Sri Lanka

2008 Key Data

Ten-Year Summary

The Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty. Both government forces and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) used antipersonnel mines extensively until the February 2002 cease-fire. Sri Lanka has voted in favor of every pro-ban UN General Assembly resolution. In October 2002, the government announced its willingness to accede to the Mine Ban Treaty contingent on reaching an agreement with the LTTE prohibiting the use of mines. In 2005, Sri Lanka submitted a voluntary Article 7 transparency report. The LTTE resumed using antipersonnel mines in 2006, and apparently laid large numbers of mines in 2008 and early 2009. There were allegations of government use of mines in 2007 and 2008, which Sri Lanka strongly denied.

Mine action has been shaped by the war with the LTTE. Soon after demining started in 1999 it was halted by fighting. When it resumed in 2002, the Sri Lankan Army played the main role, but the creation of the National Steering Committee for Mine Action that year also paved the way for a concerted demining effort, supported and coordinated by UNDP and involving foreign NGOs. The collapse of the cease-fire in 2006 and escalating fighting severely constrained the pace of humanitarian action. The LTTE’s military defeat in May 2009 led to a new government focus on demining as a prerequisite for resettlement of people displaced by the conflict.

Landmine Monitor identified 1,272 casualties in Sri Lanka from 1999 to 2008 (117 killed, 421 injured, and 734 unknown). Risk education has been delivered through emergency provision in internally displaced persons’ camps, the training of volunteers in children’s clubs, community-based organizations, NGOs, and through schools.

Sri Lanka’s health system has improved since 1999, including advancements in the provision of services to persons with disabilities in general and mine/explosive remnants of war (ERW) survivors specifically. Awareness and provision of physical rehabilitation services for survivors have increased, although in 2008 there was a lack of trained personnel and resources. The resumption of fighting in 2006 adversely affected the delivery of healthcare in the conflict areas, where the majority of mine/ERW incidents occur. The cost of services, military restrictions on travel, and lack of affordable transport remained primary barriers to survivors accessing services. Government involvement in victim assistance was reported to have decreased since 2006.

Background

In January 2008, the government of Sri Lanka terminated the 2002 Cease Fire Agreement with the LTTE.^[1] On 20 May 2009, the government declared an end to the war with the LTTE after seizing all territory previously under LTTE control, bringing an end to two decades of armed conflict between the government and the LTTE, which sought a separate homeland for Tamils in the north and east of the country.

Mine Ban Policy

Sri Lanka has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty. Government representatives have previously stated that Sri Lanka’s accession was dependent on progress in the peace process, and have linked accession to agreement by the LTTE to foreswear use of the weapon.^[2]

Sri Lanka voted in favor of the annual UN General Assembly Resolution calling for universalization of the Mine Ban Treaty, UNGA Resolution 63/42, on 2 December 2008, as it has for every annual pro-ban General Assembly resolution since 1996.

Sri Lanka provided a voluntary Article 7 report in 2005. It subsequently indicated it would provide an update, but has not yet done so.^[3] In December 2008, an official told the ICBL that due to the security situation and other priorities, Sri Lanka was not in a position to provide an update, but would endeavor to submit a report, including information on stockpiles, during 2009.^[4]

Sri Lanka sent observers to the Ninth Meeting of States Parties in November 2008, but did not make any statements. It also participated in the Bangkok Workshop on Achieving a Mine-Free South-East Asia in April 2009—the second in a series of regional meetings leading up the Second Review Conference in November—where it made a presentation on mine clearance in the country.^[5] Sri Lanka did not attend the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in May 2009.

Sri Lanka is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons and its Amended Protocol II on landmines. It has never submitted an annual Article 13 transparency report.^[6] It is not party to Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War.

Sri Lanka has not signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions.^[7]

The Landmine Ban Advocacy Forum, a non-governmental network which previously advocated for an antipersonnel mine ban in Sri Lanka, has not been active since January 2008 due to lack of funding, as well as the lack of response from the government on the issue.^[8]

Use, production, transfer, and stockpiling

During the height of armed conflict in late 2008 and 2009, both sides accused the other of using antipersonnel mines.^[9] Landmine Monitor was not in a position to verify these accusations first-hand, as Sri Lanka restricted access by journalists and NGOs to the conflict zone.^[10]

From the beginning of the cease-fire in February 2002 until mid-2006, Landmine Monitor received few allegations and no compelling reports of use of antipersonnel mines by the LTTE, other than command-detonated Claymore-type devices that are permitted under the Mine Ban Treaty. Since May 2006, the Sri Lanka Army (SLA) has repeatedly accused the LTTE of planting antipersonnel mines.^[11]

It appears that in 2008 and 2009, the LTTE laid large numbers of mines in defense of its military installations throughout the north. An SLA representative said that they came across many new mines, improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and booby-traps between late November 2008 and March 2009, including Rangan 99 antipersonnel mines with a motion sensor.^[12] In April 2009, the SLA was still publicly accusing the LTTE of continuing to use antipersonnel mines.^[13] The war ended on 20 May 2009.

The SLA frequently reported recoveries of mines from the LTTE in 2008 and 2009.^[14] In a survey of SLA reports and some news articles between June 2008 and May 2009, Landmine Monitor noted the recovery of 2,264 antipersonnel mines, 22 antivehicle mines, 10 Claymore mines, and 14 IEDs; although this does not constitute a comprehensive accounting. According to one report citing “top defence sources,” during the fighting the military recovered more than 1.5 million antipersonnel landmines from the LTTE.^[15] It is unclear, but this figure may include mines seized from arms caches and manufacturing sites, as well as mines removed from the ground. Through July 2009, the SLA continued to find caches of antipersonnel mines and other weapons.^[16]

It was reported that the SLA encountered at least two large LTTE factories producing exclusively antipersonnel and antivehicle landmines in Kilinochchi and Mullaittivu districts, as well as more than 10 makeshift antipersonnel mine production facilities. Sri Lankan national news telecasts showed video clips of these landmine manufacturing plants with huge stocks of raw materials used for making mines.^[17]

For many years, the LTTE has been considered expert in making explosive weapons. It was known to produce several types of antipersonnel mines: Jony 95 (a small wooden box mine), Rangan 99 or Jony 99 (a copy of the P4 MK1 Pakistani mine), SN 96 (a Claymore-type mine), fragmentation antipersonnel mines from mortars, and variants of some of these antipersonnel mines, including some with antihandling features, as well as Amman 2000, MK1, and MK2 antivehicle mines.^[18]

Landmine Monitor has not seen compelling evidence of use of antipersonnel mines by Sri Lankan forces in this reporting period (since May 2008). There were serious allegations of use of antipersonnel mines by Sri Lankan security forces in 2007 and early 2008; Sri Lanka has strongly denied all accusations.^[19]

In April 2009, Brigadier Lasantha Wickramasuriya of the SLA acknowledged in a presentation at the Bangkok Workshop on Achieving a Mine-Free South-East Asia that the SLA had used antipersonnel mines in the past, but stressed that such use was only in the past and that the SLA was not currently laying mines.^[20] He said the army had used non-detectable Chinese, Belgian, and Italian mines, as well as bounding and fragmentation mines of United States, Pakistani, and Portuguese manufacture.^[21] Landmine Monitor had previously reported that Sri Lanka had acquired antipersonnel mines from China, Italy (and/or Singapore), Pakistan, Portugal, and perhaps Belgium, the US, and others.^[22]

There is no evidence that the government of Sri Lanka has ever produced or exported antipersonnel mines. It is likely to still have a stockpile, but the size and composition are not known.

Scope of the Problem

Contamination

Sri Lanka is extensively contaminated by mines and ERW resulting from the armed conflict between the government and the LTTE as well as by abandoned explosive ordnance.

Both sides used landmines, including belts of Pakistani-made P4 mines laid by the SLA and nuisance minefields laid by the LTTE in years leading up to a 2002 cease-fire. The extent of mine contamination worsened after the cease-fire collapsed in 2006, when the government repeatedly charged the LTTE with further use of antipersonnel mines.^[23] The government also faced allegations, which it denied, that security forces used mines in 2007 and 2008 (see Use, production, transfer, and stockpiling section above).

Renewed conflict is believed to have resulted in extensive new UXO contamination, particularly in the northern Vanni region, as a result of government use of air- and ground-delivered ordnance and LTTE artillery attacks, which reached a peak in 2009 as government forces sought to capture the last LTTE positions.^[24] A UN spokesperson alleged the government used cluster munitions in a bombardment in February 2009^[25] but after further investigation retracted the statement.^[26]

The National Steering Committee for Mine Action (NSCMA) reported in April 2009 that Sri Lanka had 402km² of land contaminated by mines and UXO.^[27] Even before the final intensive rounds of fighting, however, the government had acknowledged it did not have precise knowledge of the total extent of contamination.^[28]

Sri Lanka’s last voluntary Article 7 report submitted in June 2005 identified approximately 12.6km² of land (308 mined areas in nine districts) known to be contaminated by antipersonnel mines and 141.2km² of suspected hazardous areas (2,341 SHAs in 10 regions)^[29] but pointed out that this was a rough estimate and actual contamination might prove much less.^[30] In addition, the government estimated some 99km² of land were affected by ERW. UNDP estimated that at the end of 2007 Sri Lanka had a total of 29km² of confirmed mine contamination and an additional 523 recorded SHAs.^[31] UNDP, which had recorded 863 affected villages on its Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database in 2005, had reduced that number to 394 by the end of 2008.^[32]

The northern Jaffna peninsula, a focal point of fighting before the cease-fire, is the most severely affected area. About half of all mines laid in Sri Lanka up to the 2002 cease-fire were estimated to be in the peninsula and to affect some 228 villages, excluding military-occupied High Security Zones (HSZ).^[33] However, northern districts of Kilinochchi, Mullaittivu, Mannar, and Vavuniya, and eastern districts of Amparai, Batticaloa, and Trincomalee have also been affected by resumed conflict.

Sri Lanka has some 62km² of HSZ—areas near military emplacements, camps, barracks, or checkpoints—often protected by a defensive perimeter of mines. These zones are not accessible to demining agencies.^[34] After the flare-up in fighting in August 2006, the SLA also put other clearance tasks off-limits to operators because of their proximity to SLA positions.^[35]

Casualties

Landmine Monitor identified at least 79 new mine/ERW casualties in Sri Lanka in 2008, including 11 killed and 68 injured. The casualties included 69 security force personnel, seven civilians including two deminers, and three of unknown civil status. UNDP recorded six civilian casualties, including one deminer: one person killed and five injured in four incidents. The rest of the casualties were identified through media reports.^[36] These totals exclude casualties from command-detonated Claymore mine and IED attacks. Of all the casualties identified in 2008, 77 were males (73 men, three boys, and one of unknown age) and one girl. The age and gender of one person was not reported. Antipersonnel mines caused 48 of the casualties, other mines caused 20, other ERW caused three, a victim-activated IED caused one, and the devices causing seven casualties were unknown.

This is a sharp increase compared to the 50 casualties identified by Landmine Monitor in 2007. Comparison with previous years since 2006 may be unreliable, however, due to the limited access to conflict areas and media focus on large-scale military attacks.^[37]

The total number of mine/ERW casualties recorded in IMSMA from 1985 to 2008 is 1,378 (220 killed and 1,158 injured);^[38] 920 of these casualties (156 killed and 764 injured) occurred from 1999 to 2008.^[39] UNDP reported an additional six mine/ERW casualties (two killed and four injured) from 2007 that were not printed in Landmine Monitor Report 2008, due to late verification of these casualties.^[40] Landmine Monitor identified 1,272 casualties in Sri Lanka from 1999 to 2008 (117 killed, 421 injured, and 734 unknown).^[41]

The annual mine/ERW casualty rate increased from 1999 to 2001, due to heightened conflict in the north. In 2002, the Ceasefire Agreement was signed and a decrease in casualties was observed. Yet the numbers remained high as a result of renewed civilian movement in the mine/ERW-affected areas and the lack of public awareness about mines and ERW. Clearance and risk education (RE) efforts were cited as reasons for a decrease in annual casualty figures from 2002 to 2005, but with the resumption of conflict in 2006 casualty figures rose again. From 2006 to May 2009 accurate casualty information has been difficult to access, probably resulting in under-reporting.^[42]

Casualties continued in 2009 with Landmine Monitor identifying five new mine/ERW casualties, all injured, as of May. Of these, UNDP reported three casualties, and the remainder were reported by the media.^[43] The casualties included three civilians and two military personnel. All were injured by antipersonnel mines in five separate incidents, three of which occurred in the first 17 days of April.

Civilians continued to be injured and killed in remote-detonation Claymore mine or IED attacks in 2008. In the first two months of 2008, the UN Secretary-General reported two Claymore mine attacks killing at least 25 people and injuring at least 10, including 15 children killed and 10 injured. It was noted that the full scale of civilian casualties from Claymore mine attacks and other military offensives is unknown, due to restricted access to conflict areas.^[44] Landmine Monitor identified 51 casualties from Claymore mine attacks in 2008 from media reports, including 36 killed and 15 injured. Forty-one of the casualties were civilians (29 killed and 12 injured) and 10 were military personnel (seven killed and three injured). The UN Department of Safety and Security in Sri Lanka recorded 1,619 casualties from Claymore mine/directional fragmentation devices from 2006 to 8 September 2008, including 250 casualties from 1 January to 8 September 2008.^[45]

Risk profile

People are at risk from both mines and UXO, and recent conflict has increased this risk. The northern Jaffna peninsula is the most severely affected area. People are most at risk in September when harvesting and planting begins. The most at-risk groups are men aged 18–45, children, and those displaced by conflict, as there are a large number of internally displace persons (IDPs), many of whom resettled in 2008 and needed RE.^[46] Around 20% of recorded casualties are children.^[47] High-risk activities include collecting scrap metal, honey, forest fruits, or firewood, and fishing or hunting.^[48]

Socio-economic impact

When heavy fighting was still continuing, the UN cited landmines as a threat holding back convoys trying to deliver emergency relief to communities displaced by war.^[49] Since the end of the fighting, the crucial A9 road connecting the Jaffna peninsula to the rest of Sri Lanka has reopened. Yet mine and UXO contamination have continued to pose a major obstacle to resettlement of the more than 280,000 people estimated as of July 2009 to be internally displaced.^[50] Resettlement of IDPs is regarded by authorities as a priority for political stabilization as well as socio-economic recovery from years of conflict and natural disasters, such as the 2004 tsunami. In Jaffna, mined areas and HSZs have imposed severe constraints on the amount of land available for cultivation.

Program Management and Coordination

Mine action

Mine action management as of July 2009 was in a state of transition as the government adjusted to new political and socio-economic priorities that emerged after the military defeat of the LTTE in May.

Since its creation in August 2002, the NSCMA has held responsibility for setting mine action policy and priorities, and for coordinating mine action, mine/ERW RE, and victim assistance (VA).^[51] With the escalation of hostilities in 2006, the Ministry of Defense (MoD) and SLA area commanders came to play an increasingly dominant role in deciding which areas were open to demining, approving the allocation of tasks and issuing authorization for the movement of staff, equipment, and supplies.^[52]

In July 2009, however, Basil Rajapaksa, a member of parliament and senior advisor to the President, revealed that responsibility for mine action had passed to the Presidential Task Force for Resettlement, Development and Security in the Northern Province, of which he is chairperson. Rajapaksa stated that the Task Force would make all decisions on clearance and that demining operators and donors should submit all proposals to the Task Force, not the MoD (although visas for expatriate staff would still require MoD approval). The Task Force would appoint a coordinating director to each operator to handle such issues as visas and security passes for demining personnel and equipment.^[53]

The NSCMA, as of July 2009, was in the process of transitioning to a National Mine Action Centre (NMAC) and moving from the Ministry of Nation Building and Estate Infrastructure and Development (MNBEID) to new premises close to the Rajapaksa-led Task Force. Draft terms of reference drawn up by an international consultant set out a governance structure for the NMAC and proposed functions and responsibilities relating to operations, quality assurance (QA), information management, and RE.^[54]

In 2007 and 2008, the UNDP Support to Mine Action Project, reporting to the NSCMA, was responsible for identifying priorities, coordinating operations through tasking, QA and quality control, and issuing of completion reports.^[55] Under a three-year agreement with the government that ended in 2006 but was extended annually up to 2009, UNDP provided international technical advisors and managed a mine action database.

UNDP provided support through a project office in Colombo and District Mine Action Offices (DMAOs) in Jaffna and Vavuniya.^[56] At the NSCMA’s request, UNDP opened a mine action sub-office in the eastern city of Trincomalee in June 2007 to expedite mine action in the districts of Amparai, Batticaloa, and Trincomalee,^[57] and another sub-office in Batticaloa in February 2008 to cover the districts of Amparai and Batticaloa.^[58] The Batticaloa sub-office has functioned as the key DMAO for eastern Sri Lanka since August 2008 and the Trincomalee office had ceased operating as of January 2009.^[59]

UNDP mine action support suffered from high turnover of international staff. Its Colombo-based technical advisor (who acted as program manager) left in November 2006 and was not replaced. A technical advisor stationed in Jaffna also left in November 2006, and had not been replaced as of mid-2009.^[60] An international technical advisor recruited in July 2007 resigned in November 2008 for personal reasons.^[61] UNDP selected another technical advisor but as a result of delays in government approval of his visa he took up another appointment.^[62] Task Force chairperson Rajapaksa said the government had approved recruitment by UNDP of only one international technical advisor and other appointments would be considered in future.^[63]

Risk education

The NSCMA is responsible for coordinating RE, with support from UNICEF. UNICEF RE staff presence in DMAOs ended at the end of 2007.^[64] In May 2008, UNICEF hired an international consultant to revive its mine action program,^[65] and he joined in December 2008.^[66]

Coordination meetings organized by UNICEF at district level to review activities continued to be disrupted by conflict and displacement of local populations in 2008. It was only possible to hold regular meetings in Jaffna.^[67] A Technical Working Group (TWG) comprising major stakeholders also held only two meetings in 2008.^[68]

Victim assistance

There is no government coordination of VA in Sri Lanka.^[69] To date, UNICEF has been the coordinator of VA activities in the country.^[70]

Data collection and management

Until May 2009, UNDP maintained the Sri Lanka Mined Area Database using the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) at its office in Colombo. UNDP’s sub-office in Batticaloa also operates a read-only IMSMA terminal.^[71] In May 2009, management of the database was transferred to the MNBEID.^[72] UNDP will continue to support the collection of casualty data and the maintenance of this database.^[73]

A March 2009 review by Norwegian-supported mine action consultants, Scanteam, found the database “in some disarray” and observed that “reporting from the field is slow and of varying quality. Decisions on how to report on different phases of mine clearance have not been agreed upon. IMSMA data is not being used, as far as the evaluation team was able to verify, for priority-setting and tasking.”^[74] UNDP said the assertion was inaccurate and that data from the IMSMA database was being used for planning, tasking, and monitoring.^[75]

UNDP collected casualty data in 2008 through a network of RE operators, including UNICEF, and the NGOs Sarvodaya and Community Trust Fund. Information is gathered directly from community members, local government officers, the security forces, and clearance agencies. UNDP verifies community reports of casualties.^[76]

Casualty data collection was affected by stringent security restrictions particularly in the northern Kilinochchi and Mullaittivu districts. Informal reports indicate that the number of casualties could be much higher than those recorded in IMSMA.^[77]

There are no reliable national statistics for the number of people with disabilities in Sri Lanka. The Community-Based Rehabilitation program of the Ministry of Social Services and Social Welfare (MoSS) estimates that 7% of the population is disabled.^[78] The World Health Organization, with other donors, provided financial and technical assistance to the Ministry of Healthcare and Nutrition to establish a national injury surveillance system, including mine/ERW casualties. The project was piloted in six hospitals, including the National Hospital of Sri Lanka, and there are plans to extend it to other district hospitals.^[79]

Detailed RE activity reports are entered into IMSMA.^[80] However, by July 2009, entry of 2008 activities was not complete, and data on RE activities by partner organizations in Amparai and Batticaloa districts was not recorded.^[81] There is a well-developed system for monitoring RE, both internally by the operators and UNICEF, and externally by the DMAO QA teams.^[82]

Mine action program operators

Plans

Strategic mine action plan

Since 2004, Sri Lanka has repeatedly set itself the goal of becoming mine-free, but the deadline for completion of mine clearance slipped from 2006 to 2008 and in that year officials changed their position to say “all mined areas except HSZ will be cleared by the end of 2009.”^[83] Those targets, however, became impractical in view of the disruption to demining resulting from the revival of hostilities in 2006, the extent of known contamination, reports of possible new use, and the refusal of the military to allow clearance of minefields in and near the HSZs.^[84]

Integration of mine action with reconstruction and development

Sri Lanka’s mine action strategy prioritizes clearance that supports the resettlement of displaced persons; reconstruction of infrastructure such as roads, bridges, powerlines, and drinking water supply; and community needs such as schools and hospitals.^[85] After a visit by UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon in May 2009, Sri Lanka also called for international support for demining as “an essential prerequisite to expediting the early return of IDPs.”^[86] After taking the lead in mine action in Sri Lanka in July 2009, the Presidential Task Force for Resettlement, Development and Security in the Northern Province described demining as “the foremost operation in order to enable resettlement and other development initiatives.”^[87]

After security forces regained control of large areas previously occupied by the LTTE in 2006, the government prioritized emergency demining of these areas to expedite its “Re-awakening of the East Programme” aimed at resettlement, reconstruction, and development to rebuild houses, schools, public buildings, roads, and bridges while creating employment and encouraging investment in these areas.^[88] In November 2008, the government launched its “Reviving the North” (“Uthuru Wasanthaya”) program which included Jaffna, Kilinochchi, Mannar, Mullaithtivu, and Vavuniya districts.^[89]

National ownership

Commitment to mine action and victim assistance

For several years, Sri Lanka has exercised full national control of mine action through the MNBEID, the NSCMA, and DMAOs. In 2009, the government appealed for international support for demining but made clear in discussions with international organizations that national authorities would dictate the scope and location of their activities. Officials compared performance of international demining NGOs unfavorably with those of national and Indian agencies, and suggested donors should channel funding through the government to agencies recommended by the MNBEID.^[90]

National management

As a transitional measure towards establishing a National Mine Action Center, UNDP committed to supporting six full-time government positions. Five staff members had been recruited as of July 2009: a Senior Programme Officer for Mine Action, an IMSMA Officer, a Mine Action Secretary for the MNBEID in Colombo, and two Mine Action Quality Control Officers for the DMAOs in Jaffna and in Vavuniya.^[91]

National mine action legislation and standards/Standing operating procedures

Sri Lanka has not enacted any national mine action legislation. UNDP drafted national standards in 2003 that were approved by the MNBEID in 2005 and published on 4 April 2006. A UNDP technical advisor started updating Sri Lanka’s National Mine Action Standards (NMAS) in September 2008 at the NSCMA’s request to bring them more into line with the International Mine Action Standards but did not complete the task before he resigned in November 2008.^[92]

A communications strategy was developed, and existing RE standards were revised in March 2009 (and were awaiting NSCMA approval as of July 2009) with support from the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining.^[93] There are no national standards for VA in Sri Lanka. UNICEF and a number of NGOs have begun working with the Ministry of Healthcare and Nutrition to develop a national VA policy, to be integrated into the NMAS.^[94]

Program evaluations

A review of mine action programs receiving Norwegian support, conducted in February–March 2009 found the national mine action program “in some disarray.” The report observed that “the mine action program in Sri Lanka is not presently planned according to good practice standards and processes. The Ministry of Nation Building and the UNDP as its counterpart have little capacity and competence and the mine action database (IMSMA) is not updated and consequently not used for strategic planning.”^[95] UNDP disputed the findings observing that the IMSMA database had been updated and synchronized and was used for planning and other purposes, including tasking and monitoring.^[96]

The review concluded that “the planning, prioritisation and tasking of national authorities leaves much to be desired and this has a real and negative impact on the efficiency and effectiveness of the mine action work. The information provided by national authorities, and based on information from the SLA, is insufficient and hampers the implementation.” It further stated that “UNDP does not have the capacity to support the national authorities and so much needed capacity development in the areas of SOP [standing operating procedure] development, QA/QC and database population and use is not taking place.”^[97]

UNICEF contracted the NGO Motivation Charitable Trust to carry out an evaluation of VA in Sri Lanka from August to September 2008. The focus was to assess VA work over the previous five years, verify the needs of victims, and identify future VA partners.^[98] The final report noted that although assistance for survivors was “on the right track,” there was a lack of long-term planning, and assistance focused too heavily on the survivors themselves and not on those affected by mines in general.^[99] Lack of coordination and holistic provision of services also reduced overall effectiveness.^[100] Survivors identified economic support as their major need. The assessment determined that economic reintegration needed to be holistic and offer a variety of opportunities to be sustainable and to meet all the needs of survivors and their families.^[101]

Demining and Battle Area Clearance

Eight organizations carried out demining in Sri Lanka in 2008. The SLA’s Humanitarian Demining Unit (HDU), trained by the US commercial company RONCO in humanitarian demining between 2003 and 2006, was the biggest operator. In addition, demining was conducted by the national NGO Milinda Moragoda Institute for People’s Empowerment (MMIPE), as well as two Indian NGOs, Horizon and Sarvatra, and four international NGOs: Danish Demining Group (DDG), HALO Trust, Mines Advisory Group (MAG), and the Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD). Some operators worked jointly. NPA suspended operations early in 2008 and in December announced that it was withdrawing from Sri Lanka.^[102]

Sri Lankan and Indian media reports in July 2009 said the Indian Army was about to deploy a team of 500 deminers to assist clearance in the north.^[103] It was unclear as of mid-2009 if the Indian Army was indeed preparing to deploy demining personnel or if these reports had confused preparations by Indian demining NGOs working in Sri Lanka to increase staff, many of them ex-army.^[104]

Identification of hazardous areas

No comprehensive national survey of mine/ERW contamination has been conducted: some operators have conducted surveys within their area of operation.^[105] In mid-2009, as pressure for clearance mounted following the end of the fighting, demining operators—with support from some donors—were keen to undertake survey of areas designated for resettlement of IDPs.^[106] The Presidential Task Force ruled in July 2009 that “General Mine Action Assessment should be carried out jointly with Sri Lanka Army as Army has much information about minefields.”^[107]

Demining and battle area clearance in 2008

The government reported that demining released a total of more than 168km² in 2008, compared with 162km² in 2007.^[108] However, nearly three-quarters of the 2008 total was accounted for by the SLA, which mostly conducted emergency battle area clearance (BAC)—often only surface visual checks. Total mined area clearance nearly doubled in 2008, according to official data, of which almost half was attributed to the SLA (see table below).^[109] In eastern districts, operators cleared 1.14km² in 2008, down from 1.7km² the previous year.^[110]

In the north and the east, from January 2008 through March 2009, DMAO staff assigned 88 new tasks to demining organizations, performed 482 QA visits, and supported local government authorities to release 267.6km² of land, mostly former battle areas, for IDP shelters, resettlement, and other socio-economic uses.^[111]

Escalating hostilities in the northern Vanni region brought demining in the area to a standstill at the end of 2007 both as a result of fighting and tougher security restrictions by the military on movements of personnel and equipment to ensure that demining assets did not fall into the hands of the LTTE.^[112]

Demining continued on northernmost Jaffna peninsula in 2008 but at a much reduced rate because the military only approved new tasks for demining in November. These included survey of suspect land in Uduvil and Tellippallai in HSZ buffer areas that were released after successful court action by local residents.

Demining in 2008^[113]

The SLA had operated in 2007 with four field engineer regiments comprising a total of 505 deminers^[114] but in 2008 it kept a skeleton team of 150 deminers on BAC while the remainder were engaged in military operations.^[115]

NPA/HDU, working with the SOLIDAR consortium of NGOs in the Kilinochchi and Mullaittivu districts of the LTTE-controlled Vanni region, had scaled down its operating staff in 2007 from some 650 to about 450 persons. This was because of growing constraints on operations imposed by the security situation, and reflected concerns by the authorities that its vehicles and equipment might fall into the hands of the LTTE. In addition, escalating hostilities brought forced recruitment of some NPA/HDU staff by the LTTE. In early January 2008, NPA suspended operations initially until April but then until August 2008, in the process withdrawing its program manager in July and cutting back to a skeleton staff in Colombo and Kilinochchi. NPA had intended to keep vehicles and equipment in storage until conditions permitted a resumption of operations but in December 2008 announced it was closing the operation and finally shut down in mid-2009.^[116] “We have decided to pull out because the authorities have made our work impossible,” NPA General Secretary Petter Eide was quoted by the media as saying.^[117] NPA handed over all its available assets to the MNBEID.^[118]

HALO had worked in Jaffna with two international and 350 national staff in 2007.^[119] It continued demining in 2008 but by June 2008 had only five tasks remaining which it finished by the end of the year.^[120] By the end of 2008 HALO had reduced its staff to 30.^[121] Early in 2009, HALO started to receive new tasks in Jaffna and by February had raised its staff to 144 deminers working with two excavators.^[122] In mid-2009, in addition to its operating base in Jaffna, HALO had opened an office in Colombo. In response to the government’s emphasis on clearance for resettlement of IDPs, HALO raised its staff to 300 deminers but as of July had yet to receive clearance tasks.^[123]

FSD worked in Mannar and Vavuniya districts in 2007 and later took up operations in Batticaloa and Trincomalee districts, but in 2008 it received no tasks in the north and focused largely on Batticaloa. FSD worked with four international staff, reduced later to three, and approximately 89 nationals, supported by four mini-flails. By the end of 2008, FSD’s engagement in the east was winding down but it had increased staff to 180 in 2009 and thought the number could rise to as many as 300 by the end of the year as the government opened up clearance tasks in the north.^[124]

DDG had a total of 430 staff in 2007, including 280 in Jaffna and the remainder in Trincomalee but, like HALO, had to reduce its staff in Jaffna in 2008 due to lack of tasking and funding. It increased its operation in Trincomalee, adding one armored back-hoe loader and 114 deminers.^[125] By mid-2009, DDG had expanded to a total of 406 staff, including four expatriates, 266 deminers, 64 supervisory staff, 51 support staff, and 21 administrative staff in anticipation of receiving new tasks.^[126]

MAG worked in 2008 with two international and 55 national staff in three manual clearance teams, two of them supported by Bozena mini-flails, conducting demining and BAC in Batticaloa district. In 2009 it continued to undertake tasks in the district but operations there were winding down while MAG was expanding to take on tasks in Mannar and Vavuniya districts. By September 2009 it had opened an operational base in Mannar, increased staff to 190 and added four armored excavators.^[127]

MMIPE operated in Anuradhapura and Trincomalee districts in 2008 with 63 deminers and Horizon operated in the Mannar and Batticaloa districts with 64 deminers, including 24 Indian deminers and four excavators. Horizon increased its capacity to 85 deminers by October 2008 in Batticaloa. Sarvatra carried out manual demining and BAC in Mannar with 54 deminers.^[128] Horizon reportedly added 50 more deminers from India in August 2009. Sarvatra added 32 more in August and was reportedly planning to send another 32.^[129]

Demining and BAC in Sri Lanka from 2002–2008^[130]

[131]">Risk Education^[131]

RE has been delivered through: emergency provision in IDP camps; the training of volunteers in children’s clubs; community-based organizations; NGOs; schools; and local government (a district-based RE unit in Trincomalee). It consisted primarily of education, training, and community liaison. RE programs used formal and non-formal education systems, supported by public information dissemination (materials and mass media). According to estimates, at least 85,000 people received RE in 2008. In 2008, coverage was lower than previous years due to a reduced program period, and because most partners were without contracts for almost six months due to bureaucratic delays. In 2008, six districts were covered through three community-based RE partners, 51 field officers, and 701 volunteers and children who are animators.

Approximately the same number of men and women received RE. Particular effort was made to reach men, as they make up the highest proportion of casualties. The greatest number of people was reached through house–to-house visits, which was considered to be the most effective method.

UNICEF reports that its RE program has been very successful in contributing to a significant reduction in both mine incidents and mine casualties. It also identifies the high number of reports on UXO coming from affected communities and other suspected dangerous areas as another strong indicator RE’s positive impact.

Emergency RE was provided, despite the challenges faced due to the conflict in the north. Some NGO volunteers were themselves displaced due to the conflict, and some lost family members. Access to LTTE-controlled areas in the Vanni region was difficult. UNICEF’s partnership in Vanni with the NGO White Pigeon came to an end. RE was conducted through Sooriyan Radio with the support of the NGO Internews to reach difficult-to-access populations in Vanni and IDPs.

School-based RE was provided in the north and east by including RE in teacher training at the National Colleges of Education (a total of 2,005 teachers have been trained since the program began) and to monitor their work through In-Service Advisors, a type of inspector and master trainer (a total of 200 have been trained). School principals in 2,400 schools also received RE orientation. Although the original plan was to include RE in the school curriculum, this did not happen, and it is up to the teacher to include the topic in class. School-based RE is reportedly weak and, although a monitoring mechanism was introduced, data on how many schools have conducted RE is not available. NGOs have also provided RE in schools on request.

Community liaison was conducted by MAG and by community workers working with mine-affected communities to ensure they were aware of clearance activities being conducted in or around their areas, to provide a good link between clearance organizations and communities, and to collect information from communities about UXO and mine-related issues. RE teams also often served as an important link between aid and relief agencies and the government.

RE is increasingly integrated into other child protection issues, such as out-of-school children, under-age marriage, and child abuse.

Risk education activities in 2008^[132]

In 2009, RE was continued prior to and immediately following resettlement of IDPs. Opening of new IDP sites in areas needing ERW clearance in Jaffna required emergency or rapid intervention RE for construction workers, aid workers, and IDPs.^[133]

UNICEF started RE activities in Jaffna in 1998 with a focus on schoolchildren until activities were suspended due to hostilities in April 2000. Only limited RE was possible until after the February 2002 cease-fire when UNICEF and NGOs greatly increased activities. RE then became closely linked to resettlement of IDPs and mine clearance, with RE operators conducting community liaison.^[134]

In late 2003, UNICEF established an RE training-of-trainers capacity^[135] and conducted activities to reach out-of-school children. RE delivery increased each year to a peak of 686,274 people in 2005, but has diminished since then due to renewed conflict.^[136] In 2006 and 2007, emergency RE was provided to thousands of newly displaced people and aid workers, despite the obstacles created by renewed conflict.^[137]

The NSCMA coordinates RE, based on reports provided by UNICEF and the district-based IMSMA databases maintained by UNDP.^[138] RE has also been coordinated at a district level, where QA is also conducted, but this has been disrupted by renewed conflict in recent years.^[139] National standards were produced in 2004.^[140] Two evaluations, by UNICEF and the EC Humanitarian Aid Office, in 2004 were broadly positive and concluded that RE may have contributed to a decrease in incidents.^[141] In mid-2007 UNICEF restructured its country program to be based on a broad vision of holistic child protection. In 2007, bureaucratic delays within UNICEF were blamed for leaving NGOs “isolated.”^[142]

Victim Assistance

The total number of mine/ERW survivors in Sri Lanka is unknown, but is at least 1,158.^[143] Although there have been some improvements in VA provision in recent years, many challenges remain. There is no countrywide or centrally coordinated government effort to assist mine/ERW survivors. Assistance provided by a number of government agencies and NGOs is often ad hoc and fragmented,^[144] and constrained by limited resources in both capacity and technology. Mine survivors have reported being denied specialist medical care when they have been unable to afford the cost.^[145]

Renewed fighting from 2006 to mid-2009 resulted in a significant decrease in VA, and health services generally, in the conflict areas, where the majority of mine/ERW incidents occurred.^[146] Government involvement in VA was also reported to have decreased over this period.^[147] Attacks directly on and near hospitals in the north further reduced their capacity.

Military controls on civilian movement in the north, already tight, became even more stringent in 2008 with military operations Jaffna, Kilinochchi, Mannar, Mullaittivu, and Vavuniya districts, severely hampering transport of medical supplies into and around conflict areas and healthcare efforts.^[148] There was a lack of surgeons and specialists in most district hospitals in the northeast, and a need to improve the basic skills of health professionals in treating war-related injuries.^[149] Poor roads further limited access to services. Although distances are short on the Jaffna peninsula, irregular public transport and the high cost of transportation meant a trip of a few kilometers could be costly and time consuming.^[150]

Relief efforts were further hampered by the government reportedly refusing to extend dozens of international aid workers’ visas in June 2009, because they were considered sympathetic to the defeated LTTE.^[151]

National health policy calls for free primary medical care for all citizens, but it does not cover the specialist care that survivors often need.^[152] The MoSS is responsible for providing services to people with disabilities, including community-based rehabilitation (CBR). In the mine/ERW-affected north and east, CBR was only provided in the eastern Ampara and Batticaloa districts. Financial assistance from the government is said to be available to persons with disabilities including a monthly payment, medical assistance, self-employment grants, and housing programs. With few MoSS staff being located in the north and east there was limited awareness of and access to such programs in these areas.^[153] Survivors included in a UNICEF needs assessment in August–September 2008 reported that the level of financial support from the government was not enough to provide a decent standard of living.^[154]

Survivors in the UNICEF needs assessment identified physical rehabilitation as a “basic need”^[155] but services are insufficient to meet the demand. The government provided financial support to NGOs that assisted persons with disabilities, including subsidizing prosthetic devices and making purchases from suppliers with disabilities.^[156]

There are eight physical rehabilitation centers in Sri Lanka producing artificial limbs and assistive/mobility devices. All were supported by NGOs and offer the majority of services for free. Four centers are in the north and east provinces: Jaffna Jaipur Center for the Disability Rehabilitation (JJCDR); Jaffna White Pigeon Technical Institute of Prosthetics; Valvuthayam Mannar Rehabilitation Center; and the HI Physical Rehabilitation Center (PRC) in Batticaloa. The UNICEF needs assessment found the White Pigeon and Valvuthayam Mannar centers did not provide quality services because they lacked qualified personnel and used inappropriate technology. A severe shortage of physiotherapists was also reported in the northeast.^[157]

Sri Lankan military war disabled received free physical rehabilitation, financial compensation, and benefits.^[158] The Ranaviru Sevana Rehabilitation Centre is the main rehabilitation center of the SLA and provides a comprehensive range of services to injured and disabled soldiers. Services include the provision of artificial limbs and mobility devices, physical therapy, vocational training, and social reintegration support through rejoining a regiment. Of the center’s 312 staff, 80% have been physically disabled by the war.^[159]

The mine/ERW survivors interviewed in the UNICEF needs assessment identified loss of livelihood as having a major impact on their standard of living. ^[160] The MoSS operated eight vocational training facilities for persons with physical and mental disabilities and provided job training and placements for graduates. There were 74 NGO-run schools and training institutions for persons with disabilities registered in 2008.^[161] Courses offered were not market-driven, resulting in a mismatch between skills training and employment opportunities.^[162]

Psychological care and social support are very limited in Sri Lanka and there is little awareness among survivors of available services. Only 3% of mine survivors interviewed in the UNICEF needs assessment had received psychological care and most were unaware of such services.^[163] Psychosocial care was predominantly provided in the mine/ERW-affected areas, by NGOs Sarvodaya and JJCDR in Jaffna and White Pigeon in Killinochchi.^[164]

It is against the law to discriminate against persons with disabilities in Sri Lanka, but discrimination was reported in 2008, limiting the access of persons with disabilities to employment, education, and other state-run services. Negative attitudes were also reported.^[165] Sri Lanka signed the UN Convention of the Rights of People with Disabilities, but not its Optional Protocol, on 30 March 2007. As of 1 July 2009, it had not yet ratified the convention.

Victim assistance activities

HI signed a memorandum of understanding with the Ministry of Health to gradually hand over its Physical Rehabilitation Center (PRC) to the Batticaloa Teaching Hospital by June 2011. In 2008, the PRC provided rehabilitation services and artificial limbs to more than 1,000 new clients, almost one-tenth of whom were mine/ERW survivors. It extended services in the north, including to Vavuniya, through mobile teams. A temporary emergency unit to treat those who fled the fighting and were injured was established with the support of HI in 2009. HI-supported services provided assistance to 97 mine/ERW survivors in 2008.^[166]

The JJCDR supplied prostheses, orthoses, tricycles, wheelchairs, crutches, and other mobility devices to 405 mine/ERW survivors in 2008. The JJCRD services also included provision of physical therapy sessions to 65 survivors. The JJCRD is the only physical rehabilitation service provider in the Jaffna peninsula and was unable to assist all those in need in 2008.^[167] ICRC continued support to the program in 2008, including meeting the costs of transport of persons going to the center, when needed. The quality of services was reportedly improved through on-the-job training by an ICRC ortho-prosthetist and an ICRC physiotherapist.^[168]

Support for Mine Action

Landmine Monitor is not aware of any comprehensive long-term cost estimates or resource mobilization strategies for fulfilling mine action needs (including RE and VA) in Sri Lanka. The NSCMA, which oversees mine action policy, includes representatives from the donor community. The Donor Peace Support Group (DPSG) for Sri Lanka includes a sub-group on mine action that informs donors on progress in mine action and promotes collective policy strategies among donors.^[169]

National support for mine action

Sri Lanka did not report contributions to mine action from the national budget in 2007 or 2008.

International cooperation and assistance

In 2008, six countries and the European Commission reported providing US$6,859,896 (€5,550,520)) to mine action in Sri Lanka, 8% more than international support reported in 2007. Funding levels have decreased each year since 2004, when approximately $23.6 million was contributed and in 2008 were the lowest since 2002.

2008 International Mine Action Funding to Sri Lanka: Monetary^[170]

Starting in August 2009, India has provided technical assistance and personnel to support mine/UXO clearance in Sri Lankan territories previously occupied by the LTTE. As of July 2009, India reportedly planned to commit 500 personnel to its clearance efforts in Sri Lanka.^[171]