remnants in the villages of Kasu, Katelwa, and Est Agrico in Kabalo territory. See, for example, Human Rights Watch, “Africa and the Oslo Process to Ban Cluster Munitions,” Cluster Munitions Coalition Fact Sheet, September 2008, p. 2. In 2008, HI cleared unexploded submunitions in the east of the DRC.

[14] See, for example, Article 7 Report, Form C, 22 May 2009.

[15] Statement of the DRC, Ninth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 27 November 2008.

[16] Ibid.

[17] Article 7 Report, Form C, 22 May 2009.

[18] UN, “2009 Portfolio of Mine Action Projects,” New York, November 2008, p. 151.

[19] UNMACC IMSMA database query in email from Madieng Ndiaye, Roving Operation Officer, UNMACC, 22 April 2009; and IMSMA analysis in email from Salim Raad, Deputy Program Manager, UNMACC, 15 June 2009.

[20] Landmine Monitor identified 28 casualties in 2007, 22 of which were recorded by UNMACC. See Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 285.

[21] Ibid, p. 286; and email from Salim Raad, UNMACC, 15 June 2009.

[22] Mine Action Support Group, “Newsletter 1 October 2008–28 February 2009,” undated, www.mineaction.org.

[23] Email from Salim Raad, UNMACC, 15 June 2009.

[24] Ibid.

[25] Statement by Masuga Musafiri, Victim Assistance Focal Point, MoH, Ninth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 27 November 2008.

[26] UN, “2009 Portfolio of Mine Action Projects,” New York, November 2008, p. 151.

[27] An additional five people not physically injured are included in the analysis, bringing the total to 1,701.

[28] There were many data entry discrepancies in the data provided by UNMACC. Therefore, Landmine Monitor asked UNMACC to provide the summary demographic data reported in this paragraph. Email from Salim Raad, UNMACC, 15 June 2009.

[29] Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Matthew Willner-Rei, Program Manager, MAG, 6 May 2009; response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by King Ngoma Kilema, Senior Survey Coordinator, DCA, 23 April 2009; response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Ramazani Malwilo, Head of RE and Data Collection Section, HI, 14 April 2009; and response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Marrion Ngavho Kambale, Coordinator, SYLAM, 21 April 2009.

[30] Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Matthew Willner-Rei, MAG, 6 May 2009.

[31] Telephone interview with Raphael Debotte, Community Liaison Technical Advisor, MAG, 23 June 2009.

[32] UNHCR, “DRC Fact Sheet April 2009,” www.reliefweb.int.

[33] UN, “2009 Portfolio of Mine Action Projects,” New York, November 2008, p. 151.

[34] Statement of the DRC, Ninth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 27 November 2008.

[35] Ibid.

[36] UN, “2009 Portfolio of Mine Action Projects,” New York, November 2008, p. 151.

[37] Telephone interview with Micheline Magwamboa, Mine Risk Education Officer, UNICEF/UNMACC, 15 May 2009.

[38] Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Micheline Magwamboa, UNICEF/UNMACC, 7 May 2009.

[39] Anne Capelle and Chris Lang, “Evaluation of the United Nations Mine Action Programme in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, March–April 2008,” undated but May 2008, p. 30; and telephone interview with Raphael Debotte, MAG, 23 June 2009.

[40] Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Micheline Magwamboa, UNICEF/UNMACC, 7 May 2009.

[41] Ibid; and telephone interview with Raphael Debotte, MAG, 23 June 2009.

[42] Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Micheline Magwamboa, UNICEF/UNMACC, 7 May 2009.

[43] Ibid.

[44] Ibid.

[45] See Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 291.

[46] Responses to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Madieng Ndiaye, UNMACC, 20 April 2009; and Masuga Musafiri, MoH, 22 April 2009; and Anne Capelle and Chris Lang, “Evaluation,” undated but May 2008, p. 33.

[47] Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Madieng Ndiaye, UNMACC, 20 April 2009; and telephone interview with Patrick Tillet, Programme Officer, UNMAS, 8 May 2009.

[48] Email from Salim Raad, UNMACC, 17 June 2009.

[49] Anne Capelle and Chris Lang, “Evaluation,” undated but May 2008, p. 7.

[50] See Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 286.

[51] Telephone interview with Raphael Debotte, MAG, 23 June 2009; and response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by King Ngoma Kilema, DCA, 7 July 2009.

[52] UN, “2009 Portfolio of Mine Action Projects,” New York, November 2008, p. 151; and response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Madieng Ndiaye, UNMACC, 20 April 2009.

[53] See Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 286.

[54] Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Madieng Ndiaye, UNMACC, 20 April 2009.

[55] Anne Capelle and Chris Lang, “Evaluation,” undated but May 2008, p. 33.

[56] Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Masuga Musafiri, MoH, 22 April 2009.

[57] HI, “Report: Preliminary Opinion Collection in DRC, 1 January–31 May 2008,” undated, provided by email from Philippe Houliat, Head Office Senior Technical Clearance Ordnance Manager, HI, 25 March 2009. Previously Landmine Monitor had reported 121 casualties identified in the HI survey. See Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 287.

[58] Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Madieng Ndiaye, UNMACC, 20 April 2009.

[59] Anne Capelle and Chris Lang, “Evaluation,” undated but May 2008, p. 9.

[60] UN, “2009 Portfolio of Mine Action Projects,” New York, November 2008, p. 152.

[61] Interview with Christopher Clark, Senior Liaison and Programme Officer, UNMAS, Geneva, 24 March 2009.

[62] Article 7 Report, Form J, 22 May 2009; and Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 290.

[63] “Mid-Term Review of the Status of Victim Assistance in the 24 Relevant States Parties,” Dead Sea, 21 November 2007, p. 26.

[64] See Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 290.

[65] Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Madieng Ndiaye, UNMACC, 20 April 2009.

[66] Anne Capelle and Chris Lang, “Evaluation,” undated but May 2008, p. 9.

[67] DRC, “Document Stratégique de Croissance et de reduction de la Pauvreté (DSCRP)” (“Strategic Document for Growth and Poverty Reduction”), Kinshasa, July 2006.

[68] International Monetary Fund, “Democratic Republic of the Congo: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper,” (IMF Country Report No. 07/330), September 2007, p. 87.

[69] UN, “2008 Portfolio of Mine Action Projects,” New York, November 2007, p. 154.

[70] UN, “2009 Portfolio of Mine Action Projects,” New York, November 2008, p. 151.

[71] Statement of the DRC, Ninth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 27 November 2008.

[72] ICRC, “Physical Rehabilitation Programme: Annual Report 2008,” Geneva, 7 May 2009, p. 23; and Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 291.

[73] Statement of the DRC, Ninth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 27 November 2008.

[74] See, for example, UNMACC-DRC, “Proposed Plan for Mine Action, Concept of Operations,” First Draft, 13 March 2009, p. 2.

[75] Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Salim Raad, UNMACC, 20 April 2009.

[76] Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Saudi Alimas Kimputu, Coordinator, National Mine Action Focal Point, Ministry of Interior and Security, 21 April 2009.

[77] Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Salim Raad, UNMACC, 20 April 2009.

[78] Statement of the DRC, Ninth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 27 November 2008.

[79] Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Madieng Ndiaye, UNMACC, 20 April 2009; and interview with Faiz Paktian, Head of Standards and Quality Management, GICHD, Geneva, 25 March 2009.

[80] Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Salim Raad, UNMACC, 20 April 2009.

[81] Terms of Reference of the Evaluation of the UN Mine Action Program in DRC, March 2008, annexed to Anne Capelle and Chris Lang, “Evaluation,” undated but May 2008.

[82] Anne Capelle and Chris Lang, “Evaluation,” undated but May 2008, pp. 8–9.

[83] Ibid, p. 33; and interview with Anne Capelle, Independent Consultant, Geneva, 26 May 2009.

[84] Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Russell Friend, Program Manager, TDI, 22 April 2009.

[85] Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Signe Noermose, Desk Officer, Humanitarian Mine Action Unit, DCA, 29 April 2009.

[86] Responses to Landmine Monitor questionnaire from Signe Noermose, DCA, 29 April 2009; Philippe Houliat, HI, 26 April 2009; and Matthew Willner-Reid, MAG, 6 May 2009. Mechem data is from response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Madieng Ndiaye, UNMACC, 20 April 2009.

[87] Article 7 Report, Form G, 22 May 2009.

[88] Anne Capelle and Chris Lang, “Evaluation,” undated but May 2008, p. 32.

[89] Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Signe Noermose, DCA, 29 April 2009.

[90] Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Matthew Willner-Reid, MAG, 6 May 2009.

[91] Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Philippe Houliat, HI, 26 April 2009.

[92] Ibid.

[93] Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Madieng Ndiaye, UNMACC, 20 April 2009.

[94] Statement of the DRC, Ninth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 27 November 2008.

[95] Anne Capelle and Chris Lang, “Evaluation,” undated but May 2008, p. 30.

[96] Ibid, p. 13.

[97] Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Micheline Magwamboa, UNICEF/UNMACC, 7 May 2009. Data from IMSMA database.

[98] Ibid.

[99] Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Matthew Willner-Reid, MAG, 6 May 2009.

[100] Telephone interview with Raphael Debotte, MAG, 23 June 2009.

[101] Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Matthew Willner-Reid, MAG, 6 May 2009; and telephone interview with Raphael Debotte, MAG, 23 June 2009.

[102] Telephone interview with Raphael Debotte, MAG, 23 June 2009.

[103] Responses to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Marrion Ngavho Kambale, SYLAM, 21 April 2009; and Ramazani Malwilo, HI, 14 April 2009.

[104] Responses to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by King Ngoma Kilema, DCA, 23 April 2009; and Matthew Willner-Rei, MAG, 6 May 2009.

[105] Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Micheline Magwamboa, UNICEF/UNMACC, 7 May 2009; and telephone interview with Raphael Debotte, MAG, 23 June 2009.

[106] Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by King Ngoma Kilema, DCA, 23 April 2009; and telephone interview with Raphael Debotte, MAG, 23 June 2009.

[107] Responses to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by King Ngoma Kilema, DCA, 23 April 2009; Matthew Willner-Rei, MAG, 6 May 2009; and Ramazani Malwilo, HI, 14 April 2009.

[108] Anne Capelle and Chris Lang, “Evaluation,” undated but May 2008, pp. 9, 30–31.

[109] See previous editions of Landmine Monitor.

[110] See Landmine Monitor Report 2002, p. 201; Landmine Monitor Report 2004, p. 351; and Landmine Monitor Report 2005, pp. 293–294.

[111] See Landmine Monitor Report 2004, pp. 350–351; Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 299, Landmine Monitor Report 2006, p. 338; Landmine Monitor Report 2007, p. 299; and Landmine Monitor Report 2008, pp. 287–288.

[112] See Landmine Monitor Report 2007, p. 299.

[113] See Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 287.

[114] See Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 294.

[115] Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Micheline Magwamboa, UNICEF/UNMACC, 7 May 2009. Data from IMSMA.

[116] Ibid.

[117] Email from Salim Raad, UNMACC, 15 June 2009.

[118] Article 7 Report, Form J, 22 May 2009.

[119] Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Violaine Fourile, Coordinator, Anti-mine Program, HI, 23 April 2009; and Anne Capelle and Chris Lang, “Evaluation,” undated but May 2008, p. 33.

[120] USAID, “Democratic Republic of the Congo: Complex Emergency Situation Report #2 (FY 2009),” 4 June 2009, www.usaid.gov.

[121] MSF, “MSF in Democratic Republic of Congo,” April 2009, doctorswithoutborders.org; UNICEF, “UNICEF situation report North and South Kivu, Ituri, Haut-Uélé, DR Congo 06–20 May 2009,” 20 May 2009 www.reliefweb.int; and ICRC, “Democratic Republic of the Congo: concern over humanitarian situation in the Kivus,” 27 January 2009, www.icrc.org.

[122] Statement by Masuga Musafiri, MoH, Ninth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 27 November 2008.

[123] Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Violaine Fourile, HI, 23 April 2009.

[124] Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Masuga Musafiri, MoH, 22 April 2009; and ICRC, “Annual Report 2008,” 7 May 2009, p. 23.

[125] Statement by Masuga Musafiri, MoH, Ninth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 27 November 2008.

[126] MSF, “Condition Critical: Voices from the war in eastern Congo,” 20 November 2008, www.condition-critical.org; and UNICEF, “As DR Congo crisis persists, UN classifies rape as weapon of war,” 24 June 2008, www.unicef.org.

[127] See Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 289.

[128] US Department of State, “2008 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Democratic Republic of Congo,” Washington, DC, 25 February 2009.

[129] Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Violaine Fourile, HI, 23 April 2009.

[130] See Landmine Monitor Report 2007, p. 302.

[131] US Department of State, “2008 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Democratic Republic of Congo,” Washington, DC, 25 February 2009; and Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 290.

[132] Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Violaine Fourile, HI, 23 April 2009.

[133] See Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 290.

[134] Statement by Masuga Musafiri, MoH, Ninth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 27 November 2008.

[135] UN, “Final Report, First Review Conference,” Nairobi, 29 November–3 December 2004, APLC/CONF/2004/5, 9 February 2005, p. 99.

[136] See Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 290.

[137] Article 7 Report, Form J, 22 May 2009; and response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Masuga Musafiri, MoH, 22 April 2009.

[138] Co-Chairs of the Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration, “Status of Victim Assistance in the Context of the AP Mine Ban Convention in the 26 Relevant States Parties 2005–2008,” Ninth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 28 November 2008, p. 12; and Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2008), Form J.

[139] ICRC, “Annual Report 2008,” Geneva, 27 May 2009, p. 101. Seventeen of 22 ICRC supported hospitals in the DRC provided data.

[140] Ibid.

[141] See Landmine Monitor Report 2004, p. 354; and ICRC, “Annual Report 2008,” 7 May 2009, p. 23.

[142] Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Violaine Fourile, HI, 23 April 2009.

[143] Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Masuga Musafiri, MoH, 22 April 2009.

[144] Statement of the DRC, Eighth Meeting of States Parties, Dead Sea, 20 November 2007.

[145] UN, “2008 Portfolio of Mine Action Projects,” New York, November 2007, p. 155.

[146] Email from Salim Raad, UNMACC, 17 June 2008.

[147] Emails from Dimitri Fenger, Humanitarian Aid Section, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 8 June 2009; Amb. Lars-Erik Wingren, Department for Disarmament and Non-proliferation, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 31 March 2009; Mads Hove, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2 March 2009; Belgium Article 7 Report, Form J, 30 April 2009; email from Amy White, Deputy Program Manager, DfID, 17 March 2009; and Spain Article 7 Report, Form J, 30 April 2009.

[148] “Japan gives an almost $8 million boost to UN mine clearing efforts in Africa”, UN News Center, 10 March 2009, www.un.org.

[149] Statement of Chad, Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies, Geneva, May 2009.

[150] UNMAS, “Japan Boosts Global Fight Against Landmines,” 10 March 2009.