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Korea, South

Last Updated: 23 August 2014

Cluster Munition Ban Policy

Policy

The Republic of Korea (South Korea) has not acceded to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

South Korea has expressed support for the humanitarian objectives of the convention, but has stated that “the unique security situation on the Korean peninsula” means that it is “unable to take an active stance on the Convention on Cluster Munitions which bans the use of all cluster munitions.”[1] It has said, “We value the intent of the [convention], but considering the current relations between the North and the South, we can’t sign it.”[2] South Korea has also described cluster munitions as legitimate weapons that are “efficient…in deterring enemy attacks.”[3]

South Korea has long expressed its preference for cluster munitions to be regulated by the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW).[4] In November 2013, South Korea stated that the CCW “has provided an effective and practical forum to lead crucial discussions on way[s] to duly regulate weapons such as mines and cluster munitions which remain employed by States Parties for security reasons.”[5] South Korea has not indicated if its policy on banning cluster munitions will be reviewed following the 2011 failure by the CCW to conclude a protocol on cluster munitions, which ended its deliberations on cluster munitions and has left the Convention on Cluster Munitions as the sole multilateral instrument that specifically addresses the weapons.

South Korea did not participate in any meetings of the Oslo Process that resulted in the Convention on Cluster Munitions.[6] South Korea did attend the convention’s Signing Conference in Oslo in December 2008 as an observer and made a statement.

South Korea has not participated in any meetings of the Convention on Cluster Munitions since 2008.

South Korea has voted in favor of UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolutions condemning the Syrian government’s use of cluster munitions, including Resolution 68/182 on 18 December 2013, which expressed “outrage” at Syria’s “continued widespread and systematic gross violations of human rights…including those involving the use of…cluster munitions.”[7]

South Korea, as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council, endorsed Security Council Resolution 2155 on 27 May 2014, which expressed concern at the use of cluster munitions in South Sudan and called for “all parties to refrain from similar such use in the future.”[8]

South Korea is not party to the Mine Ban Treaty. It is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons.

Use

In April 2012, South Korea confirmed that it has not used cluster munitions.[9]

Production

South Korea produces rockets, bombs, and projectiles containing submunitions and has licensed the production of artillery projectiles containing submunitions in Pakistan. South Korea has also exported cluster munitions. It has imported and licensed the production of cluster munitions from the United States (US). It is thought to possess a significant stockpile of cluster munitions.

In 2005, the Ministry of National Defense said that “South Korea stopped production of old types of cluster munitions,” and the “cluster munitions currently in production have a high level of reliability and most are equipped with [self-destruct] mechanisms.”[10] According to a US diplomatic cable dated May 2007, a senior Ministry of National Defense official informed the US that “more than 90 percent” of South Korea’s stockpile of cluster munitions were of the non-self-destructing kind and “the cost of retrofitting them would be prohibitive.”[11] In August 2008, the Ministry of National Defense adopted a directive requiring that it only acquire cluster munitions with self-deactivation devices and a 1% or lower failure rate, and recommending “the development of alternative weapon systems which could potentially replace cluster munitions in the long run.”[12]

Two companies in South Korea, Hanwha and Poongsan, produce cluster munitions.[13] Hanwha has acknowledged that it has produced M261 Multi-Purpose Submunition rockets for the Hydra-70 air-to-ground rocket system, as well as KCBU-58B cluster bombs.[14] In April 2012, South Korea informed the Monitor that Hanwha produced 42,800 dual purpose improved conventional munition (DPICM) extended-range (base bleed) 155mm artillery projectiles in 2011.[15]

Poongsan has advertised a 155mm projectile containing 88 submunitions designated DPICM TP, and another 155mm projectile with submunitions designated DPICM K305.[16] In 2009, Poongsan listed among its products the following two types of 155mm artillery projectiles that contain submunitions: K308 DPICM TP, containing 88 K224 submunitions, and K310 DPICM B/B, containing 49 K221 submunitions.[17] Poongsan entered into a licensed production agreement with Pakistan Ordnance Factories in November 2004 to co-produce K310 155mm extended-range (base bleed) DPICM projectiles in Pakistan.[18]

The US concluded a licensing agreement with South Korea in 2001 for production of DPICM submunitions for multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) rockets.[19]

According to the 2012 NGO report “Worldwide Investments in Cluster Munitions: a shared responsibility,” at least 22 Korean financial entities are involved in investments in manufacturers of cluster munitions.[20]

Transfers

South Korea has imported a variety of cluster munitions from the US. It is known to possess M26 rockets, M26A1 extended-range rockets, and ATACMS missiles for its MLRS launchers. Between 1993 and 1999, the US provided 393 M26A1 extended-range rocket pods, 271 M26 rocket pods, 111 ATACMS-1 missiles, and 111 ATACMS missiles.[21] South Korea also stockpiles several artillery projectiles with DPICM submunitions (M483A1, M864, and M509A1) imported from the US.[22] In 2001, the US supplied South Korea with 16 of each of the following cluster bombs: CBU-87, CBU-97, CBU-103, and CBU-105.[23] Jane’s Information Group lists it as possessing CBU-87 and Rockeye cluster bombs.[24]

On 1 June 2012, the US Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible sale of 367 CBU-105D/B Sensor Fuzed Weapons to South Korea at an estimated cost of US$325 million including associated parts, equipment, and logistical support.[25] The Convention on Cluster Munitions bans sensor-fuzed weapons. US law bans the export of nearly all US cluster munitions, but permits the export of the CBU-105 version of the Sensor Fuzed Weapon, since this variant meets a 99% submunition reliability criteria. In May 2014, the US Defense Department confirmed a contract to be completed by December 2016 for US company Textron Defense Systems to construct 361 cluster bomb units for foreign military sale to South Korea.[26]

In 2008, Hanwha apparently exported an unknown quantity of M261 Multi-Purpose Submunition rockets (each containing nine M73 submunitions) to Pakistan.[27]

Stockpile

The current size and content of South Korea’s stockpile of cluster munitions is not known. In 2005, South Korea’s Ministry of National Defense acknowledged that it “maintains stockpiles of old types of cluster munitions with a high failure rate” and stated, “There are currently no plans to upgrade these holdings…Equipping old types of submunitions with [self-destruct] mechanisms is not considered feasible due to technical and financial problems.”[28] In April 2012, South Korea informed the Monitor that it had destroyed 27 cluster munitions during the previous year.[29]

 



[1] Statement of South Korea, UN General Assembly (UNGA) First Committee on Disarmament and International Security, New York, 11 October 2009.

[2] “Facing military confrontation, South Korea clings to cluster munitions,” Mainichi Daily News, 8 December 2008. For more details on South Korea’s policy and practice regarding cluster munitions through early 2009, see Human Rights Watch (HRW) and Landmine Action, Banning Cluster Munitions: Government Policy and Practice (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, May 2009), pp. 217–219.

[3] Statement by Amb. Dong-hee Chang, Permanent Mission of the Republic of Korea to the UN in Geneva, Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) Group of Governmental Experts on Cluster Munitions, Geneva, 14 December 2008.

[4] Statement of South Korea, CCW Fourth Review Conference, Geneva, 14 November 2011.

[5] Statement of South Korea, CCW 2013 Meeting of States Parties, 14 November 2013.

[6] In September 2011, Wikileaks released a United States (US) Department of State cable from January 2007 that stated that South Korea apparently considered participating in the first meeting of the Oslo Process as an observer, because it was reportedly concerned that the cluster munition “issue will be co-opted just as the landmine issue was in the Ottawa process.” “ROKG supportive of US position on cluster munitions,” US Department of State cable 07SEOUL219 dated 23 January 2007, released by Wikileaks on 1 September 2011. In September 2011, Wikileaks released five US Department of State cables from 2007 that showed that South Korean officials discussed the Oslo Process on several occasions with officials from the US government. In February 2007, a Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade official reportedly told US officials that the South Korean government decided against attending the Oslo Conference on Cluster Munitions in February 2007 because of its “understanding that the United Kingdom and the United States would not attend.” “ROKG will not attend Oslo CM conference,” US Department of State cable 07SEOUL374 dated 7 February 2007, released by Wikileaks on 1 September 2011.

[7]Situation of human rights in the Syrian Arab Republic,” UNGA Resolution A/RES/68/182, 18 December 2013. The Republic of Korea voted in favor of a similar resolution on 15 May 2013.

[9] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Il Jae Lee, Second Secretary, Disarmament and Nonproliferation Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 4 April 2012. South Korea has stated on several occasions that it has never used cluster munitions. See statement by Amb. Dong-hee Chang, Permanent Mission of the Republic of Korea to the UN in Geneva, CCW Group of Governmental Experts on Cluster Munitions, Geneva, 7 July 2008.

[10] Communication from the Ministry of National Defense through the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Korea to the UN in Geneva to IKV Pax Christi Netherlands, 3 June 2005.

[11] The Ministry of National Defense reportedly informed the US that “the ROK military was not in a position to dismantle its current CM stockpiles, prohibit CM production or development, or replace their stockpiles with effective alternative weapon systems for at least the next 20 years.” “ROKG supports USG cluster munitions policy,” US Department of State cable07SEOUL1329 dated 7 May 2007, released by Wikileaks on 30 August 2011.

[12] Statement of South Korea, UNGA First Committee, New York, 11 October 2009. See also statement of South Korea, CCW Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 13 November 2008; and statement of South Korea, UNGA First Committee, New York, 30 October 2008.

[13] Both companies were excluded from investment under the Norwegian Petroleum Fund’s ethical guidelines for producing cluster munitions, Poongsan in December 2006 and Hanwha in January 2008. For more details on production by these companies, see HRW and Landmine Action, Banning Cluster Munitions: Government Policy and Practice (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, May 2009), p. 219.

[14] Norwegian Ministry of Finance, “Recommendation on exclusion of the companies Rheinmetall AG and Hanwha Corp.,” 15 May 2007.

[15] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Il Jae Lee, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 4 April 2012. The response also stated that Hanwha produced 6,150 227mm multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) during the year.

[16] Letter from Council on Ethics for the Norwegian Government Pension Fund – Global to the Norwegian Ministry of Finance, “Recommendation of 6 September 2006,” 6 September 2006.

[18] “Pakistan Ordnance Factory and S. Korean Firm Sign Ammunition Pact,” Asia Pulse (Karachi), 24 November 2006.

[19] Notification to Congress pursuant to Section 36 (c) and (d) of the Arms Export Control Act, Transmittal No. DTC 132–00, 4 April 2001.

[20] IKV Pax Christi and FairFin, “Worldwide Investments in Cluster Munitions: a shared responsibility,” June 2012, pp.18−22.

[21] US Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Department of Defense, “Notifications to Congress of Pending U.S. Arms Transfers,” “Foreign Military Sales,” “Direct Commercial Sales,” and “Excess Defense Articles” databases. M26 rockets each contain 644 submunitions, and there are six rockets to a pod. M26A1 rockets have 518 submunitions each. ATACMS-1 missiles have 950 submunitions each.

[22] M483A1 shells have 88 submunitions, whereas M864 have 72 submunitions.

[23] US Defense Security Cooperation Agency, “Republic of Korea - F-15E/K Aircraft Munitions and Avionics,” Press release, 15 February 2001. It also provided 45 AGM-54 joint stand-off weapons (JSOW) bombs, but it is not known if these were the version with submunitions.

[24] Robert Hewson, ed., Jane’s Air Launched Weapons, Issue 44 (Surrey, UK: Jane’s Information Group Limited, 2004), p. 841. CBU-87 bombs have 202 submunitions, and Rockeye cluster bombs have 247 submunitions.

[25] The agreement requires “a statement by the Government of the Republic of Korea that the cluster munitions and cluster munitions technology will be used only against clearly defined military targets and will not be used where civilians are known to be present or in areas normally inhabited by civilians.” This statement is required by the US law that bans the export of cluster munitions other than sensor-fuzed weapons. “Republic of Korea – CBU-105D/B Sensor Fuzed Weapons,” DSCA News Release No. 12-23, 4 June 2012.

[26] South Korea Buying GPS-Guided WCMD Cluster Bombs,” Defense Industry Daily, 29 May 2014.

[27] See HRW and Landmine Action, Banning Cluster Munitions: Government Policy and Practice (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, May 2009), p. 219.

[28] Communication from the Ministry of National Defense through the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Korea to the UN in Geneva to IKV Pax Christi Netherlands, 3 June 2005.

[29] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Il Jae Lee, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 4 April 2012. The question asked if any old or unstable cluster munitions had been destroyed during the year.