Thailand

2008 Key Data

Ten-Year Summary

The Kingdom of Thailand became a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty on 1 May 1999 and served as co-rapporteur and then co-chair of the Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention from 2000 to 2002. It hosted regional landmine conferences in 2001, 2002, and 2009. It completed destruction of its stockpile of 337,725 antipersonnel mines in April 2003. Thailand hosted and served as President of the Fifth Meeting of States Parties in September 2003. It was co-rapporteur and then co-chair of the Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration from 2007 to 2009.

Thailand put in place a mine action structure supported mostly by its own financial resources in 1999 but the sector attracted little interest from political or military leaders: without adequate financial support it made little progress in either accurately defining or clearing mine contamination. Thailand set ambitious targets in its 2008 request for an extension to its Article 5 deadline but in 2009 neither the financing nor human resources needed to achieve them materialized, and clearance continued at a slow pace.

From June 1998 to 2008 Landmine Monitor recorded 555 mine/explosive remnants of war (ERW) casualties in Thailand (26 killed, 169 injured, and 360 of unknown status). This total includes some casualties injured in Myanmar and recorded in Thailand which could not be separated from the data. Since 2001, mine/ERW risk education activities reached at least 1,018,632 beneficiaries, mostly conducted by personnel from the Thailand Mine Action Center Humanitarian Mine Action Units.

Data collection on survivors and their needs improved with a national survey in 2008–2009, despite the lack of a comprehensive national surveillance system. Thailand’s progress in victim assistance was slow in 2005–2007, after which significant advances were made in increasing the level of emergency and continuing medical care. Despite improvements in psychological support and economic reintegration, these services have not adequately addressed the specific needs of survivors, most of whom live in rural communities. Improved public policy enforcing the rights of persons with disabilities has been supported by Thailand’s ratification of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.

Mine Ban Policy

Thailand signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and ratified it on 27 November 1998, becoming a State Party on 1 May 1999. Thailand has not enacted domestic legislation to implement the Mine Ban Treaty. In April 2009, the Director General of the Thailand Mine Action Center (TMAC) said that Thailand was in the process of passing an executive measure, the Office of the Prime Minister Regulations Governing the Implementation of the Convention, to ensure that the military, the police and other domestic agencies do not violate the treaty. The Sub-committee on Administration and Evaluation is responsible for this, and in early 2009 was in the process of submitting the draft regulation to the National Committee for Humanitarian Mine Action for consideration.^[1]

Thailand submitted its 11th Article 7 report on 30 April 2009, covering calendar year 2008.^[2]

Thailand participated in the Ninth Meeting of States Parties in Geneva in November 2008, where it formally requested an extension of its Article 5 mine clearance deadline. It also delivered a statement as the incoming co-chair of the Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration after serving as co-rapporteur the previous year. In addition, it made interventions during the general exchange of views, and during sessions dealing with mine clearance deadline extension requests, victim assistance (VA), and compliance (for the latter, see Use section below).

At the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in May 2009, in addition to its role as co-chair on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration, Thailand made statements during the sessions on universalization, VA, clearance deadline extensions, risk education (RE), and the Second Review Conference.

Thailand hosted the Bangkok Workshop on Achieving a Mine Free South-East Asia from 1–3 April 2009. This was the second in a series of regional meetings convened in the lead-up to the Second Review Conference. Eighteen countries, including all non-signatory states in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), participated. Thailand also hosted a parallel Chiang Mai/Bangkok workshop on VA.

Thailand has not engaged in the discussions that States Parties have had on matters of interpretation and implementation related to Articles 1, 2, and 3 (joint military operations with states not party, foreign stockpiling and transit of antipersonnel mines, antivehicle mines with sensitive fuzes or antihandling devices, and mines retained for training).

Thailand is not party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons. Thailand had not signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions as of 1 July 2009.^[3]

Production, transfer, stockpile destruction, and retention

Thailand states that it has never produced or exported antipersonnel mines. Thailand formerly imported antipersonnel mines from China, Italy, the United States, and the former Yugoslavia. It completed destruction of 337,725 stockpiled antipersonnel mines on 24 April 2003.

The Royal Thai Army, Navy, Air Force, and the Thailand National Police Department initially retained a total of 4,970 antipersonnel mines for training. The number of retained mines did not change from 2001 to 2004. In 2005–2006, Thailand reduced the number of mines retained by 257.^[4] In 2007, it reduced the number by another 1,063 mines. It appears that 63 of the mines retained by the National Police Department were consumed during training activities, and all of the 1,000 mines retained by the navy were simply destroyed, presumably because they were no longer deemed necessary.^[5]

In its latest Article 7 report covering 2008, Thailand reported that at the end of 2008, it retained 3,638 antipersonnel mines, a reduction of 12 from the previous year.^[6] It reported that 12 mines retained by the National Police Department (nine M14 and three M16) were destroyed for unknown reasons.^[7] No mines were reported as transferred for use in training. At the end of 2008, the army retained 3,000 mines, the Royal Thai Air Force retained 581 mines, and the National Police Department retained 57 mines.^[8] The total of 3,000 mines under the control of the army has not changed since 2001. Thailand has not provided details on the intended purposes and actual uses of its retained mines, as agreed by States Parties in 2004.

While Thailand has not undertaken physical modifications of its Claymore mine stockpile to ensure use only in command-detonated mode, officials have stated that all units have received orders that Claymore mines are to be used only in command-detonated mode.^[9] The Director General of TMAC told Landmine Monitor in March 2009 that Thai forces have not used the Claymore mines.^[10]

Use

The insurgency in southern Thailand has seen extensive use of command-detonated improvised explosive devices (IEDs). There have apparently also been isolated instances of use of homemade landmines or victim-activated IEDs.^[11] In February 2009, a police officer was seriously wounded in Yala province by what was reported to be an explosive booby-trap.^[12]

On 6 October 2008, a Thai paramilitary ranger stepped on an antipersonnel landmine while on patrol in disputed territory between Thailand and Cambodia, near the World Heritage Site of Preah Vihear. A second ranger stepped on an antipersonnel mine while attempting to aid the first injured. Both lost their legs. This took place three days after an exchange of gunfire between Thai and Cambodian military units at the same location.^[13]

Thai authorities maintain that the area was previously clear of landmines. TMAC sent a team to investigate which found some PMN2-type antipersonnel mines. TMAC stated that the mines were newly placed. The sequence of the discovery was detailed on the Thailand Ministry of Foreign Affairs website.^[14]

Cambodian authorities stated that the Thai investigation of the incident site was a unilateral incursion on Cambodian territory undertaken without their consent or participation, and denounced the action. The Cambodian Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that the Thai paramilitary rangers had entered Cambodian territory in an area known to contain antipersonnel mines and were injured by mines laid during previous armed conflicts.^[15]

The Coordinator of the Thailand Campaign to Ban Landmines (TCBL) visited the site at the invitation of TMAC and Thailand’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and observed, “The mines which were displayed as recovered from the site showed no rust on their metal parts. Identification numbers on the mines were clearly visible, and did not appear to have been exposed to the elements very long. Local villagers informed me that they regularly used the path where the incidents took place.”^[16]

Thailand stated that the Royal Thai Army has never possessed PMN2 mines.^[17] Cambodia’s annual transparency reports indicate that PMN2 mines are commonly found during mine clearance operations.^[18] It has also reported stockpiling PMN2 mines in the past.^[19]

On 17 October 2008, representatives of the Thai Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defense, and TMAC met with an ICBL/TCBL mission and presented information from Thailand’s investigations into the incident. Subsequently Thailand made this information available to the Ninth Meeting of States Parties in Geneva in November.^[20]

Both Thailand and Cambodia made statements on the incident at the Ninth Meeting of States Parties. Thailand said it was “compelled to bring to the attention of States Parties the facts relating to an incident which, in our view, constitutes a clear violation of the Convention…[A] process of clarification must be set up and conducted in a constructive way within the framework of the Convention…Thailand has no intention of accusing any state party or politicizing this matter. Thailand has exercised utmost restraint to avoid jumping to conclusion. Rather, we have taken the appropriate step to request clarification from Cambodia via bilateral channel in accordance with Article 8(1) of the Convention. At this stage, Thailand is still ready to consider any options within the framework of Article 8(1) that would allow us to shed light on the 6 October incident, including the setting up of an international fact finding mission…”^[21]

It would appear from available evidence that this incident involved new use of antipersonnel mines, but Landmine Monitor is not able to determine who was responsible for the use. To Landmine Monitor’s knowledge, other States Parties have not pursued a resolution to this issue with Cambodia and Thailand.

On 1 April 2009, another Thai soldier was reportedly wounded by an antipersonnel mine at the same location during further armed conflict between the two countries.^[22]

Scope of the Problem

Contamination

Thailand is affected by landmines and ERW, both abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO) and UXO, the result of conflicts on its borders with Cambodia, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic (Lao PDR), Myanmar, and Malaysia. The 2001 Landmine Impact Survey (LIS) identified 530 communities in 27 of 76 provinces and more than 500,000 people as mine-affected.

The LIS estimated the total area of mine/ERW contamination at 2,557km².^[23] Thailand’s revised Article 5 deadline extension request claimed Thailand had released 1,354.75km² leaving a total of 1,202.25km² of suspected area to be tackled, including an estimated 528.2km² of “real minefield” requiring manual demining.^[24] TMAC revised those estimates in 2009 and as of July had increased the estimated area of mined areas to 562km² (see Identification of hazardous areas section below).^[25]

Thailand’s 700km border with Cambodia, used as a base by Cambodian guerrilla factions in the 1980s and 1990s, is worst affected, accounting for three-quarters of the LIS estimate and 51 of 69 high-impacted communities.^[26] More than half of the mine incidents in Thailand have occurred on this border.^[27] The Cambodian border is also contaminated by artillery and mortar shells fired by Vietnamese and Cambodian government forces and caches of abandoned mortars, rocket-propelled grenades, and ammunition left by Cambodian guerrilla groups.^[28]

On the border with Myanmar, the LIS identified 139 affected communities and 240 contaminated areas.^[29] Periodic spillover into Thailand of fighting between Myanmar government forces and Burmese non-state armed groups has deterred efforts either to survey or clear affected areas on the border.^[30] Contamination on the border with Lao PDR is limited and on the border with Malaysia it is negligible.^[31]

Casualties

Landmine Monitor identified 26 mine/ERW casualties in Thailand in 2008; three people were killed and 23 injured.^[32] TMAC’s Humanitarian Mine Action Units (HMAU) recorded some 18 of these casualties (two killed and 16 injured). This was supplemented with data from hospitals (six injured) and the Epidemiology Office of the Ministry of Public Health (MoPH) (one killed and one injured). Of the total, 25 casualties were male and one was female (adult). At least four casualties were boys and the age of another three male casualties was unknown. Eighteen casualties were civilian, five casualties were military or security personnel and three were deminers (injured in two incidents).

Activities of civilians at the time of the incident, when known, included collecting wood or food (five), herding (four), and agriculture (three). Casualties mostly occurred on the Thai-Cambodian border, in the provinces of Si Sa Ket (eight), Trat (six), Surin (two), Ubon Ratchathani (two), Buriram (one), and Chanthaburi (one). Another six casualties occurred in Tak province on the Thai-Myanmar border. This represents an increase from 19 new mine/ERW casualties identified for 2007 (all injured). Three casualties were citizens of Myanmar.^[33]

In 2008, at least two Thai citizens were injured by mines/ERW in Myanmar, close to the Thai border. Both received treatment in Thailand.^[34] In addition, in February 2008, 14 Myanmar nationals were injured when an unidentified device exploded at a garbage dump while they searched for scrap metal. The device was variously reported in the media as a mine, an item of UXO, a homemade bomb, or a Molotov cocktail. Due to uncertainty about the device type, these casualties have not been included in the total for 2008.^[35]

Casualties continued to be reported in 2009 with at least four casualties (all injured) resulting from three incidents, as of 28 July. Two soldiers were injured on the Thai side of the disputed border area around Preah Vihear Temple. In Trat province, a husband and wife were both injured while collecting forest products: the man had previously stepped on a mine in 1993.^[36]

In March 2009, a Thai farmer was injured in Israel by a mine while looking for mushrooms.^[37]

From June 1998 to 2008 Landmine Monitor recorded 555 casualties in Thailand: 26 killed, 169 injured, and 360 of unknown status. This total includes some casualties injured in Myanmar and recorded in Thailand, which could not be separated from the data. It was not possible to separate out individual years for the data from June 1998 to May 2001. There has been no discernable decrease in the annual number of casualties since 2002.^[38]

The most comprehensive casualty data collection for Thailand, including casualties both killed and injured, remains the LIS, which identified at least 3,468 casualties to May 2001 (1,497 people killed and 1,971 injured).^[39] In 2008–2009, a retrospective data collection survey recorded a total of 1,252 mine/ERW survivors in 22 provinces of Thailand. Some three-quarters of all mine/ERW survivors were registered as physically disabled. Of the total 1,252 survivors identified, 1,246 provided detailed information: 1,157 (93%) were male and 89 (7%) female. The highest numbers of survivors were in the provinces of Sa Kaeo, 256 people (20 % of total); Nan, 139 people (11%); and Si Sa Ket, 109 people (9%).^[40]

Risk profile

Casualty data indicates that livelihood activities are the main activities at the time of the incident: tending animals, agriculture, farming, hunting, fishing, and collecting wood, water, or food.^[41] Most incidents are caused by mines along the border with Cambodia, and most of the casualties are male. People are prohibited from entering land within 3km of the border by law. However, in the surrounding villages some people do enter mined areas to get food from the forest.^[42] People also have incidents crossing the border between Myanmar and Thailand.

Socio-economic impact

The main impact of mines and ERW has been to deny border communities the use of forest resources and, to a lesser extent, cropland, pasture, and water resources. Residential areas, roads, and other major infrastructure are rarely affected. Thailand’s Article 5 deadline extension request noted that economic growth since the LIS had lessened communities’ dependence on forest resources but mine and UXO contamination continued to cause casualties and pose barriers to local socio-economic development.^[43]

Program Management and Coordination

Mine action

Responsibility for overseeing mine action lies with the National Committee for Humanitarian Mine Action (NMAC), set up in 2000. It is chaired by the Prime Minister and includes representatives of all major ministries and government departments. Its duties include coordinating national and international support for demining, monitoring Thailand’s progress towards meeting its Mine Ban Treaty obligations, and monitoring implementation of the law banning landmines. NMAC’s mandate expired in January 2005 but was renewed in November 2006 after a military coup d’état.^[44] Abhisit Vejjajiva took office on 17 December 2008, as Thailand’s third prime minister since the 2006 coup, but as of July 2009 had not chaired a meeting of NMAC.

TMAC was established in 1999 under the Armed Forces Supreme Command to coordinate and implement mine action, including survey, clearance, RE, and VA. Since 2005, TMAC has pressed for a change in its status to a civilian organization, prompted by the slow progress of demining and the armed forces’ limited budget for operations.^[45] NMAC accepted the restructuring in principle in February 2007 but as of April 2009 had not decided on the new structure. The proposal that TMAC becomes a foundation but remains under the Armed Forces is still pending.^[46] The February 2007 meeting also decided to set up five sub-committees for VA, coordination with foreign organizations, demining, RE, and monitoring and evaluation. Each sub-committee met at least once in 2007 and 2008.^[47]

Risk education

TMAC is responsible for coordinating RE and supporting training, and it also implements RE through the HMAUs. All RE activities along the borders have to be coordinated with TMAC because they are a military body and the army controls the border areas.^[48] TMAC monitors its own activities, but not those of other organizations. RE activity data is entered into the TMAC database.^[49]

Victim assistance

The National Sub-Committee on Victim Assistance (VA sub-committee), established under NMAC, is the coordinating body for VA. The VA sub-committee, chaired by the MoPH, meets at least twice a year and includes the Ministry of Social Development and Human Security (MoSDHS), Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Labor, TMAC, and relevant NGOs.^[50]

Data collection and management

TMAC upgraded the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database to Version 5 in November 2007 but has experienced difficulties storing and accessing some data. TMAC signed a memorandum of understanding with Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) in February 2009 to provide technical assistance to develop its information management capacity as well as its technical survey and land release procedures.^[51]

An NPA assessment of the database in February 2009 noted that “lack of consistency in available data and TMAC’s current status as an ad hoc unit within the [Ministry of Defense] greatly hampers its functioning as staff rotate annually.” The assessment observed that the database unit’s five staff had no terms of reference or guidelines, clearance data was recorded in the Geographic Information System but undated, land release data was incomplete, and incident data existed in paper format only.^[52]

Thailand does not have a complete national data collection mechanism. The total number of mine/ERW casualties, both killed and injured remains unknown and, for 2008, Landmine Monitor continued to identify a few casualties not recorded in the existing data collection system. TMAC HMAUs collect new incident reports in areas of operation in mine-affected provinces, mainly along the Thai-Cambodian border. Details of the casualty and incident are entered into local log books. In 2008, TMAC continued to receive data directly from 16 mine-affected provinces through four HMAUs. In 2008, TMAC also received casualty data collected by the Epidemiology Office of the MoPH from all 76 provinces in Thailand. TMAC compiled data from both sources, concentrating on the 27 mine-affected provinces. TMAC shares information with the VA sub-committee, the MoPH, and relevant NGOs. ^[53]

The most significant improvement in data collection and management from 2008–2009 was the completion of Thailand’s retrospective survivor data collection survey from June 2008 to April 2009. The project was the first comprehensive survey of mine/ERW survivors and established a database for future use in planning and implementation of services. The survey was conducted by Handicap International (HI) in Thailand in cooperation with Peace Road Organization Foundation (PRO), the Catholic Office for Emergency Relief and Refugees (COERR), and Jesuit Refugee Services (JRS) with the financial support of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the cooperation of the VA sub-committee including the MoPH, MoSDHS, and the Ministry of Labor.^[54] An online database containing information from the survey will be maintained by the MoPH and TMAC.^[55]

Mine action program operators

Plans

Strategic mine action plans

Thailand’s Master Plan on Humanitarian Mine Action No. 2 (2005–2009), drawn up by TMAC, set out general objectives of mine action in the country, emphasizing the integration of mine action into the National Socio-economic Development Plan. In view of the large estimate of contaminated area produced by the LIS and the slow progress of clearance operations, TMAC has increasingly focused on area reduction.^[56]

TMAC’s current strategy is set out in Thailand’s Article 5 deadline extension request. The request identifies “Area Reduction Survey” as the “primary method of land release,” focusing particularly on its “Locating Minefield Procedure” (LMP). However, the request also “assumes” 528.2km² remains to be manually cleared, calling for annual clearance rising from 43km² in 2009 to 64.7km² in 2016 before dropping back to 63.5km² in 2019.^[57]

The request envisaged total expenditure of THB17.4 billion (US$527.2 million). To achieve this target, TMAC also planned administrative reorganization and a major expansion in personnel, including a rise in the number of deminers from 546 in 2007 to around 900, making up 90 ten-person teams, and the acquisition of new equipment, including vehicles and detectors.^[58]

Thailand has a Master Plan for Mine Risk Education 2007–2011, approved in February 2007. The plan notes which government agencies share responsibilities for RE, and mentions the role of NGOs, but lacks detailed planning and timeframes.^[59]

The Master Plan for Mine Victim Assistance 2007–2011, allocates responsibility for VA services to various ministries in conjunction with the work of NGOs and other relevant bodies.^[60]

National ownership

Commitment to mine action and victim assistance

Thailand’s institutional framework for managing mine action provides for engagement of the Prime Minister and senior ministers as well as the Armed Forces Supreme Command, directly responsible for TMAC. In practice, Thai political and military leaders have paid little attention to mine action which, as a result, remained severely under-funded in the past decade. Thailand’s Article 5 deadline extension request acknowledged TMAC had experienced “some organizational disadvantages” as an organization under military control and that it had been seeking to become a civilian organization to increase its flexibility and “administrative effectiveness.”^[61]

In 2009, Thailand reported that “Thailand has always been committed to assisting victims of landmines.” Management of VA is carried out through national bodies and coordinated by NMAC’s VA sub-committee. Thailand has no specific VA legislation, but uses existing disability legislation for its VA planning. Except for the assistance to Myanmar refugees by HI, ICRC, and Clear Path International (CPI), all funding for VA was national (see Services for non-Thai nationals section below).^[62]

National management

TMAC has operated with an entirely national management and staff, mostly on two to three year rotation from regular service with the armed forces.^[63] A UNDP project officer started work in TMAC in mid-2009 to provide support for strategic planning and identifying provincial mine action priorities, to provide support for VA and enhance cooperation with NGOs. UNDP also agreed to provide an international technical advisor to lead the project but as of August 2009 had not finalized the appointment.^[64]

National budget

TMAC has been financed exclusively from the national budget since it was set up in 1999, although it has received some in-kind support from foreign governments, notably army surplus vehicles from the US. National funding has accounted for nearly 60% of total mine action expenditure between 1999 and 2008, the balance coming in the form of donor support to NGOs.^[65]

National mine action legislation and standards/Standing operating procedures

Thailand has no national legislation on mine action, other than government orders setting up NMAC and TMAC.^[66] TMAC’s humanitarian mine action units operate according to Thai national standards which TMAC says are based on the International Mine Action Standards.^[67] There are no national RE standards.^[68]

No standing operating procedures are known to exist for data management. TMAC reached an agreement with NPA in February 2009 to provide technical support, including development of land release procedures and ensuring they met international standards.^[69]

Program evaluations

The reporting of the retrospective survivor survey completed in 2009 included assessment of existing services and structures, together with general recommendations for improving VA.^[70]

Demining and Battle Area Clearance

TMAC operates four HMAUs: three army units reporting to army task forces and one unit of marines reporting to the navy. Three of the units work on the border with Cambodia while the fourth works on the border with Lao PDR. In fiscal year 2009 (October 2008 to September 2009), the units had 426 staff out of TMAC’s total staff of 498, which was down from a total of 546 in fiscal 2008.^[71]

In 2008, demining was also conducted by two NGOs: the Peace Road Organization Foundation (PRO) with 35 field staff and the Mekong Organization for Mankind (MOM), which had about 50 staff, including 40 deminers, operating with some of its own equipment and some provided on loan by TMAC.

Identification of hazardous areas

In 2008 and early 2009, TMAC continued the LMP that began in October 2007. TMAC’s reporting, however, left considerable uncertainty about the dimensions of Thailand’s residual mine threat.

The LIS had identified a total of 2,557km² as suspected hazardous area (SHA). In its revised Article 5 deadline extension request submitted in 2008, Thailand reported it had released a total of 1,611.2km² of land through the LMP and clearance. The extension request further estimated Thailand still had 528.2km² of “real minefield.”^[72] In March 2009, TMAC said that out of a total SHA of 2,417.6km², it had identified 531.5km² of minefields through LMP and 1,886.1km² as safe. It also reported 55.9km² as demined land and 77.6km² as “dangerous land” needing to be checked by LMP.^[73] In July 2009, TMAC estimated the area of minefield at 562km².^[74]

MOM started a two-year Integrated Area Reduction Survey (IARS) project in November 2007 as part of TMAC’s LMP initiative. TMAC assigned MOM to survey 219.5km² in the provinces of Buriram, Chanthaburi, Sa Kaeo, Si Sa Ket, Surin, Trat, and Ubon Ratchathani on the border with Cambodia. The project covered four main activities: LMP; posting warning signs around SHAs; informing the community about the location of minefields; and spot demining. MOM deployed about 40 staff in the field for the project and received $1.28 million from Japan through the Japan-ASEAN Integrated Fund.^[75] MOM completed fieldwork in April 2009 leaving a further six months to check data and undertake spot clearance tasks.^[76]

Demining in 2008

TMAC nearly tripled the area it demined in 2008 to 1.3km² from the previous year, when its four units cleared less than 0.5km² and a total of 51 mines.^[77] The main focus of its efforts was implementing its LMP, which resulted in area reducing 805km² of land identified by the LIS as suspect. But the 2008 and initial 2009 results underlined the highly, perhaps unrealistically, ambitious targets Thailand set in its Article 5 deadline extension request. This proposed that Thailand would clear 43km² of mined area in 2009. In the first half of 2009, TMAC reported provisionally that it cleared 1.3km².^[78]

PRO continued mine clearance in the Pra Wiharn Sanctuary area in Si Sa Ket province and completed the project at the end of December 2008. As of April 2009, PRO no longer had funding and was not conducting any demining.^[79] MOM conducted spot demining as part of its IARS project.^[80]

Demining in 2008^[81]

* Unconfirmed clearance data indicates that TMAC also cleared 579 items of UXO in 2008.

Progress since becoming a State Party

Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, Thailand was required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 May 2009. Thailand’s limited progress in clearance since 2003 is reflected in the table below.

Demining from 2003–2008^[82]

In April 2008, Thailand applied to extend its Article 5 deadline, and submitted a revised request in August 2008. It asked for an extension to its deadline of 9.5 years, to 1 November 2018.^[83] The request estimated Thailand had 528.2km² of “real minefield” requiring clearance by “traditional landmine clearance method [sic].” Although Thailand has cleared on average less than 1km² a year, the request suggests annual clearance will climb from 43.07km² in 2009 to 64.71km² in 2016 before falling back to 63.51km² in 2018.^[84]

The Ninth Meeting of States Parties in Geneva granted the requested extension but called the 9.5 year timeframe “ambitious” and noted that achieving it was “contingent upon maintaining a sizeable increase in State funds dedicated to implementation and obtaining external support at a level that is at least 10 times greater than Thailand’s recent experience in acquiring such support.” The Meeting of States Parties further noted that significant progress was expected, through Thailand’s LMP, to overcome impeding circumstances such as the manner in which it said the LIS “had hindered implementation efforts” by its overestimate of contamination.^[85]

By mid-2009, Thailand was already having difficulty meeting the goals set in its extension request. The rate of demining by TMAC in the first half of 2009 (1.3km²) was well behind what was needed to achieve the projected annual rate (43km²) while the estimated area of contamination had actually increased (from 528km² to 562km²).

To achieve its clearance targets, TMAC had envisaged increasing the number of deminers to 800 by the end of April 2009.^[86] As of June, however, TMAC’s HMAUs had 426 deminers. TMAC’s expansion was also dependent on receiving a big increase in its budget. In fiscal year 2008 (October 2007 to September 2008) TMAC’s budget rose to THB107.4 million ($3.3 million), 20% more than the previous year and more than double the annual budget received through much of the last decade.^[87] In August 2008, the government pledged THB1.4 billion ($42.4 million) for mine action for fiscal 2009 in line with the budget need set out in Thailand’s Article 5 deadline extension request. However, a new government took office in December 2008. As of July 2009, TMAC had not received the budget and was still uncertain of what funding was available for the year.^[88]

Risk Education

In 2008, RE was carried out by the HMAUs, HI’s Burmese Border Program, and COERR. HI’s Disability and Development Program, which included RE, ceased activities in February 2008 due to changes in its internal strategy and a lack of funding.^[89] At least 37,180 people received direct RE in 2008, in 11 of 27 the mine-affected provinces, all near the borders with Cambodia and Myanmar.^[90] This is a significant decrease from 2007, when some 63,911 people received RE.^[91] RE implemented by NGOs has decreased due to lack of funding, although TMAC activities continued at the same level.^[92] There are female RE staff in HI, but not in the HMAUs.^[93]

Casualty data is used to plan activities.^[94] TMAC RE teams go to villages and gather information about the locations of mines, then deliver RE.^[95] Messages delivered depended on the target group and geographical areas, and mainly consist of “do not touch, do not get close,” “do not go to the forest in mine-affected areas,” “do not go to unknown places.”^[96]

On completion of HI’s Disability and Development Program, HI handed the materials and curriculum over to the RE sub-committee members, so that it could be used by schools, landmine survivors, HMAUs, border patrol police, and other NGOs. The supervisors at the educational area offices monitor school activities but, without follow-up, activities are decreasing.^[97]

Each organization developed their materials for their specific uses and needs, but also collaborated to produce and share materials. ^[98]

In the first two months of 2008, there were some radio broadcasts (i.e. provincial radio, community) by HI in Chanthaburi and Trat, which continued from 2007.^[99]

Activities in 2008^[100]

RE in Thailand has been mainly conducted by HMAUs and up to five NGOs in any one year. The NGOs were: the Asian Disaster Preparedness Center (ADPC), HI, COERR, the General Chatichi Choonhavan Foundation (GCCF), and JRS.^[101] A training center for mine awareness was established in 1999 by TMAC and ADPC.^[102] The HMAUs mainly worked near the borders with Cambodia and Lao PDR.^[103] RE was conducted by military officers, who spent up to two weeks in a community conducting marking, giving RE sessions, and sessions on other subjects including agriculture and drugs.^[104] The NGOs mainly worked along the borders with Cambodia and Myanmar with affected communities, and in refugee and displaced persons camps.^[105] The ADPC conducted training for government officials and teachers, and provided RE to schoolchildren, including child-to-child training. HI conducted RE integrated with other programs, including emergency RE in refugee camps and training of teachers. COERR focused on training of school teachers and children.^[106] In 2005 a local RE curriculum was developed and integrated into schools near the border areas.^[107] GCCF posted mine warning signs and disseminated RE messages through its deminers.^[108] Since 2001, RE activities have reached at least 1,018,632 beneficiaries, the majority reached by HMAUs.^[109]

Victim Assistance

The total number of mine/ERW survivors is unknown, but is estimated to be 1,252.^[110] In 2009, Thailand reported significant improvements in VA, specifically regarding healthcare services, but also noted that challenges remain.^[111] In 2008, Thailand expanded its emergency medical service system to cover local communities in every province, supplemented by local health volunteers. A network of emergency response teams had access to most areas, while service times for emergency care, transport to primary health centers and referrals to hospital were significantly reduced. ^[112] However, no system was in place for securing safe access of emergency personnel to casualties in mined areas.^[113] In 2008 and 2009, local healthcare centers and hospitals in many mine-affected regions were being upgraded and made accessible for persons with disabilities.^[114]

Physical rehabilitation services are provided by military hospitals, public hospitals, and private institutions. Persons with disabilities registered with the government are entitled to free medical examinations and mobility devices.^[115] Provincial general hospitals in Thailand offer prosthetic and rehabilitation services, but not all services are available locally at community hospitals. Prosthetics are provided to persons with disabilities, including mine/ERW survivors, through public hospitals, with the support of the Sirindhorn National Medical Rehabilitation Center or through the national health insurance reimbursement system.

The recent retrospective survivor survey indicated that overall coverage for mobility devices was efficient, as 96% of respondents reported receiving services. But 43% of respondents cited repair or replacement of devices as key problems, due to the distance to centers and transportation costs.^[116] The national NGO, Prostheses Foundation in Chiang Mai, continued to establish workshops linked to medical centers in hospitals; some 11 workshops were in operation in 2008, as well as a mobile unit.^[117] The Sirindhorn Center and the Prostheses Foundation provide services in prosthetics and orthopedics free of charge to persons with disabilities, including mine/ERW survivors, in remote areas throughout the country.^[118]

The MoSDHS ran a volunteer-implemented, community-based rehabilitation (CBR) program providing social support for persons with disabilities, including mine/ERW survivors, primarily by assisting them to register for disability benefits, but including other support services. By 2008, the CBR network covered all 75 provinces of Thailand, including provinces heavily affected by landmines.^[119] Social workers in hospitals also assisted patients who were disabled by their injuries, including mine/ERW survivors, to register for official disability status and benefits. But little psychological support outside the family is available to most survivors, although in rare cases, institutional psychiatric assistance may be available for particular issues.^[120]

According to the recent retrospective national survivor survey, almost three-quarters (72%) of mine/ERW survivors reported having employment: just over half worked on farms and another 30% in the home. Seven out of ten survivors have very low incomes and live in poverty.^[121] In 2008, many persons with disabilities reportedly faced wage discrimination and some state enterprises had discriminatory hiring policies. An employment quota system of 0.5% persons with disabilities in the workplace for private businesses was not adequately enforced. In 2009, the Ministry of Labor was in the process of taking over responsibility of the quota system from the MoSDHS.^[122]

Thailand’s Master Plan for Victim Assistance states that the Ministry of Education should ensure 12 years of education for mine survivors and access to vocational training.^[123] The survivor survey indicated, however, that almost three-quarters of survivors have not completed primary school education.^[124] Government, private, and NGO training centers for persons with disabilities exist.^[125] In 2009, Thailand reported that less than 30% of survivors have received vocational training and that training was seen as incompatible with the needs of agricultural occupations.^[126] In 2008, the Ministry of Education provided specialized materials to students with disabilities.^[127] The government provides a monthly allowance of THB500 (approximately $15) to persons with severe disabilities, including mine/ERW survivors and other amputees.^[128] The amount is insufficient to cover living costs, but survivors report it is vital for supplementing their meager incomes.^[129]

Thailand has legislation protecting the rights of persons with disabilities and its 2007 constitution prohibits discrimination against persons with disabilities and provides for access to services. Other laws continued to allow discrimination against persons with disabilities in employment.^[130] Some amputee landmine survivors reported that they were denied driving licenses because of their disabilities.^[131] In December 2008, a policy on the eradication of all forms of discrimination against persons with disabilities and promotion of employment, education and suitable social welfare was announced in parliament by the Prime Minister.^[132] Strategic plan documents include specific projects for implementing the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.^[133]

On 29 July 2008, Thailand ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, but as of 1 August 2009 had not signed its Optional Protocol.

Progress in meeting VA26 victim assistance objectives

Thailand is one of the 26 States Parties with significant numbers of mine survivors and “the greatest responsibility to act, but also the greatest needs and expectations for assistance” in providing adequate services for the care, rehabilitation and reintegration of survivors.^[134] Thailand presented its 2005–2009 VA objectives to the Sixth Meeting of States Parties in November–December 2005.^[135] The objectives have not been revised since and they did not meet SMART (specific, measurable, achievable, relevant, and time-bound) criteria. No plans to implement the objectives were reported.^[136] Thailand adopted the Master Plan for Mine Victim Assistance 2007–2011 on 26 February 2007, which assigned responsibility for implementation to relevant ministries and bodies. It set few specific targets and left the setting of individual plans and objectives to each actor. The Master Plan was used in place of Thailand’s 2005–2009 VA objectives.^[137]

Thailand reported progress towards the achievement of VA objectives in 2008–2009. There was improvement in mine/ERW survivor data collection with the completion of the retrospective survivor survey, needs analysis, and database on survivors. Emergency and continuing medical care capacity improved due to a nationwide emergency response network with increased coordination and enhancement of infrastructure in rural areas. Progress was also made in developing physical rehabilitation capacity. Some progress was reported in providing psychological support to mine/ERW survivors, particularly through the CBR program. More vocational training centers were reportedly established in some mine-affected areas. More persons with disabilities, including mine survivors, received monthly disability pensions and benefits, including free medical care and rehabilitation. Thailand ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and made improvements in long-term disability policies.^[138]

Thailand included a VA or disability expert on its delegations to the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in 2007 and 2009, and to the Eighth Meetings of States Parties; three VA experts attended the Ninth Meeting of States Parties. Thailand reported on VA at all the intersessional Standing Committee meetings since 2005 and at all meetings of States Parties since 2006 and used the voluntary Form J attachment to its annual Article 7 report to provide details on VA activities in all years since 2005. In its Article 7 report covering 2008, Thailand reported on the results of the retrospective national survivor survey and the activities of HI for refugees on the Thai-Myanmar border.

Victim assistance activities

Services for Thai nationals

The Sirindhorn Center provided prostheses, assistive devices, wheelchairs and other aids for persons with disabilities to 97 hospitals in 19 of 22 mine-affected provinces with survivors. The center also provided training in prosthetics and rehabilitation. In 2008, the center’s mobile units provided services to patients with mobility disabilities.^[139]

In 2008, the Prostheses Foundation provided prostheses to beneficiaries, including mine/ERW survivors, through its satellite centers and mobile services.^[140] In cooperation with HI, the Prostheses Foundation also provided free foot components to a group in Kantharalak sub-district, Si Sa Ket, for future repairs for 30 landmine survivors.^[141] The volunteer group, Single Drop of Sea Water, provided THB3,000 ($91) to the group for coordination expenses.^[142]

JRS and COERR both continued to provide assistance to mine/ERW survivors as part of their broader programs in 2008. Five mine survivors in Aranyaprathet district received support packages from COERR in 2008. ^[143]

Services for non-Thai nationals

Landmine survivors from Myanmar seeking assistance in Thailand received medical care at hospitals in refugee camps and public district hospitals in the Thai-Myanmar border provinces. Physical rehabilitation is available at the Mae Sot General Hospital, Mae Tao Clinic Prosthetic Center, and within refugee camps at prosthetic workshops run by HI.^[144]

Thai hospitals reported at least 60 mine/ERW survivors from Myanmar (58 injured in Myanmar and two in Thailand) receiving medical care in 2008.^[145] The ICRC continued its War Wounded program and covered the costs of 71 mine/ERW survivors from Myanmar receiving medical care in Thailand in 2008 (63% of 111 weapon-wounded patients from Myanmar in Thai hospitals assisted through the program in 2008).^[146] The ICRC also supported repairs to the surgical ward of the Mae Tao Clinic in Mae Sot, which assists injured refugees from Myanmar. ICRC, with the Thai Red Cross, held seminars on treating weapon wounds in Bangkok and southern Thailand for some 300 civilian and military medical staff in 2008.^[147]

CPI continued to assist mine/ERW survivors along the Thai-Myanmar border. In 2008, CPI built a new prosthetics workshop for survivors in Pang Mapha, Mae Hong Son province; in 2008, it produced 22 prosthetics. The Peng Lo workshop near the Khung Jor refugee camp, in cooperation with the Shan Health Committee, produced 16 prosthetics in 2008. In 2008 and 2009, CPI expanded the development of farm projects providing income generation for amputee residents. CPI supported the Mae La Care Villa residence for some 20 blind amputee mine/ERW survivors. It also coordinated with the Mae Tao Clinic in Mae Sot to provide support and training to medics and counselors in physical therapy and psychosocial support.^[148] In 2008, 188 landmine survivors from Myanmar received prostheses from the Mae Tao Clinic Prosthetic Center.^[149]

HI’s Burmese Border Program assisted non-Thai citizens with physiotherapy through refugee camp workers under the guidance of trained physiotherapists. The program also provided prosthetic, orthotic, and other assistive devices and accessibility to buildings and camp structures (the number of mine/ERW survivors assisted was unknown).^[150]

In 2008, at least 11 Cambodian mine/ERW survivors received free emergency treatment, continuing medical care, and physical rehabilitation in Thai government-run hospitals along the border with Cambodia.^[151]

Support for Mine Action

Thailand has estimated the total cost for completion of its Article 5 obligations by 2018 at THB17.4 billion ($527.2 million). Thailand’s Article 5 deadline extension request includes annual cost estimates for clearance activities and specifies annual funding amounts projected for the government of Thailand and international donors.^[152] From 2009 to 2013 Thailand has committed to contributing THB1 billion ($30.3 million) for mine clearance, and THB1.5 billion ($45.5 million) from 2014 to 2018, for a total contribution of THB12.5 billion ($378.8 million) or approximately 72% of its total Article 5 extension budget. Unspecified donors are projected to cover the remaining costs, totaling about THB 4.9 billion (about $149 million) and ranging from THB421.3 million ($12.8 million) in 2009 to THB635.4 million ($19.3 million) in 2016 before falling back to THB595.8 million ($18.1 million) in 2018.^[153] Thailand has not given a cost estimate for fulfilling RE or VA obligations during this period.

The request does not provide detailed resource mobilization strategies but calls for mobilization of funds from all levels of government, as well as state enterprises, European Union pre-accession funds, the World Bank, and national and international donors.^[154]

National support for mine action

In its revised Article 5 deadline extension request, Thailand reported a national commitment to TMAC of THB106 million ($3.2 million) for 2008.^[155] Thailand reported THB88.3 million ($2.75 million) in funds contributed to TMAC from the national budget in 2007. In August 2008, the Prime Minister approved a budget of THB1.4 billion ($42.4 million) for the first year of the requested extension period (April 2009 to March 2010), which covers 2009 budget estimates under the Article 5 extension plan but as of July 2009 TMAC was unsure what funding would be available (see Progress since becoming a State Party section above).^[156]

The Ministry of Defense allocates funds for mine action from its own budget, and must compete for its own funding with budget demands from other ministries. Thailand has reported that mine action has received less national funding in recent years as a result of other national humanitarian emergencies and priorities.^[157]

The government did not report the cost of the monthly subsistence allowance provided for persons with “severe disabilities,” the cost of vocational training for disabled persons^[158] or the number of landmine victims receiving these benefits.

International cooperation and assistance

In 2008, no international donors reported assistance for mine action in Thailand. In 2007, reported funding totaled $1,611,071 (€1,175,021). In October 2008, within its Article 5 extension plan, Thailand reported THB50 million ($1.5 million) in international funding to mine action NGOs in Thailand in 2008, but did not specify when allocations had been made or which donors had provided the money.^[159] The lack of international funding in 2008 calls into question Thailand’s ability to meet the long-term costs of mine clearance or VA under its Article 5 extension plan. ^[160]