Key
developments since May 2001: After the signing a cease-fire agreement for
the Nuba Mountains area, a series of new mine action projects were initiated. A
number of assessments were carried out in both government- and rebel-controlled
areas. The United States deployed part of its quick reaction demining force to
clear mines from roads in the Nuba Mountains for a five-week period. The Sudan
Landmine Information and Response Initiative was formed in 2001. Between April
2001 and March 2002, Operation Save Innocent Lives cleared a total of 329 miles
of road and 263,093 square meters of land. Both the government and the SPLA
have renewed pledges not to use antipersonnel mines, although there are still
unconfirmed allegations of use by both sides.
BACKGROUND
A series of diplomatic missions resulted in the
U.S./Swiss-brokered Burgenstock Ceasefire Agreement for the Nuba Mountains,
signed on 19 January 2002. This agreement specifically calls for an end to the
use of mines and for mine clearance in this northern Sudanese rebel enclave. It
also allows humanitarian access and monitoring. A Joint Military Commission has
been established to regulate and monitor the ceasefire and international
monitors are also to be deployed.
MINE BAN POLICY
Sudan signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December
1997, but has not ratified it. In June 2001, the Humanitarian Aid Commission
(HAC), the Sudanese government focal point for mine issues, convened a workshop
on the treaty and a technical committee was formed from ministries to advise on
treaty ratification. Both the head of the Army’s engineering department,
General Mohamed Abdelgadir, and the deputy commissioner of HAC, Abdel Ati Abdel
Kheir, supported the workshop’s recommendation for the government to
ratify the Mine Ban Treaty.[1]
The Commissioner General of the HAC in May 2002 stated, “The Government of
Sudan has not finalized the ratification of Ottawa Convention banning the use of
Landmines yet because it is still facing several problems....” After
citing continued use of mines by rebel groups, he said, “The Government of
Sudan reaffirms its commitment for the ratification of Ottawa Convention for
Banning the use of Landmines which will be effective soon as the above-mentioned
violations are ceased.”[2]
Representatives of the Sudan government attended the Third Meeting of States
Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in Managua, Nicaragua, in September 2001 and
actively participated in the meetings of the intersessional Standing Committees
in Geneva in January and May 2002. Sudan cosponsored and voted in favor of UN
General Assembly Resolution 56/24M in November 2001, calling for the
universalization and implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty.
The President of Sudan has called for a regional mechanism to address the
problem of landmines in the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD, an
East African regional grouping) countries. Based on that call, HAC started
contacts with Eritrea, Uganda, Ethiopia, and Kenya trying to implement the
President’s call, which focuses on mine action, and not a ban. These
contacts also included Chad, which is not an IGAD
country.[3]
The main rebel army, the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), has now
twice signed the “Geneva Call Commitment to Non-Use,” first on 10
August 2001, in southern Sudan and again 4 October 2001, in
Geneva.[4] In January 2002,
the SPLA and the rival Sudan People’s Defense Forces (SPDF) signed an
agreement to merge, drastically changing the military situation in south Sudan
by ending most factional fighting in Upper Nile. According to an
SPLM[5] official, “This
agreement is binding on any party or faction that joins with the SPLA, past
present or future.”[6]
The same official said the SPLA’s agreement to the mine ban was
“triggered by the simple fact that we are fighting for a peaceful homeland
and not a turbulent
minefield.”[7] A leader
of the SPDF was more equivocal, believing his faction still had to negotiate
these issues during the ongoing merger talks, but insisted his forces had
renounced the use of antipersonnel mines since 1996, and had no stocks or
intention to use them.[8]
PRODUCTION, TRADE, STOCKPILING
Both civilian and military representatives of
Sudan have stated that the country does not produce, export, import, or possess
stockpiles of antipersonnel
mines.[9] A July 2001 letter to
Landmine Monitor claimed there were no stocks of antipersonnel
mines.[10] These statements are
at odds with the allegations and evidence of past use of antipersonnel mines
reported in previous editions of Landmine Monitor Report. According to
the government, all mines collected during demining and those taken from the
rebel forces are
destroyed.[11]
It appears that the Lord’s Resistance Army, a Ugandan separatist group,
has stockpiled landmines inside Sudan. In February 2002, Uganda and Sudan
signed a protocol to allow Ugandan army units to pursue LRA units within
Sudanese territory. In late March 2002, the Ugandan Defense Minister claimed
that the Ugandan army had overrun four LRA bases inside Sudan and seized weapons
including “55 assault rifles, grenades, bombs, land mines and
ammunition.” These were handed over to the Sudanese military intelligence
chief at Lubang Tek in a videotaped
ceremony.[12]
USE
Landmine Monitor Report 2001 stated that
there were “strong indications” that both government and SPLA forces
continued to use antipersonnel
mines.[13] On numerous
occasions in the past year Sudanese military and civilian officials have denied
that the army uses antipersonnel mines. At the Third Meeting of States Parties
in September 2001, the head of the Sudanese delegation said that the government
reiterates its commitment not to use antipersonnel
mines.[14]
The government stated at the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in
Geneva in May 2002, “The rebels are still using antipersonnel landmines in
many parts of the southern Sudan. Several incidents had occurred recently in
Raga and Ganmet near Wau of Western Bahr El Gazal State.... In the Eastern
Sudan the opposition based in a neighboring country also uses antipersonnel
landmines with devastating effects on the civilians and their
livestock.”[15] For a
number of years there have been reports of various militias in the south using
mines.[16]
The UN Inter-Agency Consolidated Appeal for Sudan, 2002, mentions a UN
assessment report that claims both the government and opposition parties use
landmines: “the former to protect its garrison towns, while the latter
uses landmines to fix government forces in the towns and interdict their supply
lines.” Furthermore, “both sides reportedly have used landmines to
terrorize local populations in order to diminish their support for the opposing
sides.”[17]
Both sides have accused each other of having mined the town of Raga in
Western Baher el Ghazal area, recaptured in October 2001 by the government after
being taken by the SPLA in June 2001. The SPLA allegedly warned a security
official with UN Operation Lifeline Sudan that the SPLA had used antipersonnel
mines in October 2001 to defend the nearby airstrips at Mangayat and Deim
Zubeir.[18] An SPLM official
stated, “If this incident took place I’m sure that it was from lack
of local information by commanders on the ground. We hope that we will be able
to resolve these local difficulties through a program of education and training
in international humanitarian norms, as planned with Geneva
Call.”[19]
Although a cease-fire has been in effect in the Nuba Mountains since January
2002, fighting continues in the nearby oil-producing areas of the south,
particularly Western Upper Nile. The SPLA provided a Landmine Monitor
researcher with sketch maps indicating some 49 known or suspected minefields in
the Nuba Mountains. The SPLA alleges the Sudanese Army laid all but three. The
SPLA also claims that government forces continued nuisance mining as late as
January 2002.[20]
LANDMINE PROBLEM, SURVEY, AND ASSESSMENT
The landmine situation in Sudan has not been
comprehensively surveyed. This includes rebel-controlled parts of south Sudan,
and other locations such as the Nuba Mountains, southern Blue Nile, and the Red
Sea Hills. Following the January 2002 cease-fire, several initial assessments
were conductedin the Nuba Mountains (an area hitherto excluded from
international humanitarian assistance).
The Sudan Landmine Information and Response Initiative (SLIRI), UN Mine
Action Service (UNMAS), and the Joint Military Commission (JMC) undertook
missions in government-controlled areas of the Nuba Mountains. Operation Save
Innocent Lives (OSIL), Sudan Integrated Mine Action Service (SIMAS), and SLIRI
assessed some SPLA-controlled areas of the Nuba Mountains in March 2002. SLIRI,
advised by Landmine Action (UK), carried out an assessment on both sides,
working with OSIL in the SPLA areas. The Mines Advisory Group (MAG)
provided technical expertise for the assessment in the Nuba Mountains.
The Joint Military Commission and International Monitoring Unit began initial
deployment in mid-April 2002 and called for immediate demining of key access
routes. There are several plans to collect and collate data from mine-affected
communities and regions. SLIRI and UNMAS are planning to establish in-country
information centers.
The assessment reports of specific locations, as well as other information
provided by a variety of sources, give a fragmentary picture at best of the mine
situation in Sudan. Some findings include:
An emergency assessment of the Nuba Mountains area by SLIRI, funded by the
Diana, Princess of Wales Memorial Fund, reports: “The use of
[antipersonnel mines] in combat areas is clearly widespread based on the high
incidence of injuries within the population which conform to those normally
associated with an [antipersonnel mine]
detonation.”[21]
World Food Program (WFP) food security calculations suggest up to a million
people in southern Sudan could be affected directly and indirectly by mines -
half the total estimated in need of food relief. Most affected are the
populations inside towns who are prevented from grazing and cultivation by
encircling minefields.[22]
The Nuba Relief, Rehabilitation and Development Organization (NRRDO)
indicates that the southeastern Nuba counties of Heiban and Nugurban are most
heavily contaminated, with three times the number of mine victims of the other
five counties. NRRDO food security officer Mohamed Osman claims that 90 percent
of fertile land is also unavailable due to the mine situation. He also believes
that almost the entire population of the rebel enclave has been affected by the
use of landmines, both due to the inability to cultivate in the fertile valleys
and by the difficulty in accessing waterpoints. Osman believes the total number
affected is around 400,000, over twice the WFP estimates of around
157,000.[23]
UNMAS notes that areas “worst affected” by mines include Bahr el
Ghazal and Western Upper
Nile.[24]
The southeastern region of Eastern Equatoria is reported to be mined and in
the opinion of one senior cleric, Juba is the worst affected town in the region,
having been mined in the first year of the war (1983) and besieged for almost
two decades. Several hundred thousand displaced people have swollen its existing
population and they have virtually no access to the
countryside.[25] Another senior
cleric claims that most of Eastern Equatoria is contaminated by mines and
unexploded ordnance
(UXO).[26]
Referring to the mine situation in Upper Nile, former U.S. State Department
Sudan advisor John Prendergast, said “Landmines as a perimeter defense of
the oilfield infrastructure will have an adverse impact on the people of that
area for the next century, as unexploded ordnance will remain a serious threat
to southern Sudanese
civilians....”[27]
Another source states that the Upper Nile areas of Malakal and Bentiu are very
seriously affected.[28]
The western portion of southern Sudan is thought to be less heavily
contaminated, although all contested areas and besieged government towns are
believed to be mined. According to SIMAS, OSIL and the SPLA, every town
captured by the SPLA or government has been defensively mined.
Some of the traditional fishing areas around Yirol in Lakes Province have
been deserted because of the widespread deployment of mines around the
lakes.[29]
MINE ACTION COORDINATION, PLANNING, AND FUNDING
A number of mine action programs were initiated in
Sudan during the reporting period. While none of these programs has the
immediate objective of establishing a national mine action program, many are
focused on establishing and developing local capacities to eliminate landmines.
Programs have increasingly concentrated on the Nuba Mountains since the January
cease-fire.
In August 2001, representatives of civil society from both sides of the Sudan
conflict met in London at a meeting hosted by Landmine Action (a UK-based NGO)
to discuss the potential for a coordinated cross-conflict mine action response,
with the full approval of the government of Sudan and the SPLM/A. This
“Crosslines” meeting developed the Sudan Landmine Information and
Response Network concept. SLIRI is now a consortium of over 70 Sudanese and
international NGOs with the Sudan Campaign to Ban Landmines (SCBL), Operation
Save Innocent Lives, and Landmine Action being the main partners. SLIRI intends
to serve as a nationwide “crosslines” information network in both
government- and rebel-controlled areas of Sudan, including the Nuba Mountains.
The European Commission funds the initiative and OXFAM (Great Britain) serves as
the contractor.[30] The EC is
providing €1.5 million (US$1.35 million) for an initial period of one
year.[31]
UNMAS has established a presence in Sudan and visited both government and
SPLA controlled areas in March 2002. An UNMAS representative has been stationed
in Khartoum since March 2002. The Swedish International Development Authority
(SIDA) pledged $250,000 for UNMAS to start its emergency mine action in Sudan.
The German Embassy in Khartoum announced that it has pledged €115,000 for
emergency mine action in Sudan via the UN
system.[32] The German Fund is
supporting UNMAS in its effort to gather information on mines in
Sudan.[33]
To lay the groundwork for post-conflict mine action, UNMAS, within the
confines of an ongoing conflict, “will focus on the development and
capacity building of an appropriate, national, mine action co-ordination body
(National Mine Action Office), the professional development of an emergency
national, mine clearance capability and the development and draft of National
Mine Action Standards coupled with the establishment and implementation of a
recognized and workable Quality Assurance monitoring system. It will also seek
to establish proven mine awareness/mine risk reduction routines and to
strengthen existing mine victim assistance and reintegration
systems.”[34]
MINE CLEARANCE
There has been a reluctance to engage in or fund
mine clearance while conflict has been ongoing in Sudan. Until recently, OSIL
had been the only agency involved in demining. OSIL has projects in parts of
Eastern Equatoria accessed via Uganda. OSIL has bases in Yei and Nimule for
operations west and east of the Nile. Between April 2001 and March 2002, OSIL
cleared a total of 329 miles of road and 263,093 square meters of land,
disposing of 125 antivehicle mines, 439 antipersonnel mines, and 21,531 UXO.
In a response to donor enquiries regarding the unit cost of demining, OSIL
figures indicate that in the three months between April and June 2001, it spent
$190,000, and cleared 363 antipersonnel mines, 45 antitankmines and
3,496 UXO from 45 miles of roads and 238,649 square meters of land. In June
2001 OSIL conducted an emergency clearance of the recently SPLA-captured town of
Gogrial, in Bahr el Ghazal, which perhaps accounts for the fact that OSIL claims
to have cleared 226,000 square meters in that month
alone.[35] This equals an
average cost per mine of $49 and $0.15 per square
meter.[36] While cautioning
that averages are not really relevant and that it takes as much care and
attention to demine an area with a low density of mines as an area with many,
OSIL states that its costs are far lower than any international mine action
organization because OSIL employs only local
staff.[37]
OSIL began demining a heavily mined area around the hospital in Chukudum in
September 2001. OSIL demined the hospital area, but claimed that the local
population refused to allow it to remove the perimeter mines due to security
fears.[38] In 2002, OSIL has
been working in the Aswa Valley, north of Nimule, which it describes as
“the most heavily contaminated area in all
Sudan.”[39]
The Mines Advisory Group has provided capacity development and support to
OSIL staff, deploying one technical advisor and one community liaison advisor,
each for six months. MAG also provided funding for two OSIL mine clearance
teams on behalf of the government of
Switzerland.[40]
As part of the cease-fire agreement and humanitarian relief plans in the Nuba
Mountains, in late April 2002, the U.S. deployed specialist mine clearance teams
with mine detecting dogs from its quick reaction demining force (QRDF), which is
based in Mozambique. The RONCO Consulting Corporation, a Washington, D.C.-based
commercial demining firm will implement the mission in
Sudan.[41] A U.S. demining
official described the effort as “opening up roads for humanitarian
aid,” and said that the mission is “very finite, very specific, with
specific tasks assigned by the JMC.” He indicated the key task would be
to clear the main road network before the onset of the heavy rains, probably in
June or July.[42] The QRDF
began work on 18 May,[43] and as
of June 2002, the force was demining a route between the villages of Um Sirdeba
and Kauda and some 37,000 square meters had been
cleared.[44]
MINE RISK EDUCATION
Mine risk education activities in Kassala, eastern
Sudan and Malakal, Upper Nile of southern Sudan are being conducted by Save the
Children Sweden, Oxfam and the Sudanese Red Crescent. Childrens’ groups,
drama, songs, sports, posters, booklets, billboards and other promotional
material are intensively used together with a mine risk education training
package for children, teachers, and NGO
workers.[45]
In an emergency revision of the UN interagency consolidated appeal for Sudan
for 2002, issued in March, numerous new projects are proposed for the Nuba area.
UNICEF has budgeted $40,000 for mine risk education in the Nuba Mountains on the
rebel side, to be conducted by SIMAS, and a further $40,000 for similar work on
the government side. Save the Children Fund USA has also planned to expand into
mine risk education.[46]
OSIL conducted mine awareness in Yei and Nimule, supported by a MAG Community
Liaison Adviser. OSIL as targeted primary and secondary school children, adults
and working children in market places, church and mosque attendees, and returned
refugees. OSI uses a variety of mine risk education materials, including role
play, songs and games, posters, story books, and
videos.[47]
LANDMINE CASUALTIES
At a seminar on landmines in June 2001, the former
commissioner of the Humanitarian Aid Commission, Hussein el Obaid, reported that
there had been 123 landmine casualties already in
2001.[48]
There is presently no nationwide mechanism to collect data on landmine
casualties in Sudan, although the SLIRI network aims to do so. Limited data on
landmine casualties in the Nuba Mountains has been reported, which gives an
indication of the magnitude of the problem. It is believed that many casualties
are not reported, as an unknown number of landmine victims die before reaching
medical assistance. The true casualty figures are likely to be much higher than
reported.
The government of Sudan reportedly states that between 1989 and 2001,
landmines incidents caused 1,135 casualties in the Nuba
Mountains,[49] which is similar
to the Nuba Relief, Rehabilitation and Development Organization records of 1,129
mine casualties for the same period. The NRRDO acknowledges that the data does
not include all those killed in an
incident.[50] An SPLA Commander
provided information on 1,137 casualties from 35 villages, including both
government and SPLA-controlled
areas.[51] It is not known to
what extent the casualty data overlaps.
Save the Children-USA reported 16 landmine casualties in south Kordofan
States, and another 12 antitank mine incidents involving six commercial
vehicles, three military trucks, and three tractors between December 2000 and
December 2001.[52] In 2001,
NRRDO evacuated 25 mine casualties to Lokichokio for medical treatment; 29 were
evacuated in 2000.[53] An Oxfam
GB/Save the Children Sweden mine risk education project annual report from
Malakal, Upper Nile, provided information on mine casualties that reached the
local hospital: two women and six children were killed and four others were
seriously injured.[54] The
Sudanese Red Crescent reported on landmines/UXO casualties in the Kassala area
during the period March 2001 - March 2002: one shepherd killed and one child
injured by antipersonnel mines; three people killed and 24 injured in UXO
explosions; 15 people injured by antivehicle
mines.[55]
Casualties continue to be reported in 2002. In February, two people were
killed in Kadugli province, and in March another person was killed in the Talodi
area by antipersonnel mines.[56]
In May, eleven people were killed and fifteen others injured when the vehicle in
which they were traveling hit a landmine. The casualties were local officials
from Warap State on their way to visit a food security
program.[57]
SURVIVOR ASSISTANCE
In general, the assistance available to landmine
survivors, from both the government and the international community, is
irregular and not sufficient to address the size of the
problem.[58] Years of war
seriously damaged the healthcare system, and for many people living in remote
areas, the nearest medical facilities are days of travel away. According to a
recent report, in the Nuba Mountains there was only one doctor for every 300,000
people and health workers are often insufficiently trained or equipped to treat
patients.[59]
The ICRC’s medical assistance activities in Sudan include first aid
training and providing comprehensive medical and surgical care to the
war-wounded and other surgical emergencies, including landmine casualties, at
its two referral hospitals. These are the ICRC Lopiding surgical hospital in
Lokichokio in northern Kenya and, as support to existing local structures, the
government-run Juba Teaching Hospital (JTH). The ICRC airlift emergency cases
from Sudan to the hospital in Lokichokio; 300 were transferred between July and
September alone. In 2001, the two hospitals treated 45 mine/UXO casualties.
Limited surgical assistance and medical supplies were provided to Wau's two
hospitals, one for military and one for civilians. Support is also given to
approximately 15 primary health care facilities in southern
Sudan.[60]
Inside the rebel controlled Nuba area, Save
the Children USA and MSF Holland established new health clinics, in Como and
Limoon, prior to the cease-fire in addition to the existing German Emergency
Doctors hospital in Luweri. However, all suffer shortages of doctors and
medical supplies.[61]
In July 2002, the World Health Organization (WHO) started a training program
for medical assistants to treat landmine casualties in the Nuba Mountains.
Initially the health workers will provide emergency assistance to the demining
operations. WHO will also train 50 medical assistants, 150 nurses and 50 first
aid staff of Kadugli-based NGOs with the intention of building the health
capacity in the area. The training course was organized in collaboration with
the South Kordofan State government, and the Federal Ministry of
Health.[62]
The ICRC supports the National Corporation for Prosthetics and Orthotics
(NAPCO). In 2001, NAPCO assisted 991 amputees, including 158 landmine
survivors. Both the ICRC and WHO provide training for local staff, who are
provided by the government of Sudan, through Ministry of Social Planning &
Development and Ministry of Defense. NAPCO provides free services to military
personnel and charges 50 percent to
civilians.[63] In 2001, ICRC
activities included: on-the-job training for Khartoum staff in prosthetics,
orthotics, and physiotherapy; intensive training courses for technicians from
Nyala and Juba; equipment was provided to start local production of crutches
using recycled polypropylene; transport was provided for 15 patients from Wau
and two from Malakal for treatment in Khartoum; and prosthetic manufacturing
equipment was provided to the Norwegian Association for the Disabled (NAD)
center in Juba.[64]
The ICRC’s Lopiding Hospital, with its annexed prosthetic-orthotic
center in Lokichokio, has continued to provide physical rehabilitation to
amputees and other disabled people from across the border in rebel-held areas of
Southern Sudan since 1992. In 2001, 365 prostheses were fitted, of which 91 were
for mine survivors. In addition, 1,299 crutches and walking sticks were
produced using recycled polypropylene, and 23 tricycles, produced by the
Physically Disabled of Kenya, were also
distributed.[65]
The Sudanese Association for the Care and Rehabilitation of War Victims
(ABRAR) provides support to 650 war victims, including 153 landmine survivors.
ABRAR works with very limited resources to provide medical assistance as well as
psychosocial and economic support. ABRAR is advocating for a disability policy
and legislation that supports the victims of war, including landmine
survivors.[66]
DISABILITY POLICY AND PRACTICE
According to a government report, landmine
survivors have access to free medical treatment in the public and NGO hospitals,
and a Presidential decision protects the jobs of government employees who are
disabled by landmines.[67]
[1] Statements made at the second national
seminar on landmines organized by the government’s Humanitarian Aid
Commission, Khartoum, 18 June 2001. [2]
“Statement of Sudan delegation to the Intersessional Meeting of Experts on
Implementation of Ottawa Convention on Banning Anti personnel Landmines,”
delivered by Dr. Sulafeldin Salih Mohamed, Commissioner General, Humanitarian
Aid Commission, Geneva, May 2002. [3]
Interview with Hasabo Mohamed Abdolrahman, Head of Peace Administration,
Humanitarian Aid Commission, Khartoum, 17 March
2002. [4] Interview with Commander Nhial
Deng Nhial, SPLM Foreign Minister, London, 2 March 2002. The SPLA first orally
committed to the Geneva Call on 27 March 2000, in Geneva, though SPLA mine use
apparently continued after that
point. [5] The Sudan People’s
Liberation Movement is the largest opposition group. Its armed forces are the
SPLA. [6] Interview with Commander Nhial
Deng Nhial, SPLM Foreign Minister, London, 2 March
2002. [7] “Sudan: The scourge of
landmines,” Africa News, Issue 68, November
2001. [8] Interview with SPDF leader
Riek Machar Teny Dhurgon, London, 2 March
2002. [9] “Sudan Report to the
Meeting of the Standing Committees of Experts on Mine Clearance, Victim
Assistance, Socio-Economic Reintegration And Status, Operation of the Ottawa
Convention on Banning Antipersonnel Land Mines,” Geneva, 7 May 2001, pp.
3-4, hereinafter cited as “Sudan Report Geneva, 7 May 2001;”
Landmine Monitor Report 2001, pp.
223-224. [10] Letter from Abdellati
Abdelkheir, Deputy Commissioner, Humanitarian Aid Commission-Sudan, to Mary
Wareham, Coordinator, Landmine Monitor, 29 July
2001. [11] Sudan Report Geneva, 7 May
2001, p. 3. [12] “Ugandan army
finds large rebel arms cache in Southern Sudan,” Agence France Presse
(Kampala), 17 April 2002; Report by Osike Felix, New Vision, 30 March 2002, p.
1, referred to antipersonnel mines. Sudan has been accused in the past of
supplying arms to the LRA. [13] See
Landmine Monitor Report 2001, pp. 224-227 and Landmine Monitor Report 2000, pp.
183-186, for details about prior accusations and denials of mine
use. [14] Statement by Dr. Sulafeldein
S. Mohamed, Humanitarian Aid Commissioner to the Third Meeting of States
Parties, Managua, Nicaragua, 18-21 September 2001. Other officials making
denials of mine use include: General Mohamed Abdelgadir, head of the army
engineering corps, and Abdelkareem Abdelmoula, Minister of International
Cooperation, in statements to the government organized second national seminar
on landmines on 18 June 2001; General Abdelrahman Sirelkhatim in a statement
addressing the opening of a workshop on landmine victims organized by the Abrar
Organization, 26 October 2001; and, Siddig Mujtaba, State Minister of Culture
and Tourism, in a statement to the forum on landmines organized by the UNESCO
Clubs, 20 March 2002. Delegates from Sudan have also issued denials to Landmine
Monitor representatives at the Standing Committee meetings in Geneva in January
and May 2002. [15] “Statement of
Sudan delegation to the Intersessional Meeting of Experts on Implementation of
Ottawa Convention on Banning Anti personnel Landmines,” delivered by Dr.
Sulafeldin Salih Mohamed, Commissioner General, Humanitarian Aid Commission,
Geneva, May 2002. [16] See Landmine
Monitor Report 2001, p. 227. [17] UN
Inter-Agency Consolidated Appeal for Sudan, 2002, Executive
Summary. [18] Interview with an OLS
security official, Loki, 18 March
2002. [19] Interview with Commander
Nhial Deng, Nairobi, 10 April 2002. [20]
Interview with Lt. Maluk Roya, SPLA Nuba Engineering Officer, Moro Hills,
Nugurban County, 24 March 2002. [21]
Sudan Landmine Information and Response Network, “Explosive Remnants of
War in the Nuba Mountains: An Emergency Field Assessment,” March 2002, p.
12. [22] Interview with a WFP liaison
officer, Loki, 16 March 2002. [23]
Interview with Mohamed Osman, Kauda (Nuba Mountains), 30 March
2002. [24] UNMAS, “Portfolio of
Mine-Related Projects,” February 2002, p.
220. [25] Interview Archbishop Paulino
Lukudu, President of the Sudan Catholic Bishops’ Conference, London, 2
March 2002. [26] Interview with Bishop
Parade Taban, head of the Catholic Diocese of Torit, London, 2 March
2002. [27] Written statement to Landmine
Monitor following a question raised at a book launch, Reform Club, London, 5
February 2002. Prendergast is currently co-director of the Africa Program of
the International Crisis Group. [28]
Interview with Reverend Stephan Tut, South Sudan Post, Loki, 4 April
2002. [29] Interview with official from
SIMAS, Nairobi, 12 March 2002. [30] For
details see, Sudan Landmine Information and Response Network, “Explosive
Remnants of War in the Nuba Mountains: An Emergency Field Assessment,”
March 2002. [31] Statement at a press
conference by Xavier Marshal, Head of EC Delegation, Khartoum, 3 March
2002. [32] Sahafa daily, 2 March
2002. [33] Interview with Matthias
Meyer, German Ambassador to Sudan, 24 March
2002. [34] UNMAS statement to Landmine
Monitor, 25 April 2002. [35] OSIL
Monthly reports. See also 2001 annual
report. [36] “What Can You Get for
a Fiver?” OSIL donor update, August
2001. [37] Interview with Pers
Holmsgaard, Deputy Director of OSIL, Nairobi, 4 April
2002. [38] Interview with Aleu A. Aleu,
Director of OSIL, Nairobi, 5 April
2002. [39]
Ibid. [40] Email to Landmine Monitor
(HRW) from Tim Carstairs, Director of Policy, MAG, 25 July
2002. [41] “U.S. Demining
Assistance to Sudan,” U.S. State Department Media Note, Office of the
Spokesman, Washington, DC, 23 April
2002. [42] Telephone interview with
Colonel Thomas Seal, Deputy Director of the Office of Humanitarian Demining
Programs, U.S. State Department, 29 April
2002. [43] U.S. Department of State,
Fact Sheet, “Humanitarian Mine Action Subgroup Minutes of June 14, 2002
Meeting,” 10 July 2002. [44]
UNMAS, “Report of the UNMAS Emergency Mine Action Project in Sudan: May
2002,” 3 June 2002. [45] Kassala
Mine Awareness Project Evaluation, February
2002. [46] UN Consolidated Inter-Agency
Appeal for Sudan 2002 (Revised), 3 April
2002. [47] Email to Landmine Monitor
(HRW) from Tim Carstairs, Director of Communications, MAG, 25 July
2002. [48] Yahya el Hassan,
“Landmines claim 70,000 victims in Sudan,” Pan African News Agency
(PANA), 19 June 2001. [49] “Sudan:
Food deliveries vital for Nuba ceasefire,” UNOCHA Integrated Regional
Information Network, 27 May 2002. [50]
Landmines in the Nuba Mountains, SLIRI Emergency Field Assessment – March
2002, 4 April 2002. [51]
Ibid. [52] Save the Children USA reports
from the Nuba Mountains. [53] Yousif
Ali, Mine Coordinator, NRRDO. [54] Oxfam
GB – annual report to Save the Children Sweden, September
2001. [55] Information provided by SRC
to Landmine Monitor March 2002. [56]
Save the Children-USA Updates, February and March
2002. [57] “Landmine Kills Over 10
Officials Near Wau”, Khartoum Monitor, 4 May 2002, accessed at
http://www.khartoummonitor.com/news44.htm (7 July
2002). [58] Interview with Hasabo
Mohamed Abdolrahman, Head of Peace Administration, HAC, 17 March
2002. [59] “The Key to Peace:
Unlocking the Human Potential of Sudan,” Interagency Paper, May 2002, p.
27, prepared by Save the Children, Christian Aid, Oxfam, CARE, IRC, and
TEARFUND. [60] ICRC (Geneva), Special
Report, Mine Action 2001, July 2002, p. 21; and Sudan, Update on ICRC
Activities, 30 November 2001, accessed at
http://www.icrc.org. [61] Landmine
Monitor field work, March-April 2002; interview with SPLA Nuba Commander
Abdelaziz Adam el Helu, 22 April 2002; see also Landmine Monitor Report 2001,
pp. 232-233. [62] “WHO trains
health workers in Nuba Mountains,” Khartoum Monitor, 20 June 2002,
accessed at http://www.khartoummonitor.com/news177.htm (7 July
2002). [63] Interview with Abdeldaim
Elmagbol, Administrative Manager, NAPCO, Khartoum, 10 March
2002. [64] ICRC Physical Rehabilitation
Programmes, Annual Report 2001, accessed at
http://www.icrc.org. [65] ICRC Special
Report: Mine Action 2001, p. 21. [66]
Report from Najat Salih, Executive Director, ABRAR, to Landmine Monitor, March
2002. [67] Sudan Report Geneva, 7 May
2001; see also Landmine Monitor Report 2001, p. 232.
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